NAVAL POLICY

Evening Post, Volume CXXIII, Issue 41, 18 February 1937, Page 20

NAVAL POLICY

AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE

PRESENT SQUADRON WEAK

CAPITAL SHIP NEED

The need for a revision of Australia's naval policy, in view of the grave weakening in the fighting power of the Australian naval squadron at a moment when the international situation was never more menacing, is emphasised in an article in the Melbourne "Age." The broad outline of Australia's naval policy and strategy is examined, and suggestions are made for filling in the gaps of the navy caused by honourable adherence to international treaties which other nations have either violated or declined to renew. Today the Australian Navy is weaker in defensive power than it -was during the war, says the "Age." It consists of only nine ships, the two 10,000-ton'cruisers, Australia and Canberra, the 7000-ton cruiser Sydney, the little flotilla leader Stuart (which has no full-strength flotilla to lead), the two destroyers, Vendetta and Waterhen, the two new sloops ' Yarra and Swan (just completed at Cockatoo Island dockyard), and the old surveying ship Moresby. There are four ships in reserve, comprising two destroyers, the 6000-ton sea-plane-carrier Albatross, and the 5000----ton light cruiser Adelaide, which became quite obsolete in 1932. per sister ship, the Brisbane, has already been broken up. To comply with the terms of the Washington Treaty, the magnificent battle cruiser Australia, after being dismantled, was towed 25 miles outside Sydney Heads in 1923 only ten years after* she had been built. A charge of gun cotton was placed in her engineroom, arid the ship rolled over and sank. Naval authorities admit that her powerful 12-inch guns would have made her a most valuable asset even today. And five destroyers, which had two more years of life before them, are being scrapped in Sydney in order to comply with the London Treaty. But Japan's attitude has made it impossible for either of these treaties to be renewed as was once anticipated. Both expired recentlyA VERY MINOR PARTNER. Weakened by former treaty provisions, hampered by lack of funds, especially during the depth of the depression, and impaired by public apathy (a position which is now fortunately being/reversed) the Australian naval squadron has had little opportunity of becoming anything more than a very minor partner with the British Navy. \ A bitter realisation of these facts has compelled our naval authorities to restrict their strategic policy to very narrow limits. What, then is this policy? It consists, broadly, in complete dependence on-the big battleships and battle cruisers of the British Navy for any possible major action with a class Power. The Australian naval squadron exists, in the view of naval authorities, to co-operate with the New Zealand naval squadron (which is now being supplied with munitions made in Australia, instead of in England, as was the case until a few months ago), and also with the British naval squadron stationed in China. None of these three squadrons possess any capital ships. The largest units are cruisers, and the best armed of them are those of the Canberra type. In the event of war in the Pacific the policy is for these three squadrons to act in concert, possibly under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the British squadron in China. But their action will necessarily be a delaying one until the arrival of British battleships which, it is assumed, will be on their way after refuelling at Singapore. It cannot be emphasised too strongly that naval authorities in all countries agree on this one cardinal feature of naval warfare, namely, that no naval action can be won and no defeat can be averted without the capital ships. Since the sinking of the battle cruiser Australia, the Commonwealth has not possessed a capital ship. "SUNK AT LEISURE." Discussing this matter the other day, a high naval officer said: "If Britain's capital ships were sunk the Empire would collapse like a pricked balloon. Australia, New Zealand, and all other parts of it would "be an easy prey to whatever hostile predatory nation was in possession of capital ships. Once capital ships are destroyed all the other units, the cruisers, detroyers, submarines, and so forth, can be mopped up at leisure." .'■■.,-. ■ In other words, Britain's fifteen capital ships are all that stand, humanly speaking, between the freedom of the

Empire and its enslavement to a foreign Power. The public, generally, is only too prone to forget that the last eighteen years of peace have been due to Britain's naval power (to the fifteen I capital ships), and that peace is menaced today largely because of the increased naval building of other Powers, notably Japan and Italy, to which must now be added Germany. And it is the close understanding which has developed so rapidly between these three nations during the past few months which makes Australia's naval position so entirely unsafe and inadequate, as, in the event of a world war, it is more than probable that the British Navy would be engaged in European waters, and no capital ships could be spared lor any action in the Pacific. - In view of all these grave circumstances, it is, clearly, extremely unsatisfactory for the Australian Navy to "be regarded as a skeleton squadron, which, in co-operation with other squadrons, might be able to protect a few merchant ships or even cities from sudden raids, but.would be utterly powerless against even one capital ship of a foreign Power. Once her squadron was demolished Australia could no longer toe said to be entirely self-contained, since ships carrying our exports would be quickly sunk, and, even if invasion was repelled., the economic structure of the Commonwealth would be almost destroyed by ; complete cessation of the export trade. A revision of naval policy is urgently needed, but this is impossible unless the naval estimates are increased. • ' BUILDING A NEW SHIP. | Another warship is to be built, and the Minister ,of Defence (Sir A. Parkhill) stated that it would be made in Australia, but that the type of ship to be constructed would depend upon the | result of conversations with the.British Admiralty. The.time cannot possibly . be more opportune for giving the very [ closest consideration to the buildingl of a capital ship. Cruisers, destroyers, sloops, and even an aircraft carrier have all been built at Cockatoo Island I dockyard, but when the suggestion is made for the building of a battleship or a battle cruiser the usual reply is "impossible." It is a word that has been frequently employed before other industries were eventually established with success in Australia. Another objection is that a capital ship ought not to be "all on its own" out in Australia, j but it was the presence here of the battle cruiser Australia "all on its own" during the war which saved Australian cities from suffering terrible bombardments from German cruisers. It should also be remembered that other nations with restricted finances and population 1 have not failed to include capital ships in their navies. The well-balanceed and efficient Argentine navy contains two 27,000-ton battleships armed vyith 12in guns, as well, as large fast cruisers and destroyers; Brazil has two dreadnoughts, each of 19,000 tons, with 12hr guns; Chile.has a 28,000-ton dreadnought, with 14in guns. The latter, built during the war, was formerly H.M.S. Canada, and is regarded as being a formidable ship even now. It gives the combined Chilean fleet a definite capital ship superiority over that of the Argentine. The capital ships of these three navies are, of course, assisted by cruisers and destroyers. BIG VESSELS INCLUDED. It will ■be seen that other nations whose naval expenditure is similar to that of Australia do not omit the allimportant capital ships from their; squadrons despite the fact that in a] conflict with any strong European or I Asiatic Power they could count on the assistance of the United States under the terms of the Monroe Doctrine. Previously Australia has been able to count upon the assistance of Britain, but the existing international situation, combined with Britain's geographical position and obligations to defend such a farflung Empire, have made it essential that Australia should provide? her own means of defence. . The cost of a capital ship would certainly be large, but not as large as Js spent in Australia in one year on invalid pensions, ot as much as was spent in one week by Britain at one stage of the war. It need not be another Rodney or Nelson, which each cost over £6,000,000 in England shortly after the war; the ship need not be of more than 20,000 tons, but it must have modern long-range guns of at least 12in calibre, -which cannot be fitted into any cruiser. It should replace (with modern improvements) our battle cruiser which was sunk fourteen years ago. . . i Great strides have been made during the past year in making Australia j self-contained in the manufacture of J guns and ammunition. The three defence services have worked together unselfishly within the ambit of our modest defence estimates (modest when compared on a per capita basis with the expenditure of other countries), but something more is needed for the sake of national security. The scrapped destroyers should be replaced. Difficulties in the way of constructing a battle cruiser in Australia are enormous, but greater difficulties were overcome during the war. The cost could be spread over several years while she j is in course of construction. Her completion would create a feeling of national pride in the navy. Although naval opinion in Britain and Australia is divided on the question of what Australia should do in the matter of building warships, those who advocate a strong and bolder naval policy should be supported. The issue hanging in the balance may well be existence or extinction. .: