ALWAYS CHINESE

Evening Post, Volume CXXI, Issue 22, 27 January 1936, Page 3

ALWAYS CHINESE

CHINA IS STATIC

OUTSIDE INFLUENCE FAILS

WEST AND COMMUNISTS

China's crisis today is compounded of many elements, transitory and permanent, domestic and foreign, naturemade and man-made. In analysing the background and probable results of the crisis, for China and for the world, one must endeavour to distinguish between causes and symptoms, between shortterm and long-term problems, writes W. H. Chamberlain in the "Christian Science Monitor."

The currency difficulties which bulk large in public attention and in the headlines at the moment will most probably work out to a solution. A people with such long experience of banking and trading as the Chinese will scarcely allow themselves to be deprived of a workable currency system over a long period of time. On the other hand the problem of acute poverty and distress, with its inevitable accompaniment of occasional outbursts of social disorder and its .constant byproducts of banditism, certainly gives little promise of being solved within any predictable future.

The measures that would bring the most solid relief to China's uncounted struggling desperately lor the bare minimum necessities of existence, are large-scale industrialisation (provided it could be accompanied by higher labout standards), extensive railroad construction, adequate flood protection, and large-scale irrigation schemes. Side by side with these material improvements should go a great expansion of the national educational system, an introduction of better farming methods, a more modern progressive type of administration, free from the strong Chinese tradition of "squeeze," or graft, and a vigorous, practical programme of combating the curse of the Chinese village, extortionate usury, by means of an effective scheme of State and cooperative credit. Finally, voluntary limitation of population would seem to be urgently needed in China. But the material measures which would help to give part of China's pauperised masses employment in industries and would give the majority, who remained on the land better crop yields, more ser curity against flood and drought, a fairer price for their products, would all require, immense investment of capital.

China can supply only a small fraction of this capital from its own resources; Japan's reserves of free capital are also restricted; and the trend of Japanese policy is to oppose any loans to China from wealthier countries, such as Great Britain and America, for fear these loans would undermine Japan's claim to political predominance in the Far East. BRITISH STAKE. There is the' further consideration that many Chinese railway loans are wholly or partially in default, so that there would probably be no rush of foreign capital into China, even if the very important factor of the potential Japanese veto were non-existent. In view of these facts it seems that China's reconstruction will proceed at a snail's pace and that the earnest efforts of such organisations as the National Economic Council to combat the most glaring evidences of economic backwardness in the country can only register very modest successes. China today is exposed .to three main foreign influences, European-Ame-rican, Japanese, and Russian. Great Britain has by far the largest permanent stake of any foreign Power in China. Its investments are about six times those of the United States and also considerably exceed those of Japan, if Manchuria is left out of account. In Central China British interests are predominant in such varied fields as banking and shipping, real estate and railroad investment. The British Crown Colony of Hong Kong is the main port of transhipment for the exports of South China. America on the other hand, leads in direct trade with China, even though the American share of China's imports during the first nine months of the year declined from 27.2 per cent, in 1934 to 19.2 per cent, in 1935. Side by side with these economic links there are strong cultural links between China and the West. There has been a farflung missionary effort, with very great accompanying social services, especially in education and health. One may find a returned Oxford graduate speaking impeccable English in almost any Chinese city. Still more numerous are the Chinese graduates of American colleges and universities. WESTERN CO-OPERATION. Among the officials of the Nanking Government, among the Chinese educated classes generally, one finds many advocates of a policy of active cooperation with the West, with America, Great Britain, and the League of Nations. League advisers have been employed by the Chinese Government and have submitted reports on a great variety of subjects, finance and hydraulic engineering, sericulture and rural welfare work. One finds American and British advisers in financial and economic departments, Germans in the military field, Italians training China's air force. The influence and prestige of the West, however, are gradually declining before the impact of Japan's vigorous advance .on the mainland 'of Asia. Japan's willingness to employ force, or the threat of force, gives the Island Empire a distinct advantage over any other Power in dealing with China. The prompt sequel to China's currency reform, which owed a good deal to the technical advice of the British Treasury expert, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, was outspoken Japanese encouragement for an autonomous North China. More Chinese students have returned from Japan than from the West. It is cheaper and easier to study at Japanese universities. So Japan also has its cultural influence on China, an influence that is facilitated by the number of Chinese characters which are used in the Japanese written language. There is little sentimental sympathy with Japan in China. But there is a considerable, probably an increasing, number of Chinese who are convinced of the necessity of reckoning with the hard fact of Japanese military domination and adjusting China's policies accordingly. With typically Chinese finesse and indefiniteness Chiang Kaishek has thus far balanced himself between the pro-Western and pro-Japan-ese elements in Chinese society, avoiding a conflict with Japan while also evading complete submission to Japanese will and a breach with the West. The Kuomintang came into power with the aid of a technique or organisation and propaganda that was imparted by a very able Russian Communist named Michael Borodin, who was technically the adviser and in actual practice almost the political dictator of the Kuomintang during the early, radical phase of Chinese nationalism, which came to an end in 1927. Since that lime the Chinese Communists,'with a partially Russiantrained leadership, have been carrying on a guerrilla-insurgent struggle against the Nanking Government. DRIVEN TO NORTH-WEST. In 1934 the Communists were driven from their original base in Kianga

and Fukien Provinces, and their main I forces are now in the North-west, ift Kansu and Shensu. Diplomatic r» lations betweec China esd ths. SvsvissJ Union, broken orl after thfc Chines Communists had set up a short-lived commune in Canton in 1927, were resumed in 1932; and the Nanking Government, while it endeavours to stf£" press the insurgent Chinese Communists, is not unwilling to play- for Soviet diplomatic support against Japan. While a country where so large a part of the population is always on the starvation line is bound to experience occasional outbursts of social revolt, Communism in China is Jikely to assume serious proportions only if Chiang Kavshek decides to take the desperate risk of offering armed resistance to Japan. In such an eventuality the Chinese Government would welcome help from any source. As a leader of the pro-Western fae* tion in Chinese politics said to me:— "If Japan forces an unjust war on us. help from Russia cannot be ruled out." It seems probable that, of the three main foreign influences, the Japanese will be in the ascendant for a long time to come. There will be no sudden and violent expulsion of American and European merchants and business men from China. But Japan will almost certainly be able, with the aid of its , political preponderance, to get an increasingly large share of the Chines* market, especially as it is aided by such factors as geographical propinquity and low-cost production. Baron Shidehara. a former Japanese Foreign. Minister, said ( to me on one occasion:— *> "The Open Door in China suits us. If there are no boycotts or other artificial obstacles, our goods will make their way to the poverty-stricken Chinese masses simply on their merits.' FOX AND TAR-BABY. Paradoxical as it may sound, Japan's actual and prospective expansion on the Asiatic mainland may ere- ' ate more serious problems for itself than for China. A very well-informed and experienced American observer in China sought to make this point with . the help of allegory:— "Do you remember the Uncl'J Remus story about the fox and the Tar-baby, how the fox became angry at the Tar-baby and struck at it, first with one paw, and then with the other, until it was hopelessly stuck? Well, : that is what Japan is likely to do in China. The Japanese may dominate China. But they will never really ' change the Chinese, and I don't see how they will make the whole enterprise China's greatest strength is its extreme weakness, combined, as this is, ' with extraordinary elasticity and suppleness. The. Japanese may change Chinese-civil and military officials as much as they like. But there is no • way of insuring that the new batch will be any more "sincere" in their subservience to Japan than their pro ' decessors. The Japanese may buy up 1 a venal type of Chinese politician, but ' they have no means of insuring that ' he will stay bought. , Western educators and missionaries have failed to break the cultural selfsufficiency of the Chinese; Borodm could not make Communists out ol them; and there is no reason to believe ■ that the Japanese will be any more successful. If one takes the very longterm view one feels confident that China, whatever new political and eco- . nomic crises may be in store, will al- ■ ways remain Chinese.