SANCTIONS POLICY

Evening Post, Volume CXXII, Issue 14, 16 July 1936, Page 22

SANCTIONS POLICY

FACTORS INVOLVED

STRONG ARM ESSENTIAL

(From "Tho Post's" Representative.) LONDON, June 20.

Full responsibility, for advising the British Government that there was no longed any utility in continuing sanctions against Italy as a reprisal for her net of unprovoked aggression upon Abyssinia was taken by Mr. Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary, in the House of Commons on June 18. From the moment Mr. Neville Chamberlain expressed the opinion a week before, thnl the continuation of sanctions would bo ■'the. very midsummer of madness," the Government was the focus of attention and an early announcement of its foreign policy was lopked for.

Mr. Edcii was backed up by Mr. Stanley Baldwin) the Prime Minister, who gave.an exposition of the Government's international policy. He agreed witluMr. Eden that.there was no further use in continuing sanctions, and said that while collective security had failed so far, the nations must come together to ensure, that'it did;not fail again. He also declared that he would not be responsible for; sanctions again until • Britain's . armampnts, . were strengthened. .'. 1

-. In the course of his. speech Mr. Eden said that the. Government .had given the League a lead many times nnd there was not one time, when' anyone else had given it. After' referring to the times'upon which the Government had taken the initiative,', Mr. Eden continued: . . .. . .

"Now that the" League .is perplexed, it is the view of the Government that it is their duty .to. take, the lead again. No doubt it woiild be easy—quite easy —for'us-not to do, so and to leave it to somebody else and to follow after somebody else's lead,'but I do not believe that this is. the right attitude for this country to take.,... lam quite convinced, that, so far. from this.lead, which we are going to take.. others, it will, be .'welcome in. many quarters....,-.

Mr..Eden said it had to.be admitted that, the purpose. ■ for which sanctions were imposed has not been realised. No doubt there were serious miscalculations. One of them was a miscalculation by military opinion in most countries that the conflict would last very much longer than in fact it did. The Italian' military campaign succeeded. The capital and the most important part of Abyssinia were in Italian military' occupation, and so far as he was aware no .Abyssinian Government, survived in any part of the Emperor's territory. That was a situation that had to \be faced. . It was a situation .which nothing but military action from outside the country could reverse. WAR WOULD BE INEVITABLE. It was plain that if. the League meant to enforce in Abyssinia a.peace which the League could rightly approve, then the League must take action' of a kind that must inevitably lead to war in the Mediterranean.' And no. man could say that such a war would be confined to the Mediterranean.

It could not be expected by any one, Mr. Eden-persisted, that the continuance of existing sanctions would restore the position in Abyssinia which had been destroyed. ■ Nobody expected that. That position could only be restored by military action, and so far as he was aware no other Government, certainly not this Government, was prepared to take such military action. Sanction's could only.be maintained for some- clearly defined and specific purpose. The only such purpose conceivable was the restoration in Abyssinia of' tho position which had been destroyed:' Since' that restoration could hot be effected except -by military action, he-suggested that that purpose did not exist.

Mr.' Eden" said that the Government would maintain its assurance of help to other Powers if they were attacked in conseqence of League action. That wasrimprobable but'the assurance was not empty! ' '.- .- i? •-' < > -.-'

"In the light of experience of recent months." Mri Eden .went on,- "the' Government has determined that it is necessary that;we should maintain permanently in, the Mediterranean a defensive position, stronger than that which existed before this dispute began. Arrangements will be made to carry put that declaration. I must make it plain that the Government is determined that the League should go on.. In.our view, the' fact' that the League has tried and failed in this instance is not a reason for making us wish that the attempt had not been made, but it is a-reason-fdr making us determined -to seek so to organise the League' that' it may receive the best chance of success, hereafter. If the League is to have its best chance of j success then it must be organised on a basis'which takes account of the IcsI sons of the-last few months. These-les-sons have' .got to be visualised and the instructions which' they give have got to be embodied in the future practice of the League. ■ ' "TRUSTEE OF THE PEOPLE." ■ After strong denunciatory speeches of the attitude adopted had been delivered, particularly that.'of Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Baldwin replied with an exposition of the Government's international policy,. the foundation of which,, he >said, must-be ..collective security. In the, Government's view collective security' had so far failed. The nations of Europe must come together to ensure that it did not fail again. An international police. force could function only in a partially or.wholly disarmed Europe.- Economic and financial sanctions acted, as a rule, slowly. There must be power.in the League to give at.-at any .time certain ..and immediate superiority. The League, and Europe must decide whether they were prepared to put their forces in a condition to rally to the immediate support of League States.

Leaving out Germany and Italy, he was convinced; that, among European geoples. there was such a loathing of war that he sometimes wondered if they would march on any occasion but to defend, .their, own frontiers. He did not know the'answer. This country," if it was ever threatened, would spring, to arms as one maii, yet it wanted a good deal of education before it would fulfil all its obligations under the' Covenant, in all circumstances.

.He would not be responsible for sanctions again: until armaments were strengthened. That was not cowardice, it was his duty as thetrustee of people who would pay on the first night of war with their lives. The man who would put on sanctions before he had done all in his power to protect the country was not fit to carry on the responsibility of government. The Foreign Secretary, he said, had (he unanimous support of the Government. ■ They believed that to allow sanctions to go on and ultimately peter out would leave the League a far harder task than if they faced the future boldly. ■ : ■'•.-. ■■:..•■