A NAVAL CALAMITY

Evening Post, Issue 86, 8 October 1936, Page 27

A NAVAL CALAMITY

SINKING OF VICTORIA

FOUR HUNDRED LOST

On a calm sunny afternoon Sir George Tryon made w,hat was probably the first mistake in his exemplary and varied career, says a writer in the "Sunday Chronicle." It resulted in a great peacetime disaster involving the loss of a battleship and the drowning of more than 400 men. Only seven years previously this large and jovial man had succeeded in uniting the Premiers into forming a definite plan for Australia's naval defence.

In June, 1893, the Mediterranean Fleet was exercising under the admiral's direction in toe Levant. On the morning of June 22 the ships left Beyrout with a fine manoeuvre and were steaming at a leisurely pace of eight knots to anchor at Tripoli that afternoon.

It was the custom of Vice-Admiral Tryon to spring surprises in manoeuvres and' afterwards to explain the exact calculations to the assembled captains. He was a master hand at tactics and never made a risky experiment. He aimed at making his strange fleet of low-lying twin-funnelled battleships as flexible as possible for battle.

No one has been able to elucidate what was in the admiral's mind when he disposed his fleet in two lines 1200 yards apart instead of 1600, and when he made the preparatory signals for a complicated manoeuvre, which everyone could see was bound to result in a collision. But Tryon was calm ana sure when .his orders were queried, and such was the confidence of the juniors in their admiral, and so often was the unexpected sprung upon them, that no more was said.

When the flags were hauled down and the manoeuvre—an inversion of the lines by turning inwards —was put into operation the collision between the leading flagships was inevitable.

Both ships went full speed astern to avoid hitting, but with appalling noises the Camperdown's ram cut deeply into the side of the Victoria, which straightway began to fill.

In the Victoria frantic efforts were made to close the watertight doors and so isolate the leak, but the ship filled too quickly. The men were assembled and calmly lowered the lew boats, which were quite inadequate to. carry the large crew.

"I think, she is going," were the last words spoken by Tryon. "It is entirely my fault."

In a few more minutes the flagship turned quickly over to starboard, exposing her still revolving propellers, the men running down the sides of the hjill into the sea, and in an instant the line ship had disappeared. The personnel of the watching fleet wa3 stunned. With this dramatic suddenness England lost a fine battleship and a brilliant admiral. Among the few survivors' was the late Earl Jellicoe,. then the commander of the Victoria, and who, although sick,, escaped through the porthole of his cabin.

In the subsequent court-martial and in the many published accounts of the disaster it was most noticeable that no bitter accusations were levelled at Tryon, a tribute which is rarely bestowed upon public men in the wrong. The admiral was known and admired for his sterling character and remarkable ability. Many believed that his reason had failed; it was the only acceptable explanation for the signal.

Although his end was so'fll-fated, Tryon was held in high opinion by the. Admiralty, and had been sent to Australia, the first admiral to command the ships on that station, to fulfil a difficult mission; to persuade the Australian Governments to take some of the burden of Imperial naval defence.

He arrived in Australia at a time when the tension between Russia and England had become acute, in consequence of a skirmish on the Afghan frontier. War seemed certain, and to Australians very near. They had the uncomfortable feeling ;that they were a mighty , rich and tempting prize, and very poorly defended from"

cruisers raiding from Vladivostok. Since the Crimean War, each State had developed a local navy of harbour defence, vessels manned by enthusiastic, volunteers.

To make matters worse, the Imperial Squadron was weak, being composed of antiquated wooden vessels, and one old armour-clad, the Nelson. To increase the feeling of uncertainty, there was no guarantee that England would keep th ships in Austxa^i^ waters if hostilities broke out. Tryon immediately reassured the Premiers on this point.. :

In a sane memorandum he did much to/assuage the'-feeling of: alarm of supposed attacks from; Russian raiders, of which many wild : stories were being circulated. He: showed ' that these raiders; were .dependent upon obtaining coal and, supplies to'keep long, at sea so far from their home bases, and that if these were withheld by stubborn resistance, the /raiders could achieve little. If the raider expended ammunition in one place, he pointed out (rather a cheerful touch), that, there would be all the fewer shells for the next town. '

The war clouds blew away, and if there had been a less vigorous man than Tryon on the spot; the scare may have-been forgotten and the financing of a navy left to another decade. '

There is an old sea superstition that a ship is guided by the spirit of the man whose name it bears. If this is so, then the Australian Navy was born under the supernatural guidance ;of England's greatest sea hero. On April 25, 50 years ago, the Premiers met on board the Nelson and came to a definite understanding regarding naval defence. • '

Two forces were advocated. The local navies were to be .maintained for harbour protection, and a special mobile squadron of five cruisers and. two torpedo gunboats - was' to be built to chase the enemy on the wide seas. The financial arrangements were left to the London Conference in the following year, when it was decided that England would build the ships, and the States pay an annual subsidy for their maintenance. ,