Evening Post WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1935. A BAD BREAK

Evening Post, Volume CXX, Issue 135, 4 December 1935, Page 10

Evening Post WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1935. A BAD BREAK

However it may be interpreted or excused the Canadian Government's repudiation of the action of its Geneva representative, Dr. "Walter Riddell, is a bad break. It suggests a weakening of the unity for which Sir Samuel Hoare, in his Guildhall speech, expressed unqualified admiration and gratitude. "Has any feature of this crisis been more remarkable than the solidarity of the British Empire?" «he asked. His answer is worth quoting in full as it reveals the importance attached to Empire solidarity and its value in a crisis which tested both the Empire and the League of Nations.

■ Never in the history of the Empire, he said, has there been greater unity in foreign politics. Mr. Eden and I could never have carried out our work in Geneva if we had. not had constantly at our side the representatives of the Dominions and of India to give us their wise advice and steady support. Time after time the representatives of the Dominions gave the League invaluable help. Day after day it was made clear to the world that the policy for which we stood was not a policy of transitory government in this small island, but the considered and abiding judgment of the whole British Empire.

The essence of this solidarity was that Britain, the Dominions, and India shared the work and the responsibility for collective security. They spoke with one voice, whether the voice were that of Sir Samuel Hoare, Mr. Eden, Dr. Riddell, or Mr. Bruce. Now Mr. Ernest Lapointe, Acting Prime Minister of Canada, has gone out of his way to tell the world that Dr. Riddell was expressing his own personal opinion and not the views of the Canadian Government when he suggested extension of sanctions to include oil, coal byproducts, and iron and steel.

Though the repudiation is accompanied by affirmation of Canada's acceptance of the financial and economic sanctions programme, it is none the less deplorable. The explanation offered that it is "dictated largely by political psychology" rather makes it worse. It blazons abroad a contradiction of Sir Samuel Hoare's assertion that the attitude of the British people is "an attitude that will not change with passing circumstances, geographical variations, or electoral decisions." We can imagine nothing better calculated to strengthen the feeble knees of France than the emphatic confirmation of Sir Samuel Hoare's claim which the electors of Great Britain gave a few days later. It heartened ' France, and it warned Signor Mussolini that he was defying not a transitory Government, but a united people. Now Canada, as the title of the Toronto "Mail and Empire" leader suggests, is giving comfort to Mussolini. It renews his hope that either geographical variation or electoral decision has caused the Empire front to bend,, and if he perseveres it may even break.

Mr. Lapointe's statement is regrettable for two reasons: its bad effect, and the lack of reason for it. It may be pleaded that Canada, in stating that she will not take the initiative in extending sanctions, is doing no more than Britain did when she corrected the idea that Mr. Eden was leading the League. For that correction there was every reason. The League proceedings were being skilfully presented by the controlled Italian Press as merely affording cover for Britain in the attainment of her own selfish Imperialist ends. This was designed to support Signor Mussolini's thesis that the dispute was really one between Britain and Italy— not between Italy and the civilised world as represented in the League of Nations. It was not only desirable, but positively necessary that this erroneous impression should be corrected; But there could be no similar need for denying the Canadian initiative in the proposal for oil sanctions. Though the proposal was made first by the Canadian representatives, it passed immediately to the Economic Sub-committee of the League to come back with the Sub-committee's approval of the extension when the conditions were realised which would make extension effective. It has since been a matter for the League to decide whether and when the conditions were realised.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the bad effect of the repudiation. It could not have been made at a worse time. The hope of an early peace rests upon the prospect of convincing Signor Mussolini that he is opposed by a determined League that will not shirk from exerting greater pressure. The uncertainty of M. Laval's position in France, arising from difficulties that are mainly ' domestic, has encouraged Signor Mussolini to keep on his defiant course. He has been persuaded to modify his threats only by the political reprieve won by M. Laval and by the convincing evidence ■of British firmness. The anxiety of Mr. Mackenzie King's Government to get under cover before oil sanctions are applied will now suggest to the Duce that Empire solidarity is not what it is claimed to be; with a little more persistence he may reveal its weakness. It may even become necessary to extend the

sanctions—though Britain and all the nations wish to avoid extension —to disabuse the Duce's mind and to convince him that the truth is not Mr. Lapointe's faltering disavowal of the initiative but Sir Samuel Hoare's claim that the policy enunciated at Geneva is "the considered and abiding judgment of the whole, British Empire."