Evening Post. THURSDAY, JULY 16, 1936. A "NEW" FLEET AND AIR ARM

Evening Post, Volume CXXII, Issue 14, 16 July 1936, Page 8

Evening Post. THURSDAY, JULY 16, 1936. A "NEW" FLEET AND AIR ARM

Gradual reduction of Britain's naval concentration in the Mediterranean coincides with the Southampton speech of Sir Samuel Hoarc, First Lord of the Admiralty, who says that delayed naval rebuilding means now "virtually a new fleet." For over six months a naval position existed which exposed to the fullest some of the deficiencies of the sea and air defences. To maintain the Mediterranean concentration, naval [establishments in other quarters were i gravely depleted. The Royal Australian Navy and the New Zealand Divijsion were both drawn on, and arc now [included in die thanks expressed to the services by the Admiralty. At the present moment, it is cabled, only j the monitor Terror and small warcraft are at Singapore; the naval [strength on the China Station, in j these critical Far East times, is not stated. A new German fleet is coming into being, Heligoland is being re-1 fortified, and a writer in the "Round Table" (June) touches the possibility of simultaneous strained relations with the Mediterranean dictator and the Baltic-North Sea dictator. If, in addition to "Mediterranean anxieties," Britain's danger "grew equally acute in north-west Europe, she would be almost paralysed as a first-line instrument of defence for the more distant British countries." These countries include, of course, New Zealand and Australia.

Probably the people of New Zealand and Australia do not realise what they owe to this "first-line defence." Since the Imperial Conference of 1923 each self-governing member of the British Commonwealth has been primarily responsible for its own local defence, but that local defence has never been tested, because no one has challenged the first line. Unless Sir Samuel Hoare's "virtually new fleet" taps stores of money not yet in evidence, the Singapore line will not be more than a defensive one. Having regard to European dangers, in which an object lesson has just been given, the "Round Table" writer hopes that the British Navy, and its air arm, may yet be able to maintain

on the defensive line from Singapore to New Zealand sufficient naval and air strength, not to take a dominant part in the power politics of the China Seas and the Western Pacific, but to defend that line and to make any encroachment on our vital interests north and east of it a hazardous risk. This limited defensive aim is all that he considers to be compatible with the demands imposed on Britain's naval and air strength by defence against blows aimed by sea or air at the heart of the Empire, or aimed at cutting off its food supply (limited, says Sir Samuel Hoare, to six weeks), or aimed at any vulnerable point of the narrow seaways,siich as Gibraltar, Malta, Suez, Aden. In a Mediterranean crisis, ships can be moved there from the North Sea and the Atlantic, and from Australia and New Zealand. But what would happen if Italy, Germany, and Japan were active all together, or if two of them merely exerted pressure in. support of a third active member of the triangle bent on some adventure? Without any German pressure in the North Sea or any Japanese pressure in the western Pacific, Italy-has just succeeded in annexing Abyssinia in face of the naval concentration; and that fact has made the English people think hard, just as New Zealanders and Australians would be thinking hard if some Power came doAvn to the East Indies to take Java from Holland, o? to wrest some Pacific island from a weak holder. The Singapore cablegram already referred to forecasts the establishment there of "a strong British naval squadron." Nevertheless, the "Round Table" writer is probably correct in his estimate that "to take a dominant part in the power politics of the China Seas" would need something' more than Singapore. That something more might be supplied from America. Yet it seems to be as much the concern of Japanese diplomacy lo avoid driving Britain and the United States into joint cause against her as it is the concern of British diplomacy to avoid a situation of simultaneous conflict with Germany, Italy, and Japan. No Government can hope lo pay for naval and air forces equal to all possible combinations, but must look to its military and diplomatic services to meet probable combinations. In such a scheme, Singapore remains primarily defensive.

Even so, the building of "virtually a new fleet"—by what Sir Samuel Hoare terms "the most vulnerable society in Europe," formerly the most insulated society—remains a colossal undertaking. Its financial displacement is immense, and the waves caused thereby must reach the Treasury of every Empire unit, which must pay either in added "local defence" responsibilities or in greater contribution to the defences that are controlled from London. Strategically, "local dc-

fence" niusl. bo hard to define. If ll>e United Kingdom's di'lViuvs fail, do Dominion "local defences"' any longer count? And, if they do not, is the Dominions' froniirr really the British Channel, or even (in M,'. Baldwin's phrase) (lie Rhine? The tactical side is .still more dillicull than Ihc strategical. One looks lo [the "Round Table" article ( ov ;1 I firm opinion in the matter of aircraft v. battleship, only to find I that "the vulnerability of giant battleships to air attack" is slill "a moot question." Some war authorities are positive on this question, but quite recently many war authorities were certain that the Italians could not reach Addis Ababa before the rains. It is fairly clear that the vulnerability of giant battleships, like that of Addis Ababa, will not cease to be "a moot point" until, it is demonstrated, either for or against. If expert evidence were a clear and definite factor, the public could rest easy on Sir Samuel Hoaro's assurance that scientific discovery and practical experience will be combed for "the right lines." Bui if there are any exact sciences, the science of war is not one of them. I