Evening Post. THURSDAY, MARCH 4, 1937. COVENANT AND LOCARNO
"The obligations of the Covenant ■of the League of Nations," stated Mr. Eden in his latest speech, "are less far-reaching, /less specific, and less . precise than the Locarno obligations.1' He made this statement to the House of Commons in order to drive.home the point that Locarno has been, and can I be again, a definite political-military force within the framework of the League, but that the League itself is not ( such a force. When Britain, France, Belgium, and Germany agreed to help each other against unprovoked, aggression by anybody, it meant something; with Germany out, Britain's and France's undertaking to similarly help each other, and to protect Belgium against unprovoked aggression, still means something. It means that the undertaking will be given specific performance, and that the military part of it will have military expression on the first day that unprovoked aggression undeniably exists. It means also that the Powers giving the undertaking have formidable military forces ready to use in the affected region; and that, if aggression took place under the limited Locarno established by the Anglo-French undertakings, history would not again have to record, as it did record through the mouth of a k :British Foreign Secretary in 1935, that no Power save Britain had moved a ship or a gun or a man against a declared CoA'enant-breaker. In short, Locarno is a political-military agreement with military teeth that will bite at once against an aggressor within a defined region. Everybody knows that.
But everybody does not know-— worse still, nearly everybody now doubts—that the Covenant is an agreement with military teeth that will bite instantly in any region. Before the Abyssinian War, some people may have thought so; but, since the Duce "called the bluff," it is realised that the Covenant does not possess everywhere (nor anywhere) the biting force that, in its Western field, Locarno possesses. The facts speak for themselves. Arguing back from the facts to the terms of the Covenant, Mr. Eden now contends that the Covenant which, when flouted, did not produce a Locarno result, is also lacking in the Locarno obligations. The sentence which we have quoted was followed by these sentences:
• It might be argued that the Covenant obligations should be as precise respecting military action as Locarno, and that all nations ought to undertake in advance to have recourse to military sanctions, but that was not the Covenant. Such a commitment would not only go beyond the Covenant, but beyond the abortive Geneva Protocol of 1924. Was it the view of the Opposition that ,they should go beyond the Protocol now when the League was relatively in a much weaker condition? If the Opposition holds such* a view, then it is illogical to stand for universal military commitments, and not be ready to provide the necessary armaments.
"Universal military commitments." Tile phrase implies striking force not merely in a region or regions, but in all regions. In the absence of international trust, the cost and ihe responsibility must be immense. The League of Nations obviously is not equal to such a task, either morally or physically; and Mr. Eden adds that the Covenant does not provide for it in the only effective way— the Locarno way. Clearly Britain cannot undertake, as an individual, "Universal military commitments," and the League Covenant does not provide for such. "The Government could not and did not endorse universal military commitments, but it stood by the Covenant." ' Both the Covenant and Locarno are brakes on aggression. Locarno is a moralmilitary brake; the Covenant is at least a moral brake. Britain will guarantee military forces in the Western region; but will not guarantee to use military forces in Eastern Europe, or in any universal sense. Some people derive from this fundamental position the idea that the League will develop along the lines of regional anti-aggression pacts like Locarno, until the League is thus supported in all regions by undertakings that have real military teeth 'plus the will to use .them against aggression. That will implies common interest if only common regional interest. Whether the advance is to be along the lines of regionalism or not. nothing can be done without establishing common interest in those parts of Europe where it does not exist in the way that it exists as among ' Britain, France, and Belgium. A policy of military guarantee in the Western region, and of working for common interest elsewhere, is a policy "based on the Covenant." And that is the foreign policy of Britain. To say that Locarno is within the framework of the League of Nations is to say that Locarno is part of a whole. "The whole is greater than the part," but at a given 'time the whole may be less efficient than the part. Whether the advancement of the whole can be secured by copying the methods of the more efficient part is a question opening up mat-
ters beyond the scope of Mr. Eden's review. But he has set the Opposition the question: "How can Britain advance the cause of the Covenant better than by arming to strike where and when physical capacity and moral justification (anti-aggression) | permit, and by promoting peaceful settlements in other regions?" Is it suggested by the Opposition that Britain should seek to break (he Franco-Soviet Pact as being embarrassing to Locarno? That suggestion at any rate is not likely to come from the Labour section. It is far easier for Labour to say, as Mr. Grenfell says, that Britain should speak more firmly to Germany. Yet if he were in office he might discover how difficult it would he to speak to Germany and to rebuke her Ambassador's peculiarities and yet keep open the door for German reentry to Locarno. A British Foreign Secretary requires to lie many things. There is, however, no suggestion in Mr. Eden's speech that he is near the resignation-point as predicted by the "Daily Mail" at the beginning of his recent holiday.
Permanent link to this item
https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19370304.2.40
Bibliographic details
Evening Post, Volume CXXIII, Issue 53, 4 March 1937, Page 8
Word Count
1,002Evening Post. THURSDAY, MARCH 4, 1937. COVENANT AND LOCARNO Evening Post, Volume CXXIII, Issue 53, 4 March 1937, Page 8
Using This Item
Stuff Ltd is the copyright owner for the Evening Post. You can reproduce in-copyright material from this newspaper for non-commercial use under a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 3.0 New Zealand licence. This newspaper is not available for commercial use without the consent of Stuff Ltd. For advice on reproduction of out-of-copyright material from this newspaper, please refer to the Copyright guide.