ITALY'S ARMY

Evening Post, Volume CXX, Issue 133, 2 December 1935, Page 12

ITALY'S ARMY

MAKES A SLOW ADVANCE

QUICKER FORTY YEARS AGO

BURDEN OF MACHINES

After a prolonged pause, caused, apparently, by the need to consolidate positions in the north and by the interference of rains in the south, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia has made further progress in both extremities, wrote Captain B. M. Liddell Hart in the "New York Times" on November 1.

In the north an advance from the Adowa-Adigrat line seems now in process, but there is no clear indication whether it is a converging thrust towards Makale or a wide-fronted movement to occupy the areas between Makale and the Takazze Biver —a movement that would be more in accord with a policy of security and with the apparent Italian policy of making campaigning and colonisation march in

step. Although no serious resistance is being offered, the invaders show no sign of attempting any rapid rush.

In the south there is ho news of a resumption of movement on the right, the more threatening line, but there has been an advance in the centre up the Webbe Shibeli Elver, and it would appear that the Italians have now firmly occupied the territory in the angle between the Webbe Shibeli and the Fafan. There are also rumours of a fresh move from Dolo on the extreme left.

But all these moves have far to go before they could come within striking distance of any position important to the defence. Although it is natural to speak of them'as movements of the right, left, and centre, it is well to remember that they spread over a front of some 400 miles and are being made by forces much smaller than those employed in the north, where the front is munh narrower. If a sense of proportion is preserved the actual progress of the invasion is seen to be inconsiderable. MUST BE DULL. While the deliberate nature of the advance may be trying to the Ethiopians, awaiting some rash or careless movement by the invaders, it must be dull fare for Italian public opinion, long nourished on dramatic gestures and attuned to the keynote of "activity." Comparison with the past emphasises the contrast.'

In 1868 a British force under Sir Robert Napier numbering fewer than 15,000 troops advanced nearly 400 miles in barely two months. This march on Magdala, which culminated in the overthrow of Emperor Theodore, was made with slender resources and with none of the aids to rapidity that modern inventions have provided.

Early in 1895 an even smaller Italian • force conquered the northern pro- ■ vinces within a month and installed itself in Adowa and Adigrat. In the autumn it advanced sixty miles move '■ within a few days. The disasters that . befell the growing but not yet fullgrown force some months later were iby no means inevitable. They can be traced to a dangerous mixture of strategic impatience with ambition, and even so they were directly caused by tactical blunders. If the advance detachment at Amba Alaji had not stayed there to suffer attack when remote from help as a result of military misunderstandings, the Italians would have had time to complete their forces and preparations. And if they had escaped this local reverse they, would have avoided the impulse that drove their commander on Leap Year Day in 1896 to take the offensive, again bungled, which so conveniently came to the relief of Emperor Menelik just when he was at his wits' end to solve the problem of feeding his forces. GREAT CARE. It is difficult to determine from the exiguous reports that filter back from the front in what proportion the present slow motions are due to apprehension of another Adowa or to a chosen strategic method and not merely to difficulties in organising a largescale movement in such a country. Extreme deliberation and minute care to detail have been the basis of postwar teaching at the Italian Staff College until recently, when there was a .revival of the theme of mobility. Those years of training in excessively systeniatised operations must have had a strong influence on all who were subjected to it, and its retarding effects probably have been accentuated by the peculiar conditions of colonial warfare. .

Another modern handicap on mobility is the tendency of all European armies to increase their own needs. A desire for stronger armament causes a demand for more transport; a desire for better communications leads to more complex communications; a desire for superior organisation creates additional organisation. In building up its powers to overcome an enemy's resistance an army is likely to set up internal resistance to its advance. Hence, what is gained by an introduction of mechanical means is largely offset by a growth of impedimenta. It is not a necessary growth, but military evolution has always tended to be a process of accretion, of tacking a new means to an old body. The idea of remodelling a design is foreign to tradition. The result today is the paradoxical one that armies become less mobile as their limbs become more mobile. The hare dons the shell of a tortoise. AIR ARM MORE FREE. The air arm is relatively free from limitations of action. Although it requires considerable ground organisation—and ground protection as its base is pushed forward—it can operate at such long range that its handicaps may be deemed inconsiderable compared to its inherent advantages. Reports from Ethiopia suggest that it is the one new factor that has exerted an important influence hitherto; its moral effect, indeed, makes precarious any calculation of the course of the campaign. But it would also seem that much effect has been wasted through the slow motion of the ground forces.

With time thus granted them, the Ethiopians may have a chance to adapt their ways and school their nerves to the menace overhead. Nevertheless, delay in the advance is not an unmixed blessing to them. In gaining relief from the enemy's pressure they suffer increased internal pressure because of the difficulty of feeding the feudal hosts that have been assembled and because of the difficulty of curbing their impatience while preserving their martial enthusiasm. Delay also enables Italian diplomacy and propaganda to pursue "sapping operations," which promise potential weakening of the resistance that eventually will be met.

It may well be imagined that the Ethiopian leaders would welcome a much deeper advance than the invader has yet made; this they need in order to develop effectively their own guerrilla action and possible ripostes. Adequate room is an essential condition of the strategy that is suited to their circumstances. Even when the Italians have achieved the expected advance to Mckale they will still be fifty miles short of the distance they travelled in »18S5 before the Ethiopian counter-offen-sive was opened. . j