CRASH INTO POLE

Evening Post, Issue 17, 20 July 1936, Page 9

CRASH INTO POLE

GLASS AND BLOOD ON ROAD

(By Telegraph.—Press Association.)

HAMILTON, This Day.

Mystery surrounds ' a crash into a telegraph-pole at the corner of Victoria arid Knox Streets early this morning. The only trace of the car "was a pile of broken glass on the road,, and possibly an occupant of the car was severely injured, as a considerable quantity of blood was found nearby. Owing to the fusing of wires thirty telephone subscribers were disconnected. The police are investigating the matter.

of our imports would be affected by re-routeing traffic via the Cape. ROUTES VIA THE' CAPE^ The following table shows the differences in milage between the English Channel and east of Suez ports,- via Suez and via the Cape:— Additional Via -Via. milage via Suez. Capo Capo. Excess. Abatliin (Persian Gulf) 0,111 10,015 4531 7f1% Bombay 5,859 30,35t 4525 77% Colombo (i,2»G 10,14i> lISDO «1% Calcutta 7>lo 11,372 3832 51% Mombasa 5,50' l B,MI 2030 43% Singapore 7,9 IS 11,4:14 3456 41% Hong Kong .... 9,407 12,893 :MS« 37% Melbourne '...10,700 11.752 10S2 10% The excess milage via the Cape is the factor likely to cause a temporary falling-off in the flow of imports. Voyages would be proportionately longer and more expensive—though the heavier fuel bill would be offset in part by the saving in canal dues —and more ships would have to be put into the Indian Ocean and Pacific trade. But if our shipping resources were adequate the situation would be speedily restored to normal. These facts should suffice to explode the untenable notion that the closing of the Mediterranean route would spell national ruin.

The ocean route via the' Cape is amply provided with harbour and fuel-ling-facilities, and with a strong British guard over the Straits of Bab el Mandeb and Gibraltar shipping on this route should be safe from enemy raiders of Mediterranean origin.

Cape Town, ..or the adjacent naval port of Simonstown, might become a base of the first importance, and the headquarters of the erstwhile Mediterranean Fleet. From the strategic viewpoint it is as good a position as Malta, and possesses the inestimable advantage of being remote from potentially hostile territory. Reinforcements could reach the Pacific more quickly frjom Cape Town than from Malta.

I do not suggest th/ 1 the problem of our future in the Mediterranean can be settled by a stroke of the pen, since issues other than those of pure strategy are involved. My purpose 'is merely to demonstrate that control of the Mediterranean route is in no way vital to national security. The real question seems to be, not whether we could do without the Mediterranean, but whether the Mediterranean could do without us.