WORLD FLEETS

Evening Post, Volume CXXI, Issue 20, 24 January 1936, Page 10

WORLD FLEETS

PROBLEM OF GRADING

MEETING OF GREAT POWERS

SEAECH FOE A BASIS

International problems of the first magnitude await solution .by the Naval Conference, wrote. Hector C. By water in the "Daily Telegraph" just before the opening of the London Naval Conference. Japan's denunciation of the Washington Five-Power Treaty a.year ago has undermined' the whole structure of naval limitation laboriously built up at Washington in 1921-22, and reinforced by the London Three-Power Treaty of 19.30.

Both of these covenants . expire at J the end of 1936, and unless they are j repiaced betimes by new safeguards the way will be left open for unrestrict- . ed competition in naval armaments. : The root principle of the system of j control established in 1922 is fleet limitation by ratios, subdivided into ship categories. Thus, in the Washington ' Treaty, the British and American navies were placed on a footing of equality; Japan was allotted three-fifths of their ; respective aggregates, and France and ' Italy each received a tonnage allow- ' ance slightly , above one-third of the maximum figure. CONFERENCE'S FIRST TASK. Until 1930 these ratios applied only to capital ships and aircraft-carriers, , but in that year they were extended to cruisers, destroyers, and submarines . in the case of Britain, the United States, and Japan. France and Italy did not accept this extension, and since 11930 both Powers have added largely j to their fleets of light-surface craft and submarines'. Inevitably, therefore, tlvj proposed scale of relative naval power has been completely upset. It will be the first task of the Conference to establish a new system of grading the world's principal fleets, and controlling their future expansion. From the British point of view, the problem has been rendered more urgent in consequence of Germany's re-armament at sea. By the AngloGerman agreement signed last June, Germany became entitled to build up to 35 per cent, of Britain's total tonnage—including that of the Dominion navies —in surface vessels, and up to 45 per cent, of bur submarine strength. She is exercising this right with so much energy that the appearance in tb.2 North Sea of a. fleet one-third as large I as our own. but infinitely more modern in design and construction, is a matter of a few years.only. A VITAL AREA. This new fact is bound to effect a radical reorientation of British naval strategy. Since ' the war the Admiralty staff has been much more inter.ested in the Mediterranean, the Far East, and other distant zones than in home waters. Now, however, th 2 North Sea is reverting to its former status as a strategic area of cardinal importance. It would be imprudent to overlook the fact that, whereas Germany is free to mass the whole of her fleet in the North Sea, our world-wide commitments compel us to keep the major part of our naval force' in the outer sea-;. At the present moment, for example, out of a total of thirty-flve cruisers in full commission, only four are attached to the Home Fleet. It is fully recognised that naval limitation on the ratio system is moribund, and cannot be resuscitated. There--1 fore, at the forthcoming Conference, ! the British Government will suggest an i alternative formula, which was outlined ! in Parliament on July 22 by thq First '. Lord of the Admiralty: "We have had to, give up (he said) ' the idea of ratios,, and in future we must go in for the principle of programmes. We have abandoned th-j ; principle of.asking naval Powers what ', the ultimate strength of their navies \ is to be, and instead are asking them ' what size they will be in 1942. If we can then pool these replies, and by agreement accommodate these, various \ naval strengths in' such a way as to provide adequate . defence for each country, but make it unlikely that they could attack any other country i with prospects, of 'success, we shall : have contributed to the pacification oE ■ the world.". MINIMUM NEEDS. '. This does not mean that cut-and-dried building programmes are to be ' asked for. The intention is to invite : each Power to declare its minimum i requirements in naval tonnage over a period of six years, such tonnage to [be distributed in agreed proportions \ over the various ship categories. The ■ Powers will be asked to make their • declarations simultaneously, and thJ ; resulting totals will provide a firm ■ basis for discussion. ; That the British Government is re- : solved to restore our naval defences to I a standard of adequacy is common ■ knowledge. So far, however, it has I not drawn up any definite programme .of new construction. Instead, certain . minimum requirements in battleship, ■ cruiser, and anti-submarine tonnage have been formulated, and these figures will be put forward' as our con- . tribution to the "pool" round which ; the discussion in regard to quantita- , tive limitation will proceed.

It may be taken as certain that the British Government will not in any circumstances consent to perpetuate the existing disparity between the

British Navy and foreign fleets in cruiser, destroyer, and submarine strength.

During the past six years ' our1 resources for combating submarine warfaro have diminished, relatively, by at least 50 per cent, and there has also been a sharp decline in our relative cruiser strength. The ground thus | lost must be recovered, either by a drastic reduction in foreign establishments or a substantial increase in British cruiser and anti-submarine tonnage. "FULLY DETERMINED." According to all evidence, Japan is fully determined to demand complete naval parity with this country and the United States. As the American reaction to this claim, is one of uncompromising opposition, the possibility'of deadlock at an early stage of the Conference cannot be ignored. Although the British attitude on this - particular problem has yet to" be; de- ( clared, there is every expectation of close Anglo-American accord on this and other fundamental issues. For • some time past a much clearer percep- ; tion of, and sympathy with. British naval needs has been shown at Washington than was previously .the case. Recent events in the Mediterranean have opened American eyes to the vulnerability of those sea. routes which are the veritable arteries of the British Commonwealth. . Each of the English-speaking Powers now regards the other's naval strength as essentially an instrument for the preservation of peace, a common viewpoint which excludes all suspicion or thought of rivalry. That is one ot the "imponderables" which is bound t> influence the proceedings of the Conference. . . . The only difference of opinion between London and Washington occurs upon a'technical question—the size" of future warships. The. United States, desires battleships of 35,000 tons ana cruisers of 10,000 tons, where Britain advocates smaller vessels. Whether: a compromise can be reached remains to be seen. . ' ' ' Japan will'couple her demand for equality with a proposal, to abolish battleships and aircraft-carriers, on the ground of their "aggressive" character. Conversely, she will claim a generous quota of submarines, which she holds to be primarily a •♦defensive" arm. France is credited with a- readiness to accept a maximum tonnage appreciably less than thatof Great Britain, but is still reluctant to tie her hands in respect of the development of submarines and light surface craft. Italy has not yet indicated the case she will put forward, but if precedent followed, she will insht on full equality with France. Both of these Powers prefer limitation by total tonnage to the existing system. STRENGTH OF FIVE NAVIES. The table below exhibits the present strength of the. ..five ' ."Conference Navies." Except in the case of capital ships .whose life has been artificially prolonged by treaty, only postwar ves-sels-including those authorised but not yet laid down—are listed. Ships of the previous era are now obsolete, and their inclusion would give a very misleading impression of < relative strength:— ."...' .

These figures serve .oruy ■as a ruugu-and-ready guide to relative strength, for among the vessels listed abovs there are marked differences in age, 1 tonnage, and armament , • Apart from its international political 1 importance, the impending Conference is of peculiar interest to the British taxpayer. Failure to reach an agreement on quantitative limitation would add : immeasurably to the cost of, restoring ' our naval defences, more' especially if : ships of the present excessive standards : of tonnage and armament are retained ;in preference .to the smaller and 1 cheaper vessels which could 'perform 1 their respective functions equally well..

British Kmp. U.S. J'p'n. i'r'nce. It y. rapltnl ships ..13 , 13 9 10 *■ Cruisersgin guns .. li>' ■ 18 . 12 . ■ 7 • f ri'i-Oin guns 20 19 20 41 1Alrcrnft Carriers S «. 6' „£ ci Destroyers. .... SI 63 . ll.i ■ S9 hi Submarines ... 40 -H OS. SO 06 Total Personnel • (appros.) : British Emp. JPO.000 -.France ...-: fio.r.OO ■ US V 119,000 Italy al.SOO Japan 88,500 t