BRITAIN'S PROBLEM

Evening Post, Volume CXXI, Issue 142, 17 June 1936, Page 9

BRITAIN'S PROBLEM

GERMANY OR FRANCE? SYMPATHIES BEYOND THE RHINE RACIAL DIFFERENCES Germany has again sought to prevent the co-operation of Great Britain and France by objecting to their military consultations for the defence of Franqe and Belgium. Ex-Prime Minister Lloyd George and other Britons likewise object on the ground that the consultations may compromise peace, writes Harold Callender from London to the "New York Times."

Emergence of a re-armed Germany •would be a far less disturbing factor to Europe were it not for the sharp divergence between the views of the British and the French, of which Germany naturally takes full advantage. This divergence is not merely political but reflects profound differences in the history and character of the two nations which for so long were enemies but for more than a generation have been reluctant and uncongenial, yet inevitable, associates whenever danger appeared. Since it is German armaments and Germany's peculiar views of her rights in the world which drive Britain and France together in emergencies—today just as a quarter of a century ago—it is unlikely that German diplomacy can divide them permanently. But the policies and opinions of the British and French are so far apart that doubts constantly arise regarding their ultimate collaboration. It is upon these doubts that German hopes thrive. HITLER'S VISION. In his single venture into literature Hitler dreamed of an Anglo-German alliance against France. No German living in Britain today could be blamed if he made the mistake of imagining such an alliance possible.

At a meeting of a small debating society of professional men in a London suburb a few days ago contrasting views of the French and British were revealed in sharp relief. A brilliant French lawyer expounded the French case against Germany—and against Britain. His British listeners retorted. The Frenchman's thesis was: "Shall Europe blunder into war again through the fault of Britain?" He cited the German plans for expansion outlined in Hitler's book, and German violation of treaties, and argued that peace could be preserved only by the open association of Britain with France, Russia, and the Little Entente as a warning to the Germans. He feared that Britain, as in 1914, would hesitate until the last moment, thus making war virtually inevitable. His British hearers replied by saying that France was a rich country ■with more land than she needed, while Germany required a greater territory; that France had done wrong in invading the Ruhr and in declining armament limitation; that France's policy of trying to keep Germany in a position of inequality was responsible for the Nazi regime. TRUST IN FORCE. The predominant French view is that it is hopeless to try to deal with Germany unles she is opposed by a coalition of superior military strength. This, they think, is the essence of the whole , European problem. If Germany is afraid to start trouble, then Europe can have peace. France alone cannot provide this club, fdr she is a nation of 40,000,000 against a nation of 67,000,000. Germany's industrial resources are greater than France's. The French will fight valiantly if they must, but the Germans take to militarism like ducks to water. In refusing to join the anti-German i alignment and encouraging the Germans by acting as an arbiter eager to consider their claims and eager to conciliate them, says the French, Britain is helping to bring on a war in which she will be engulfed with the rest.

The Trench consider Germany a nation in which the civilised element has been suppressed, and regard Nazi violence against Germans as an indication of what the Nazis would do' to external adversaries if they could. This clear-cut Latin view—like most clear-cut Latin views—does not appeal to the British, who prefer to hope for, and even to gamble on, Germany being peaceful. They think France and the British Government also are largely to blame for German grievances and German truculence. They have a less clear conscience than the French. They ascribe Germany's rebellion against the treaties to France's sternness at the end of the' war and her badgering and worrying of Germany ever since. Now that the inevitable reaction has come France wants to drag Britain into an alliance or a war, and Britain does not want to be dragged into either. BRITAIN'S FEELINGS. This is the way the majority of the British feel. Britain has given military guarantees to France, but she has done so with misgivings because she is unwilling to be involved in war in Eastern Europe or in France's alliances. The British attitude towards Europe is very easy to understand. It is precisely like the prevailing American attitude, with only this difference: the distance separating America from Europe is just a hundred times as great as the distance separating Britain from t/te Continent. The British suspicion of France goes dSeep. French and British temperaments are basically different. Moreover, the British veterans who wore short-changed in Paris cafes during the war remember it still, and this recollection colours their views of Germany's treaty-breaking. But the British troops who occupied the Rhine quickly became friendly with the Germans. They remember that, too. Most Britons prefer Germans to French as individual human beings. An odd result is that democratic Britain manifests marked sympathies with militaristic, dictatorial Germany and marked distrust of democratic France; that the only two remaining great Powers of Europe which value freedom disagree on methods of dealing with a State which repudiated the whole liberal tradition upon which French and British civilisation is founded. Yet both France and Britain are frankly arming against possible German aggression, and if it comes they again will be allies.