NEXT TWO YEARS

Evening Post, Volume CXXIII, Issue 28, 3 February 1937, Page 11

NEXT TWO YEARS

A CRITICAL PERIOD

GATHERING WAR CLOUDS

GERMANY'S STRENGTH

What are the prospects of peace and war in Europe in these closing weeks of 1936? Let us attempt to draw the balance-sheet, wrote the famous French writer, Pertinax, in the New York "Herald-Tribune" recently.

The cardinal fact to place on record is the distinct weakening of the socalled system of collective security. In Geneva, the session of the Assembly which took place in September-Octo-ber brought deep discouragement to everyone concerned. Among the national delegations there was no longer any pretence of behaving as though the League of Nations could again be made a living force. The issue of the limitation of armaments, quietly dropped two years ago, was officially revived—but in a most unimpressive and ineffective manner. The sudden disappearance of the gold bloc gave rise to the idea that a conference of the greatest economic Powers could be summoned for the purpose of investigating how the channels of international trade could best be reopened. However, it soon dawned upon the promoters of the movement that President Roosevelt's adherence to the scheme could not be obtained in the midst of the electoral campaign and, moreover, that the most logical course was to wait for the end of the negotiations between the Ldcarnian Powers which, if successful, would eliminate, or at any rate relieve, the international tension. LOSS OF CONFIDENCE. But the most adverse factor was to be found in the extraordinary lack of trust and confidence shown by most delegates towards the Franco-British leadership. In that leadership _ rests whatever chance remains of achieving something on the collective principle. The rout suffered by the League when at grips with the Abyssinian problem has utterly discredited the London and' Paris Cabinets with other member States. Everywhere one finds the conviction that it would be futile to repair the Geneva machinery so long as the two great Governments of Western Europe have failed to prove they are ready to. assume full responsibility —by deeds as well as by words—for the maintenance of international law. Nobody had foreseen that the Assembly would revolt against Messrs. Delbos and Eden, rather than accept their suggestion that the Abyssinian delegation should be turned out, without further delay, from the .international institution. It is significant that Holland should have headed the movement—a country which feels that it is most exposed to the danger of a German invasion. The preparations made by the General Staff at The Hague to flood the land in an emergency bear witness to its fear. Holland therefore is more interested than any other nation in strengthening its old connection with England. In the same respect, consider the attitude of Belgium; A creation of the first Anglo-French entente cordiale a century ago, she now evinces the greatest reluctance to cast her lot with her two historical protectors and associates in the new Locarnian Treaty. She-.dreams— though ,it cannot, be more than a dream—of a policy of neutrality which would place her above the battles of the future. And the Belgian - Foreign Minister who indulges In such empty visions, who would withdraw from 'active co-operation with the two great democratic States, is. a Socialist! CONFUSED AND UNCERTAIN. Lacking Anglo-French leadership, the League has turned into a confused, uncertain group of nations. But, assuming that the policy of collective security could be revived by France and England—what about its possibilities of being translated into victory on the battlefield? We know that, last March, when Adolf Hitler freed himself from the Rhineland Pact of Locarno and ordered the Reichswehr into the demilitarised zone, the German General Staff hadcome to the conclusion that resistance would be inadvisable if the French Army took the offensive. It was agreed between the Fuhrer and his generals that, in such a case, the Reichswehr would withdraw. In other words, Hitler gambled upon the timidity and wobbling mood of the French Cabinet —and won. Today, despite all the steps that have been taken by Germany to strengthen its army,, most experts (French and foreign) believe that the preponderance of military power has not yet ceased to rest with France. Most competent observers anticipate that the German military machine will not reach its maximum of efficiency before the summer or the autumn of 1937. Meanwhile, it is true, the Rhineland will have been heavily fortified. This will lessen' to a material extent the capacity of the French army to make deep inroads into German territory, and has led many experts to believe that the practical value of France's assistance to her associates in Central and Eastern Europe is about to be reduced, if not wiped out. But other experts—and the highest loaders of the French army are reported to share in their opinion—insist that, even under the new circumstances, they will be able to keep the major portion of the German forces busy, and that the allies will be relieved and helped to a corresponding degree. IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. In the Mediterranean, the antagonism between Italy and England, an aftermath of the Abyssinian war, makes it doubtful whether, in wartime, the British and French fleets could ensure all the communications of strategic importance between the western and the eastern sections of that sea, or between metropolitan France and her African possessions—a reserve of man-power that could not be-dis-pensed with. But, hemmed in. between the progress of pan-Germanism in the Danubian countries and the speedy strengthening of the British position in the Mediterranean —especially through her close co-operation with Turkey—the Fascist Government can hardly expect to follow an independent line very much longer. Sooner or later it will have to seek for some bargain in London and in Paris, and limit its ambitions. [A pact has now come into existence between Britain and Italy.] Through Turkey, the British Government is likely to secure the good will of Soviet Russia, and the Yugoslavs and Greeks are normally in sympathy with it.

To withstand such a coalition, Benito Mussolini and his advisers would have to plunge very deeply into the embrace of the Hitlerian Reich. With such an inveterate gambler as the Duce, no prediction can certainly be made about the forthcoming moves of Italian diplomacy. But there are risks that not even he would be likely to take.

Against those two adverse elements —the fortification of the Rhineland and the uncertainty in the Mediterranean —must be set forth the process of military expansion now discernible in France, Great Britain. Soviet Russia, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Ru-

mania. The Socialistic Government of M. Blum, impressed by the perit to peace, has recently appropriated 110 less than 14,000,000,000 francs for the extension and consolidation of, the "Maginot" fortified line and for the improvement of field artillery, and has charted a 5,000,000,000 franc programme for improving the air force. It is no exaggeration to say that after the fulfilment of these plans there will not be much to be added to the French armoury. HIGH TIDE FOR GERMANY. As to the British re-armament—it is being energetically conducted as regards the Navy and the Air Forces, but is impeded, as to the Army, by the reluctance of the average citizen to enlist. However, it will be fairly complete after eighteen months, if the assurances Mr. Anthony Eden gave to M. Blum in Geneva are to be trusted. Soviet Russia today has at its disposal an incomparably greater volume of war material and ammunition than the Imperial army of twenty years ago, and the aerial forces loom large in the picture. However, her transportation facilities are still poor. Poland, Yugoslavia, and Rumania are being rearmed by France; and Czechoslovakia, in possession of the huge Skoda works, contributes to the restoration of the Rumanian forces. Here, too, railway communications are the hardest question to solve. The members of the virtual anti-Germanic coalition are disjointed. It is not easy to make them fit in together in a general strategic scheme. To sum up, Germany will be relatively stronger than at any subsequent time during the next twelve months; afterwards, she ought to become relatively weaker, unless something now unforeseen hinders the opposite camp's re-armament plans. We are not yet sure whether we can avoid the great trial. A doubtful period of twelve or eighteen months, or possibly.two years, is ahead. Anyhow, the nations devoted'to the maintenance of .peace ought to be strong enough to ward off the crisis if they are wise enugh to enforce their solidarity at every turn. THE HITLERIAN COLOSSUS. The financial and economic distress of the German . people—which this winter will exceed what it. was last year—means that the feet of the Hitlerian colossus are perhaps made of clay. It is asserted from serious diplomatic sources that, under the surface, the old German parties have been revived. But are all the Governments which, in an international sense, can be called conservative, ready to sing their differences and concentrate on a common line of defence? The true cause for anxiety is that no affirmative answer can be returned to that question with a feeling of certainty. In the last resort, everything depends upon the French and the British Cabinets. If they make up their mind to stand by the principle' of indivisible peace, everyone will follow suit, from Soviet Russia to Turkey, from Czechoslovakia to Yugoslavia and Rumania. In Poland, all odds are that General Rydz-Smigly, the Commander-in-Chief, would then have enough authority to overcome the Germanophile leanings of Colonel Beck, Foreign Minister, and of his clique.' Italy herself would probably have to lower her terms. ■ But if the Ministers in Paris and in London continue to hesitate between a policy of collective security and a policy of "everyone for himself," their associates or sympathisers in Central and Eastern Europe will more and more move independently and in despair some day come to. terms with the German Reich. DEPENDENCE ON BRITAIN. "In' Geneva, on> October 2, M. Litvinoff, Commissar: for Foreign Affairs, said it in so many words to M. Leon Blum, the French Premier. warned that Czechoslovakia, owing to her perilous geographical position, would be the first to be attacked, and that it rested with France to decide whether she was to be assisted or abandoned to her fate. "You tell me," M. Litvinoff is reported to have added, "that the necessary arrangement will be worked out after the contemplated conference of the Locarnian Powers has been brought to a close, because to act otherwise would seem to prejudice its failure. But the sands are running out at a very high speed." •What M. Litvinoff did not say is that the general uneasiness perhaps does not result so much from the delay recommended by the British Government and agreed to by the French than from a lingering belief that, when closeted with the representatives of Adolf Hitler and being pressed by them to accept peace in the West provided their respective countries do not any longer assume any responsibility for the freedom and' independence of Central and Eastern Europe, the French and British Ministers may be swept off their feet by a tremendous wave of pacifism at home and precipitated into surrender.

Do not let us forget that France cannot face the present issue in Europe apart from Great Britain. An overwhelming outburst of British defeatism would thus be sufficient to suppress any desire of the French Government to stick to its principles.