Evening Post. TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1935. THE MIRACLE OF EMPIRE POLICY

Evening Post, Volume CXX, Issue 116, 12 November 1935, Page 10

Evening Post. TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1935. THE MIRACLE OF EMPIRE POLICY

"The battle at Seahara is terrific . . . and Mr. Ramsay Mac Donald is having difficulty in getting a hearing," stated the cables yesterday. Apparently the ex-Prime Minister* has been given help and Mr. Ernest Brown, one of Mr. Baldwin's recruits for Cabinet rank, has gone to Seaham to match his voice (said to have been the best sergeant-major's voice in the Army during the Great War) against the united voices of the miners. There are disturbances in other constituencies. Sir Malcolm Campbell, who beat the speed record at Utah, was beaten by noise at Wai worth. Yet while this election battle is raging with increasing fierceness, Sir Samuel lioare, speaking in the calm and dignified atmosphere of the Lord Mayor's banquet at the Guildhall, can declare that the British people are firmly united and determined to throw the whole weight of their country into the scales of world peace. This is the attitude of the British people and an attitude that will not change with passing circumstances, geographical variations, or electoral decisions. Soberly and steadfastly we intend to carry out our obligations wherever they exist, and to strive for peace wherever peace is threatened. This is our policy. It is simple and clear. It has not changed since my speech at Geneva, nor will it change after the election. To the foreign onlooker this may be incomprehensible. In such a clash of opinions, such a welter of political conflict, and such a babel of shouting and disturbance, can there be no difference on the most momentous question of the hour? It is incomprehensible, and yet it is true. Sir Samuel Hoare's declaration will not be contradicted. Yet marvellous as this unity in support of a peace policy may be, it is surpassed by a common understanding extending far beyond the shores of Britain. Geographical variations have changed the policy no more than electoral decisions will change it. Sir Samuel Hoare noted this triumph of a policy over distance and geographical variations. The Government would go forward with greater courage and assurance, he said, from the fact that in the efforts for peace Britain had a solid and unanimous Empire by her side. Has any feature of this crisis been more remarkable than the solidarity of the British Empire? he asked. Never in the history of the Empire has there been greater unity in foreign politics. . . . Day after day it was made clear to the world ■ that the policy for which we stood was not a policy of transitory government in this small island, but the considered and abiding judgment of the whole British Empire. The minor discordances in an Empire of many varying interests and widely divergent viewpoints on other matters have on this issue been so trifling as not to be heard above the chorus of unanimity. The differences that might have been expected because of remoteness from the Continental scene have not been expressed. The protests have just been echoes of the minor disagreements in Britain herself. Mr. Lang in New South Wales merely repeated ihe class-war objection of Sir Stafford Cripps to a capitalist war; and Mr. W. M. Hughes, if Mr. Lyons were right in taking his book as a protest, appears to have taken a line that might have been taken by Mr. Winston Churchill. The unity of policy thus achieved may be accepted, with the fatalism which has been the British substitute for careful forethought, as being nothing at all unusual; just another proof that Balfour Reports and Statutes of Westminster really make little difference. But to those who have given thought to the disruptive tendencies of the last fifteen years, it must give reason for profound gratitude. It is not the ultimate test of Empire strength, for the forces of disruption and drift are not yet overcome. Yet it is a test, and one sucli as M. Andre Siegfried envisaged when lie surveyed the Empire only eleven months ago, probably with no thought lhat the trial would mme1 so soon. This third British Empire of "autonomous communities," succeeding the first Colonial and the second Dominions Empire, tempted M. Siegfried to quote Pascal's definition of the universe: a sphere whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere. 1 he logical development of the principle of autonomy had deprived the Empire of any definite political centre. There is, practically speaking, no unity in treaty-making or in legislation. A common foreign policy has become merely optional. You may, of course, come to an Imperial foreign policy shared by all the members of the Empire, and such a thing happens frequently, but it is necessary to negotiate such a common political attitude every time; and even then the result is always precarious. The common political attitude has been achieved by consultation—a term which does not connote the bargaining implied in negotiation. Great Britain has made no offer of concessions to the Dominions to win their support, and they have sought

nothing as a return for their adherence. It has been a common agreement, expressing in definite terms a policy which has hitherto been felt, rather than stated. Like all British policy, it has in it something of compromise and something of refusal to compromise on principle. Because it has these qualities it has solved ihe second of the problems which .M. Siegfried foresaw. The first problem arose from the possibility that the Empire might be without a policy; the second from the possibility of Iwo policies. Britain, he said, must face a double peril. She could not turn her back upon Europe, or deny the facts of history. "The dream of England to be freed from any solidarity with Europe remains and will remain a dream." But if she adopted an attitude which might be considered too European she ran the risk of being entangled in Continental responsibilities and even in the wars of Europe, and thus being in danger of displeasing the Dominions, who in a crisis might not follow her. The test has been made, and it has not even been a crisis. Britain has looked on Europe and on the Empire and has kept both views in perspective. To the foreigner it may be a miracle; to the British a matter of course. B^it for the correct perspective of the view we may at least acknowledge the clearness of vision of the statesman who now gives thanks to the Dominions for their support.