END OF SANCTIONS

Evening Post, Issue 17, 20 July 1936, Page 4

END OF SANCTIONS

AND EMPIRE DEFENCES

TWO PATHS FOR BRITAIN

As forecasted, the strength of Italy and her strategic position in. JSt'--?->e

are leading inevitably to her rea^..

tance tb Europe's councils, and, to better relations with Great Britain (says a writer in the "Sytfne" Iviuming Herald"). The completeness of her vic-tory-'in Abyssinia and the futility of further sanctions mark the first step in the process.

Mr. Bywater, the well-known naval correspondent of the London ■ "Daily Telegraph," is among those who are persuading the public' to face , the facts. His opinions as cabled bear out what has been written as to the difficulty of maintaining the ,Mediterranean route against the new Italian sea and air power. He points out that, while the Eastern waters could perhaps be strongly held with a base which could be constructed at Cyprus, whence fuel supplies'are available by the pipe-line from Irak to Haifa, in Palestine, we should still be without a foothold between Cyprus and Gibraltar. For Malta, he says,, has had its strategic value permanently reduced by the development of air power. In that case, he concludes, the Empire's communications not only with' India, Australia, and the East, but even with Egypt, Palestine, and our oil interests in Irak, would be round the Cape. Exactly the same arguments were put forward long before the Abyssinian crisis had attracted public attention to this subject by Lord Strabolgi (formerly Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy, M.P.). . . ~". .■■ : v If these arguments are sound—and possibly even if they go too far—the case for a strong base at Cape Town is unanswerable. But Mr. Bywater goes further than that.. He announces that control of the Mediterranean route is in no way vital to British security, and that its strategic importance has been exaggerated. A TIMID VIEWPOINT. Now,11: can imagine a man whose front doorstep is occupied by a suspicious character with a revolver, remarking to his-wife, as they escape by the back window, that the stratc/ c importance of the front door had been greatly exaggerated. But when he goes on to say that the safety of his entrance and exit by his own front door is in no way vital to his security because he can always get in and: out by the back window, I think he is not so much a strategical, genius as a rather timid person making a virtue of necessity. His welfare clearly requires the freedom of his front door, and the safety of the street outside it. •'•■ ■■■■ ■ •-,■ ,'■•-.•.• ■ The Mediterranean is unmistakably the street outside Britain's front door. Possible though it might be to obtain Britain's oil supplies from Irak and her cotton from Egypt round the Cape of Good Hope, and for her communications with India, Australia, and*the Far East to be by the same route, it would in time of war throw an enormous burden upon an already strained transport system. '.'•■•

- There are two possible ways 'of assuring the safety of the Mediterranean. One is Britain's old policy of having a navy (and now also an air force) strong enough to blockade the Mediterranean Powers and render them impotent in their own home waters. In view of the present position of France and Italy and their industrial . strength, such- a policy, would entail an orgy of competitive armament utterly out of the question for, the Empire at the present time.. Public opinion would not stand it even if our finances would.

The other possible way is to cultivate the friendship of the Mediterranean Powers. I have attempted to show before that we are already necessarily in the closest accord with France, and that the paramount danIger to Europe of German aggression makes a close accord with Italy an easy matter. Since the fall of Addis Ababa it has been becoming easier. Herr Hitler's attitude has stiffened. Mussolini has ■ indicated unmistakably his desire to negotiate, his wish for good relations with Britain, and his\ unaltered policy regarding Austria, which is still a keystone in the arch of European peace. There is little doubt that Dr. Schuschnigg discussed with him'the . possibility of a restoration of- the Austrian monarchy; and it would be an act of real statesmanship if Great Britain and France joined with him in. facilitating such a step. Anything that revives the self-respect and the unity of Austria renders German aggression more difficult, and is, therefore, an advantage. Apart from the fact that little present-day Austria can *be a menace to 'no one, she has surely as much right to choose her own form of government as Germany or Australia. Czechoslovakia, in opposing this step, may be helping to dig her own grave, as she, with her large German minority, is also ah object of Prussian ambition.

It may or may not be a coincidence that Austrian relations with Britain have, been drawn closer through two recent visits of his present Majesty when Prince, of Wales: if it was, it was a very fortunate one.- In Vienna and in the Tyrol he was just the Prince that his own people know so well, and to the Austrians he was irresistible. There is too much evidence that since the last war Germany has learnt nothing and forgotten nothing. It is Herr Hitler himself who has linked together for the present the destinies of Britain, France, and Italy, and as long as he anft his kind control the might of seventy million vigorous Germans they are likely to remain linked. All mutual difference between the three o£ them, all such shadowy possibilities as Italian designs on Egypt, or on, Tunisia fade into insignificance before the threat to' Europe of "Mcm iKampil."