BRITAIN AND JAPAN

Evening Post, Volume CXXIV, Issue 14, 16 July 1937, Page 9

BRITAIN AND JAPAN

MOVE FOR AGREEMENT

EAST HOPE! AS A BARRIER

FINDING A FORMULA

During the recent session of the Diet, both the Premier, General Hayashi, and his Foreign Minister. Mr. j Sato, voiced a hope for improved) relations with Great Britain, writes j H. G. W. Woodhead from Shanghai to •the "Sydney Morning Herald." London cables of recent days indicate that an attempt is now being made to translate that hope into j reality. Mr. Yoshida, Japanese Ambas- j sador to the Court of St. James, is reported to have sounded the British j Foreign Office regarding the possibility j of a "new deal" in the Far East. The proposals he is stated to have submitted do not include formal recog-1 nition of Manchukuo, to which it would be impossible for the British Government to consent without the approval of the Council of the League of Nations. Japan apparently, in return for British recognition of her special economic and strategic position in the Far East, is prepared to "ive pledges regarding the tern tonal fntegrity of China, and to co-operate with Britain, America, and France in financing the rehabilitation of that country. . . This gesture is significant, and it is to be hoped will not prove unfruitful, though the difficulties of a rapprochement on the lines suggested will not be easily surmounted. There is reason to believe that their existence is fully appreciated in Japanese diplomatic circles. , . . Two Anglo-Japanese issues which have not contributed towards good feeling between the two nations have recently been settled—the perpetual lease question on terms favOjrable to Japan, and the Keelung incident, by giving satisfaction lo Great Britain. Assuming that the establishment of Manchukuo is now regarded in British official circles as a "fait accompli, the main obstacles to an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement today are the activities of the Japanese Army in North China, and the restrictions imposed upon Japanesee manufacturers in various portions of the British Empire. EAST HOPEI PROBLEM. It may be taken for granted that. desirous though she may be of regaining Japanese friendship, Britain will not consider any arrangement that would involve letting down China, or estranging the United States. She may be willing to ignore the status of Manchukuo, but she will not recognise the existence of the so-called East Hopei Autonomous Anti-Communist Council, or condone the continuance of smuggling through the coastline of its territory. There is reason to believe that responsible Japanese recognise the necessity of liquidating Yin Ju-keng's farcical regime as a preliminary to improved relations either with China or with Britain and the United States. The recent Japanese Economic Mission, though it did not as a body visit East Hopei, left China under no illusions as to the possibility of improved Sino-Japanese relations while the East Hopei Autonomous Council continued to exist. But even in those Japanese tircles which have criticised the establishment of this regime from the outset there' is some apprehension as to the consequences of its abolition. It was one of Great Britain's earliest and ablest Envoys, Sir Harry Parkes, who expressed the view that the Chinese were a nation that would yield everything to force, and nothing to reason. There has been a disposition to regard the aftermath of the surrender of the British Concession at Hankow, in 1927, as proof that this is no longer true. Under the present Anglo-Chinese Municipal Council, the former Concession is undoubtedly being efficiently and progressively administered. But it would be no exaggeration to state that the 1927 surrender was the indirect cause of the whole trouble in Manchuria. When a Power of Great Britain's prestige could be thus brought to its knees, thought the Nationalists, there was no need to be conciliatory to Japan. Japan's treaty rights and other interests in Manchuria were consistently ignored, and all attempts at c settlement were frustrated by the policy of "passing the buck," and repassing it, betw.een Mukden and Nanking. It was not realised that, whereas Hankow was relatively unimportant to Great Britain, Manchuria was regarded as vitally important by Japan, who had fought two wars to establish her rights therein. TURNED TO THE POWERS. When Japan's patience had been overtried, and she struck, it was not on her own resources —military or diplomatic—that China relied. She demanded assistance and protection from other Powers, principally from Britain, whose interests and whose nationals had suffered so grievously from nationalist excesses. The present satisfactory condition of affairs in the former British Concession at Hankow may be attributed, to no small extent, to the desire to emphasise that today "Co'dlin" (Britain) is the friend, not the Jana^L".s* < "Short"). Today even the most liberal-minded Japanese are asking themselves what would be the result of liquidating East H"DRi They have' to deal with a China far more united than hitherto, which summoned up courage last autumn to reject Japan's proposals for a settlement of Sino-Japanese differences, and even to put forward counter-demands. Would there be any possibility, it is asked, of a Sino-Jap-anese agreement, which recognised legitimate Japanese political and economic interests, if there were any suggestion of a weakening in Japanese policy? The artificial East Hopei regime is undoubtedly regarded in Tokio as a pledge which cannot be released until China has demonstrated that such release will produce evidence of good will—not arrogance—on her part, i On the other hand, Japanese assurances regarding China's territorial integrity must appear unconvincing in London and in Washington while East Hooei retains its pseudo-independence. The Chinese have a proverb to the effect that once astride of a tiger it is safer to ride it than dismount. That appears to be Japan's position at the morn-ent. She is at heart willing to dismount, but is fearful of the consequences. ~ , , Whether it would be possible to satisfy the Japanese demand for recognition of Japan's special economic and strategic position in the Far East would depend upon the formula proposed by Tokio. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1905 recognised Japan's "Paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea." The Consortium Agreement of October. 1920, to which British, American, French, and Japanese banking group., were parties, with the approval cf their respective Governments, was only concluded after Japan had made stipulations which in effect established special rights in Manchuria. In the Lan-sing-Tsnii Notes of November. 1317 frenounced in April. 1923) the American Government recognised that "Japan

has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." SPECIAL INTERESTS. It. would be futile to deny broad sense Japan does have special Interests" in China. Her trade witn | h country is relatively of inrtuitely; greater importance to her than is Br?un's or America's trade with China. The difficulty arises when Japan m-'self-defence within her own territory always remembering that should Japan's naval and military armaments be increased to an extent that exceeds legitimate defence requirements Bii tain—and America—must reseive tne right to counter with the .strengthenIng of fortifications in their own Fat Eastern bases. " The British Government has undoubtedly viewed with concern the increasing isolation of Japan. It does not regard such isolation as making for peace and stable cond. ions m the Far East. It cannot concede to Japan a monopoly in the maintenance of that peace and stability. British co-opera-tion with Japan must depend upon Japan's willingness to ?°-operatealso with China and the United States. It has been made clear in recent pronouncements of British foreign policy that the British Government has no intention ot seeking friendship with a Power or group of Powers at the expense of alienating, or condoning, acts of aggression against another. It it be true that Japan proposes financial assistance in the rehabilitation of China from America, Britain, France, and herself, it may reasonably be inferred that, in the opinion of the Tokio Foreign Office, the day for isolation has gone. If that be so, a formula for the renewal of co-opera-tion in the Far East ought not to present insuperable difficulties. The real difficulty lies in establishing a basis for such co-operation by a settlement of Sino-Japanese differences. It can only be suggested in this connection that this might be simplified by British mediation or advice, if both parties are agreeable to such a course.