THE ROAD TO WAR

Evening Post, Volume CXXI, Issue 131, 4 June 1936, Page 17

THE ROAD TO WAR

AND BALKAN JEALOUSIES OFFICIAL REVELATIONS A view of the seething Balkan caul" dron after the Balkan wars and the Tripoli war between Turkey and Italy is presented by Volume X, Part I, of British Documents on the Origins of the War, writes Major-General A. C. Temperley in the "Daily Telegraph." The historians who edit the volum# —Professor G. P. Gooch and Professor Harold Temperley—show how Russia, Austria, and Italy were all taking a hand in promoting their respective policies, with Germany in the background, now supporting Austria and now holding aloof. Sir Edward Grey, as the chairman of the Ambassadors' Conference which had made peace in the Balkans, could not disinterest himself from the resulting situation, and was fully conscious of the dangers to European peace as a whole which each fresh crisis produced. Of the events dealt with in the present volume all, with two exceptions, arise out of the Balkan Wars. The story opens in CWapter LXXXIV, witlt the early struggles in October, 1913, of the independent State of Albania, created by the after Turkey had been defeaiwj-. The new State was to be governed by an International Commission of Control and interna-, tional forces were then at Scutari. The country iteelf was naturally in a state of turmoil and Serbian troops were occupying 4he strategic heights, well within its so-ftthem frontier, while Austria was fomenting the Albanians against the Serbs, and supplying them with arms. Whilst fighting was in progress, diplomatic exchanges were continuous. Eventually, on October 16, 1913, the Austrians 'presented the Serbs with an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of theitr 1 troops within eight days. "REHEARSAL FOR 1914. Sir E. Grey had previously joined the other Powers :|n pressure upon the Serbs, but he spoke sharply to the Austrian Governmlent in objecting to their taking the law into their own hands and not waiting for the co-oper-ation of the other'.Great Powers. Serbia, failing to obtain Russian support, had perforce to comply with the ultimatum. The whole incident was in essentials a rehearsal for 1914, buton this occasion Russian backing was forthcoming. The scene shifts in> Chapter LXXXV to the Aegean Islari ds, when an interminable wrangle: took place in August, 1913, as to their allotment to Turkey and Greecei following on the Balkan Wars. It wa»s further complicated by Italy's continued occupation of the Dodecanese, •which she solemnly undertook to By June, 1914, the situation h ad! become so acute that Turkey was onjly awaiting the arrival of the Dreadiwiyght, then being built in England fcur her, to declare war on Greece. The. matter was still unsettled when the var broke out. Chapter records an incident which at the tirrii t seriously threatened the peace of I'urope. General Liman von Sanders, a. German general, was appointed by the i.Turkish Govern-, ment Commander of the Ist Army Corps, with headquarters in Constantinople, and was attqompanied by a mission of forty-two-Ajerman officers. The news was .received by Russia' with absolute constellation. M. Sasonov, the Foreign Minister, pointed out that it .w&S'a'kfiy position from which the Turkish- Cro vernment could be completely doming ed. The' German view vi as that he wa3 no more than a succassor to General von. der Goltz, who lwid been inspector, but had never h&ki a command in the Turkish Army. ] t was a matter, of prestige, for the pri 3vious German mission had been unfa irly held responsible for the Turkish defeats. PREPARED FOR JYTHING. M. Sazonov was prepared to go to almost any lengths, incj ading a financial blockade of Turkey by the Triple Entente and the occupation of Trebizond, Beriout, and Smyrm a by the Russian, French, and Britfij h Fleets respectively. He told our'. Ambassador that he would regard it as a test case for the Entente, and, if we failed to support him, he -s/ould look elsewhere. Our position was not ie asy, for not only did Sir E. Grey tld nk that too much fuss was being mEtt'e. of it, but there was a British Adxjiiral in a somewhat similar position j,to von Sanders, at the head of the Tut kish Navy. After diplomatic conversatiit ns extending over four months the German Government was induced ten agree to a slight variation of the ajpj pointment, and the Russian Governmeat felt that their firmness had won th em a victory. The crisis, the editors reraa "k, caused more alarm than any o#!fc4 r. matter during the last year of p eace. It showed how frayed were ihe international nerves. One of the most interests ng documents is that in the appendl x, which contains an offer by in June,, 1913, of a defensive alliance with us, or alternatively with the H|.:iple Entente. It was rejected by us because Sir E. Grey did not wish to' < challenge the Central Powers, though, • the prospect of a regenieration of the country; under our guidance was afcti -active. It was the last attempt otf Turkey to shake off German influeo ce, and with our refusal the die wa ; cast—• with what consequences we J know. Surveying the story given in tha Documents, two features part icularly; stand out. First, there was the explosl ve condition of the Near East. It Had seen three wars in quick succession i. Yet, helped by the intrigues of , of the Great Powers, the Balkan countries, though exhausted by war, wera still "quick on the draw," and! repdy" to flare up and march over any (ahd every minor incident. . 1 Secondly, the figure of Sir JT<d\fard Grey towers over all his aries in his unwearying labejur ' fop peace. He never took the smflA' \fiew, and was prepared to aband 4ffc al national advantage in order to 'hold tha uneasy team of Great Powfers together, which he saw was {he , only l means of averting the thereat] ened catastrophe.