NOT ESSENTIAL

Evening Post, Issue 17, 20 July 1936, Page 9

NOT ESSENTIAL

MIDDLE SEA CONTROL

BRITISH OCEAN STRATEGY,

ALTERNATIVE KEY

For nearly a year now the British public, and indeed the peoples of the whole Empire, have been looking anxiously towards the Eastern Mediterranean, where the political situation has compelled the Government to ctfect a strong concentration of naval and ait power, writes Hector By water in the "Daily Telegraph." . As is generally known, the bulk of the Mediterranean Fleet, reinforced by units from the Home Fleet and foreign stations, including China, Australia, and New Zealand, is still assembled at Alexandria, with Haifa and Cyprus available as unfortified "overflow" bases. t For the time being, Malta appears to have .dropped out vi the strategic picture. Malta is so close to Italian territory '.that it may be said to lie within pointblank air range, and although the offensive power of aircraft against warships at sea is still problematical, it would have been tempting Providence to pack the Mediterranean Fleet inside a harbour which was less than 30 minutes' flight from the aerodromes of a potential aggressor. That the strategic value of Malta has been permanently reduced by the development of air power appears all tpo probable. If that be so it would seem the part of Wisdom to seek an alternative base for the Mediterranean Fleet, and in this connection the advantages offered by Cyprus are being unofficially canvassed. • Strategically the position is an excellent one, for a fleet operating from Cyprus could command the approaches to the Suez Canal—Port Said is only 230 miles from the Island—replenish its bunkers from the Irak pipeline terminal at Haifa, and remain out of reach of heavy air attack except, possibly, from the Dodecanese. , THE "COMPLEX." .But it must not be supposed that the creation of a naval bas,§~in Cyprus would of itself solve our Mediterranean problem. If Malta is to be discounted we shall be left without a single foothold between Gibraltar and Cyprus, a stretch of over 1900 miles. Consequently a hostile Power possessing a formidable, navy and air force might well succeed in establishing command of the passage between Sicily and North Africa; where the Mediterranean narrows to, a bottle-neck less than 100 miles across. In that event the whole of our Mediterranean traffic would come to a standstill. Such a contingency cannot have been absent from the thoughts of British statesmen and strategists during the past ten months, nor is it likely to be 'dismissed as soon as the situation reverts to normal. We have, in effect, seen the red light, and we shall ignore its implications at our peril. . Nevertheless, I venture to submit that the importance of our Mediterranean communications in relation to the safety of \the British Empire has, been much exaggerated, both at home and abroad. Foreign spokesmen frequently. refer to this route as "the jugular vein of Britain's Empire," and they are wont to expatiate on the catastrophic results to this country if it were severed. Not a few British publicists have also expressed the view that to lose our grip on the Mediterranean would be tanta-' mount to losing the Empire. In fact, something like a Mediterranean "complex" has, developed, and it is high time that it was analysed. The Navy, I am satisfied, is free from this obsession, nor is it conceivable that the , staff-' officers of the sister Services should be so blind to history, geography, and economics as to suppose that the fate of Britain and her Empire depends on the Suez Canal. A HOLD. ON THE GATES. Let us, then, examine the strategic position from a.new angle, .entirely without prejudice, and begin by assuming that the Mediterranean route is liable to be cut as the result of a future crisis. What course should we pursue in those circumstances? Devote our main efforts to recovering control of that route, thereby involving ourselves in a campaign of the first magnitude, or, alternatively, evacuate the Middle Sea for the time being, forgo the use of the Suez Canal, and practise a purely oceanic strategy? I believe that a very large section of naval opinion would unhesitatingly pronounce in favour of the latter policy. The most serious objections that can be raised against it are, of course, political, since our withdrawal from the Mediterranean would leave Malta, Egypt, and Palestine uncovered. Into that question. I do not propose to enter, merely observing, first, that the ultimate fate of those territories would be determined not by the opening moves of the war, but by its outcome; and, secondly, that temporary release from Mediterranean commitments would give us an overwhelming advantage in other spheres. Evacuation of the Mediterranean itself would by no means deprive us of the power to influence the course of events in that sea. With . Gibraltar and' Aden firmly held, the gates of the Middle Sea would remain in our hands, and in the western area, at least, we should be in a position to deliver direct blows with considerable weight behind them. To obviate possible misunderstanding, it should be made clear that no British strategist is ever likely to suggest the abandonment of Gibraltar, which promises to remain one of the key positions of the Empire. . EFFECT ON TRADE. The next question to be» considered is how .the closing of the Mediterranean would affect the flow of seaborne trade, and especially the volume of imports into this country. There appears to be a widely-held idea that denial* of the Mediterranean route would lead to a grave shortage of foodstuffs and other essential supplies, if not to famine conditions. That belief is quite unfounded. With the Suez Canal out of bounds all friendly shipping from the East would be diverted round the Cape, and this would necessarily cause some dislocation in the time-schedule of British imports. I am, however, assured on good authority that matters would readjust themselves within the space of four to six weeks. For that brief period we should have to draw on our reserves of food and materials, and possibly suffer some inconvenience, but there would be no reason whatever to anticipate serious privation. Approximately one-fifth of our imports come via the Mediterranean—ll.4 per cent, from inside that sea and 8.7 per cent, from countries east of Suez. Cotton from Egypt and minerals and chemicals from Spain form the bulk of our Mediterranean supplies, the temporary stoppage of which would embarrass but by no means cripple our industrial system. Moreover, certain of these supplies could be obtained fvom other sources. It will be seen, therefore, that less than 9 per cent.