NAVAL POLICY

Evening Post, Volume CXX, Issue 124, 21 November 1935, Page 31

NAVAL POLICY

BRITISH DISAGREEMENT I am able to disclose the fact that there is a difference of opinion in official circles as to the naval policy Britain should pursue in the near future, writes Hector Bywater in the "Daily Telegraph." The problem is whether we should proceed at once to set our naval defences in order, or whether we. should wait until the lapse of the Washington and London Treaties restores our freedom of action.

As has been stated in the "Daily Telegraph" a large programme of new construction to make good the more serious deficiencies has been approved in principle by the Government. Details are still somewhat elastic, and cannot be fixed until definite conclusions, emerge from the naval conversations still proceeding between this country- and the other interested Powers.

On the one hand it is urged that in view of the admittedly dangerous shortage of vessels for commerce protection no time must be lost in building many additional cruisers and increasing the annual quota of destroyers from nine to eighteen. To lay down five or six cruisers next year would necessitate invocation of the "escalator clause" of the London Treaty. This clause was inserted to meet precisely the contingency that has now arisen-—' excessive building by non-signatory Powers. . DANGERS OF DELAY.

Those who oppose this course ai-gue that it would not only offend the United States, but might .impel both that country and Japan to expand their respective navies on a proportionate scale. In support of this contention they quote President Roosevelt's statement of September 29, in which he said:—

"The United States adheres to the Washington and London Treaties. Only a failure to renew these treaties or their renunciation could change American policy, and then only in the event that other nations exceed the limits provided by these treaties." Were Britain to wait until the lapse of the treaties the Navy would receive no important increment of strength before 1940, and then only at the cost of very large programmes in 1937-38. During the interim period it would remain, relatively, weaker than it has been for 150 years. The diplomatic consequences of that position were frankly set forth by Mr. Neville Chamberlain in his recent speech at Kelso. The United States, having only one major problem to face —the maintenance of the balance of power in the Pacific—cannot be expected to appreciate this country's far greater and more vital responsibilities at sea. For us it is essentia] to have adequate forces in home waters, the Mediterranean, and the Far East