JUTLAND FIGHT

Evening Post, Volume CXXIII, Issue 3, 5 January 1937, Page 5

JUTLAND FIGHT

JELLICOE AND BEATTY

MANY MISSED CHANCES

TALE OF CONFUSION

At 2.15 p.m. on May 31, 1916, the British light cruiser Galatea sighted a Danish tramp steamer in the North Sea apparently stopped and blowing off steam, says a writer in the "Winnipeg Free Press." She made towards her at full speed, and soon saw the vessel had been stopped by two German destroyers. At 2.28 p.m. the Galatea opened fire, and the Battle of Jutland had begun. This British victory, in which the British lost three capital ships to two lost by the Germans and suffered a loss of 6274 men to 2545 by the enemy, has been a subject of violent controversy ever since it took place. It was the only occasion on which the Grand Fleet and the German High Beas Fleet came into contact; and Ehere are many writers who insist that, had Beatty instead of Jellicoe led the British ships, a crushing, annihilating defeat would have been inflicted hn the enemy instead of a victory Qualified by "ifs" and "buts." It will probably be the verdict of history, however, that this opinion is wrong and that Beatty, despite contemporary popular appeal, was the lesser man of the two. Certain it is that Beatty's failures and mistakes at Jutland contributed little but losses to the result; though it is certain too that his courage and gallantry will remain an inspiration to his service. FLEET ORDERED OUT. A glance at a map shows where, the action took place in the North Sea. Learning {hat the German Fleet was taking to blue water, Jellicoe the night before ordered his battle fleet out of Scapa Flow and Invergordon and the battle-cruisers from the Firth of Forth. Beatty had under his command the six fast battle-cruisers and a squadron of four super-dreadnoughts as his reserve. The messages from the Galatea reached Jellicoe and Beatty and both turned south, the Galatea retreating under German battle-cruiser fire towards the north and the protection of the big ships. Hipper with his four battle-cruisers eagerly followed, but at 3.30 he suddenly realised that the cloud of smoke on the horizon was not a few scattered light cruisers but on the contrary proved the presence of Beatty's ships. He turned and fled to the south, hoping to lure the British ships within range of the heavy armament of the main High Seas Fleet. Tragedy followed. Not only did the gunnery of Beatty's squadron prove hopelessly inaccurate, but a fatal error on the admiral's part had placed his reserve of dreadnoughts to the north instead of to the south of his own faster ships, thus keeping them out of early action. In addition, precious minutes were lost by failure of the Lion, Beatty's flagship,, to transmit the Vital signal for the turn south in pursuit to the heavier, but slower, ships Under his command. At 3.45 p.m. fire Opened between the battle-cruiser fleets bnd in forty minutes the Indefatigable end the Queen Mary had been sunk, the latter in less than two minutes When a salvo exploded her magazine, jhe Germans were scoring: three hits |to every one made by* the British gunners. ■■ g HIS COURSE MAI^AIIIEp. Beatty'bravely maintained Hi! southward course, but at 4.30 p.m. he realised he was running into a trap. He turned abruptly north, and it was now the turn of the Germans to pursue the retreating British ships. They pressed on jubilantly, with no knowledge of the fact that, this time, it was they who were being trapped, for they had no knowledge that in the haze and smoke to the north the whole Grand Fleet was desperately steaming south to overwhelm them. , , At 6 p.m. Beatty found himself safely under the huge guns of the Grand Fleet's super-deadnoughts which fifteen minutes later began to deploy in order to envelop the onrushing enemy. Straight into the trap ran the High Seas Fleet under von Scheer, and Jellicoe, in the Iron Duke, must have felt that annihilating victory was to be his. It was not to be. With amazing skill, von Scheer executed a difficult manoeuvre as soon as he realised the Grand Fleet lay ahead, fell rapidly, away to the west, and in a few moments disappeared after inflicting heavy damage on the British. It was a daring piece of work, but jnore astonishing still was the Germans' next move, for in twenty minutes they turned east again and this time crashed headlong into the British line of battle. The whole horizon leapt into flame. In a moment the Seydlitz burst into flames and the Lutzow staggered and reeled out of line to go to the bottom a few hours later. VANISHED AGAIN. Once again von Scheer executed his manoeuvre westwards, covered by a smoke screen and torpedo attacks of his destroyers, and disappeared from the Grand Fleet's sight. Daylight was coming to an end, and through the night the British ships sought vainly to find their enemy or at least to place themselves in position for decisive action at dawn. What followed is a bitter chapter of missed opportunities. Jellicoe had lost touch with the enemy. All he could do Was to guess by what route the Germans would seek the safety of their base. He knew that at nightfall lie had lain between them and home. On the basis of inaccurate messages from the Admiralty wireless and in the absence of reports from his light craft, many of whom were in contact with the enemy during the night, he judged they would seek the safety of the Heligoland Bight. In this judgment, it is safe to say, Beatty concurred. Therefore he formed in column and steamed south through the darkness. Meanwhile, a few miles to the westWard, the German Fleet also steamed south, but . during the night they turned in their tracks, steamed north and then east, steering for Horn's Reef. The High Seas Fleet passed within four miles of the British rearguard squadron, and about midnight went into action against it, losing a capital ship, the Pommern, in the process. No word of this reached the British flagship. Wireless messages failed, while commanders of light craft repeatedly failed, all during the night, to report their contacts with the enemy. Missed opportunities abounded, and by daylight the German Fleet was safe. AN ASTOUNDED PUBLIC. The bald bulletin issued by the British Admiralty left the impression that the Grand Fleet had met at least with a partial defeat. The public were astounded to learn that the British Navy was not the invincible weapon which all had thought it, astounded also to learn that the Germans could fight at sea. This astonishment was also reflected in the Admiralty itself where orders were given for the Grand Fleet to undergo extensive overhauling. Later in the war, Jellicoe was replaced by Beatty, partly at least because of the popular acclaim that followed publication of some flamboyant (and misleading signals which that im[petuous seaman had sent during . the .feattle.