BRITISH POLICY

Evening Post, Volume CXX, Issue 136, 5 December 1935, Page 6

BRITISH POLICY

IN ABYSSINIAN DISPUTE

AS SEEN BY AMERICA

British readers may find it difficult to recognise British policy in the'survey given under the heading of "England's Dilemma" in the "New Republic," the well-known American weekly, states "Public Opinion." The basis ' for the reasoning may not be sound, ' but. it indicates possible Kalian a.spira- ( tions and British fears. The fact that . these things are stated in America is ' important. The "New Republic" ' says:— i "Six months ago Massawa was an un- i protected harbour on the Red Sea, i unkempt and miserable, inhabited by twelve thousand natives and a lew home-sick Italian officials. Since then ; its population has increased tenfold, , and it is in process of being tiv.isformed into a first-class military and air base. "The railroad from Massawa to Asmara, on the Eritrean plateau, has been completely rebuilt. At present it is being used to transport military supplies to the Ethiopian border, but in the future, if Massawa were besieged, it could equally be used to bring food and various other supplies down from the plateau. ENGLISH HIGHWAY. "Since the Egyptian dispute between England and France in the eighteennineties, it has been understood that the route through the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and on down the Red Sea was an English highway. The military bases along this route have been Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria, and Aden—all British garrisons. It is now evident that the one certain result of Mussolini's attack on Ethiopia will be the creation of a new military base at Massawa, by which England's road can be blocked as if by a steel door. "The door could not be kept permanently shut. So long as England continues to hold both ends of the Red Sea, Massawa is militarily isolated from Italy. In a war in which England and Italy were on opposite sides, Massawa's ultimate reduction by the British would be inevitable. But, drawing supplies from the Eritrean hinterland, it might hold out for weeks and months, and during that time England would be cut off from its traditional Eastern route. "Massawa, itself, however, is not what chiefly concerns the British Cabinet. A number of British officials have become convinced that, in. the back of his mind, Mussolini aspires to challenge, in the future, England's controt not merely of the Red Sea, but of the whole eastern Mediterranean and the Suez Canal as well. If he wishes to make Ethiopia into Italy's chief colony, he has the strongest motives for doing exactly this, since otherwise Italy will hold Ethiopia only upon sufferance of England. "From a technical military point of view, the startling fact is that Mussolini has the means with which to carry out this aim—if it really is his aim. For more' than two generations, the narrow stretch of water between Sicily and Tunis has been dominated by the British fortress of Malta. But, with the perfection of air power, military experts are beginning to believe that Malta would be extremely vulnerable. "Certainly it could easily be bombed from Sicily. Unless England were prepared to establish an air fleet at Malta, equal to the largest one that Italy could bring against it, Malta might turn out to be a military liability. Parenthetically, itmay be worth nothing that in recent years Mussolini has repeatedly collided with the British authorities at Malta by trying to. inculcate a feeling of loyalty to Italy among its Italian-speaking inhabitants." It has been asserted again and again that Great Britin is only interested in saving the League of Nations, but the above shows how, others may view British policy.