STEP BY STEP

Evening Post, Volume CXX, Issue 115, 11 November 1935, Page 10

STEP BY STEP

POLICY OF BRITAIN

IN ABYSSINIAN DISPUTE

EEPEATED WAITINGS

Attempts are again being made by Italy's propagandists to represent Italian policy in Abyssinia as frank and consistent from the beginning, while Britain, at first seeming to acquiesce, is supposed to have startled the innocent Italian Government by a wholly unpredictable move against the Duce's policy when.it was too late to [divert it, says a writer in the "Daily ; Telegraph."

Thus a reprint is now being cireuted of an interview which Signor ussolini gave in English in Septem:r, stating thai on January 29 he had I id the British Government informed .at the Italian Government invited ,c consideration of "specific agreeents for a harmonious development : the Italian and British interests in thiopia." The interview continues: "The British [inistry of Foreign Affairs answered /asively. In face of that silence lere was only one way left. And I >ok it." In fact, the British Government at ice examined the issues raised and insulted the Colonial administrations ijacent to Abyssinia, which would be jncerned in any fresh economic adistments. If Signor Mussolini exected agreement to be reached before c began mobilising two divisions a 'eek later, he must surely have forotten. that a similar arrangement beve'en Italian and French interests had iken ten years to complete. The svasive" British answer simply made ; clear that discussions would take jme time, but promised a report. | . ITALY'S DECLARATION. The suggestion that Signor Mussoni was already in January making ; clear that he intended to throw over 11 general and specific pledges to seek peaceful outcome of the dispute, and iat we gave a s'ilejit consent to his /ar-plans, is particularly interesting in lew'of the fact that on January 19 the ispute had been withdrawn from Jeneva for settlement under the Italoibyssinian Treaty of 1928. Italy had declared then that "for ts part it does not regard the dispute s likely to affect' the peaceful relaions between the two countries." On February 13 the Italian Under-Secre-ary for Foreign Affairs, Signor iuvich, assured the Abyssinian repreentative that Italy had no aggressive lesigns. ■ In view of these statements of policy t would not have been easy for Sritain to dissuade Italy from aggresive designs which she had so firmly lisclaimed. The dispatch of the first wo Italian divisions to Africa, which segan on February 17, seemed, how;vcr, to confradict these professions, md on February 23 Sir Eric Drumnond, the British Ambassador in ilome, expressed our Government's serious concern. A second warning was given on 17 by'the British delegation at Seneva, where a special council meeting had been called to discuss LJerman re-armament. This warning ivas repeated to Signor Grandi in Lonflon by Sir.Robert Vansittart on April 30. In subsequent contacts between the' British Foreign Office and the Italian Embassy these warnings have been repeated. It was made clear that the interests of Britain and Italy in Abyssinia could not usefully be discussed'in the atmosphere raised by the Italian policy, which was • now seen to be developing in Eritrea. Britain had contemplated the possibility of extending the 1906 Tripartite Treaty into a Four-Power Treaty which Abyssinia might sign. Contacts between the officials of Britain and Italy, not only in Rome and ir London, but in Addis Ababa, anc Geneva, were already making rt obvious that this aim was not shared. BRITAIN'S POSITION CLEAR. The three strong warnings given ir February and in April made it quiU clear that Britain was not inclined tc go back on her League engagement; and give Italy "a free hand." Britair would, however, have been willing t< offer mediation at almost any point and consented to the repeated with drawal of the dispute from Genev; only on the understanding that Ital; was settling the matter under the IG2! Treaty direct with Abyssinia. The absence of the Abyssinia ques tion from the agenda of the Stres; meeting in the middle of April ha been put forward by Signor Mussolin in an interview as an example o Britain's misleading silence, brokei immediately afterwards at Geneva b; the revelation of "the British Go\ ernment's inclination to block off ever; just demand of-Italy for satisfaction. i Actually the Stresa- Conference wa held on Italian soil with Signor Mv: solini presiding and preparing th agenda. The British Government sen an expert to Stresa prepared to discus the Abyssinia question if it wer raised. Signor Mussolini was unwil ing to raise it. None the less, the official sent t Stresa made it perfectly clear to th Italian Foreign Office what view ou own Foreign Office held of the risV Italian policy would incur if it coul not be dissuaded from the militar conquest of Abyssinia. MR. EDEN'S WARNING. On May 22 Sir Eric Drummon called on Signor Mussolini and stresse the dangirous effect of. the Italic plans on the political situation. Thw days later Signor Mussolini tardi: agreed to the League of Nations takir a hand in the situation if proceedinf under the 1928 Treaty made no pr gress. In June Mr. Eden saw him in Ron I and made the Zeila offer which was : {brusquely refused. Signor Mussoli | expressed his intentions with . gre ! frankness. Mr. Eden with equ j frankness warned him of the Briti: j attitude. I On July 24 Sir Eric Drummond dre Signor Mussolini's attention to the ob Igations imposed by the Kellogg Pa i and the League Covenant, as well the special compulsion on Italy to i : frain from action against Abyssini; . independence in view of the 1906 T • partite Treaty. All these were threi . ened by Italy's proposed actions. I Britain's intention to maintain li > pledges under the Covenant was : serted in the House o£ Commons '■ the Foreign Secretary on July 11 ai i August 1. The abortive Paris Confi , ence was held a fortnight after t i second of these warnings, but it w : not until September 4 that Italy cc sented to make any statement of h i complaints against Abyssinia in £ official and public form.

A week later Sir Samuel Hoare repeated at Geneva, with even greater solemnity, the substance of the two warnings lie had uttered in the House of Commons. These made clear Britain's readiness to stand by her pledges against any unprovoked aggression.

It is apparently the view of Italy's spokesmen that it was only then that Britain gave her first warning of any objections to Italy making war on another member of the League.