CRISIS CLEARLY DEFINED

Evening Post, Issue 82, 6 April 1936, Page 8

CRISIS CLEARLY DEFINED

The . inadequacy of Germany's "stand-still in the Rhineland" proposal, as a "contribution" by a treatybreaker to a basis of discussions, has now been stated plainly to Herr Hitler by the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Consequently, German newspapers, lately moderate, "attack Britain, especially Mr. Eden, suggesting that Mr. .Ue-ycl George better represents British public opinion." .The irony of a situation in which Germany closely examines British public opinion, because it is free, while not at all concerned about German public opinion, because it is regimented, invites comment—but let that pass. What Mr. Eden has done is to show Heir yon Ribbentrop that Herr Hitler's Government "has not been able to meet us" in our "appeal" for German "contributions in respect of the interim period." Germany's failure to thus meet the short-range part of the situation has made it the more necessary for Britain to make "contributions" on the French and Belgian side. Those contributions are two: (1) Reaffirmation of Britain's Locarno obligations, with limited staff talks (military); (2) "certain undertakings to come into effect in the event of ultimate failure of the efforts of conciliation." These undertakings include "assurances [to France and Belgium] of support against unprovoked aggression." Asked in the House of Commons by Mr. Lloyd George if any military plans arrived at would operate only if there was "an actual invasion of either France or Belgium," Mr. Eden replied "Yes." '•''.■ In his main speech the Minister also stated the Government's view that the staff talks "cannot be con: sidered as in any way prejudicing the settlement which we all wish to realise." Also, in his letter conveying these "contributions" to France | arid Belgium he says that the lelter "in no way implies" that the attempt at conciliation with Germany has failed. : German irritation with him is not understandable except on the basis that Germany forgets that the British conciliator is also a Locarno guarantor. Staff conversations, Mr. Eden also said, "would relate only to the intermediate period pending negotiations with Germany"; in other words, they relate only to the short-range situation, and in so far as Germany "contributes" to that immediate situation she can render the staff talks unnecessary or can take all the immediate meaning out of them. That is to say—it is now Herr Hitler's move. Mr. Eden agrees with the Labour Leader, Mr. Attlee, that it would be desirable to "bring in the League of Nations," thus bringing in non-Locarno parties, including the British Dominions. But while a League opinion that Germany should now make a greater immediate "contribution" to a basis for discussing her own treaty-breaking might be morally useful to everybody except Germany, Mr. Eden at the same time is faced with the specific point that "the origin of all this was the denunciation of Locarno." How, then, can the deadlock be manoeuvred from the Locarno Powers to the League? Herr Hitler has announced, "long range," that he himself is headed for the League; but, if the League stepped in at this moment to force his shortrange hand, could he not recant concerning the League in toto? If he so easily denounces his old love, Locarno, cannot he desert his new one—too new to be of deep anchorage? Interesting, but hardly helpful, is the Paris report that Germany was a bluffer on March 7 in the Rhineland, and would have evacuated if France had been firm. Whether true or untrue, this report will tend to inflame French opinion. It is attributed to the French Ambassador at Berlin, and its usefulness would have existed in its confidential communication to the French Government before the event, rather than in its publication now in an inflammatory atmosphere: