BEATTY'S PART

Evening Post, Volume CXX, Issue 105, 30 October 1935, Page 16

BEATTY'S PART

PRELUDE* TO JUTLAND

BATTLE CRUISER CLASH

A FATEFUL DELAY

la the spring of 1916 I wrote to Sir John Jellicoe and Sir David Beatty to say that I was available for service in the Grand Fleet, and at the same time my Admiral <de Eobeck) telegraphed to the Admiralty to ask that I might be considered for command of a battleship or battle-cruiser, writes. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes in the "Daily Telegraph." ' He suggested to me that as X had been a Commodore for six years I might well aspire to the command of a cruiser squadron, but I felt that I ought to go through the mill and command a capital ship, much as I looked forward to the command of a cruiser squadron in due course. Admiral Jellicoe replied that he would welcome me in the Grand Fleet, and Beatty said that I must have one of the new "Gallopers" (Repulse or Renown), but the Naval Secretary replied to the Admiral that although I should have the first available command, that was not likely to occur until August, when the first of the new "B," class would be commissioning. So I made up my; mind to wait patiently until August. Before the end of May, however, Admiral de Robeck was offered the command of the Third Battle Squadron, and said that I might return home with him. We were waiting for cur reliefs when, on June I, we heard the German wireless shouting to the world that their High Sea Fleet had won a great victory, against a superior force of the British Fleet, between Skagerack and Horn Reef. One June 18 I arrived home and learnt from the Naval Secretary that the deaths of Admirals Sir Robert Arbuthnot and Horace Hood, who were killed at Jutland, had left me second on the .lists of captains, and that I might be promoted to rear-admiral any day. .■.','■ ". THE CENTURION. He then suggested that I should" go to the Centurion in the Second Battle Squadron, which Michael Culme-Sey-'mour was leaving to take up an admiral's appointment. Of course, I gladly, accepte.d, .and went up to report myself to the Admiralty the following .mowing.. The next day his Majesty did me the honour of receiving .me.a.t.Buckingham Palace. I joined the Centurion in Scapa Flow. abqu.t.7. pan. on June 27. During my service in the Grand Fleet, -I studied every phase, of the Battle of Jutland, in order to try to learn its lessons. The following account records my impressions at the time, derived from personal contact with officers engaged -in the battle, and a study of the British and German official reports, added to other information now available. ' Vice-Admiral Sir -David Beatty, commanding the Battle-cruiser Force, flying his flag in. the Lion, was leading the First • Battle-cruiser Squadron (Rear-Admiral O. de-B. Brock) with the: Second Battle-cruiser Squadron (Rear-Admiral W. throe miles on his starboard, and the Fifth Battle Squadron five miles on his port bow. Acting under the orders of 'the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet Beatty was standing to the northward to join him, after a sweep eastward towards the Jutland - coast. Twelve light cruisers in pairs were spread on a north-easterly line of bearing. At 2.20 the light cruiser Galatea (Commodore E. Alexander Sinclair) on the starboard flank of the screen reported "Enemy in sight." At 2.28 she could be heard engaging the enemy, and she gave further information by wireless during the next few minutes. The two cruisers nearest the Galatea closed her at once, and the whole cruiser line moved to their support without waiting for orders. QUICK DECISIONS. The Galatea's signal was a warning to Beatty and all who heard it, to be ready to make rapid decisions, and it is on record that a signal was received in the Barham (Flagship Fifth Battle Squadron) at 2.30 that Beatty intended to steer. S.S.E., his obvious intention being, of course, to cut off the enemy from the Horn Reef. The rear-admiral commanding the Fifth Battle Squadron had received. pre : cisely the same information from the Galatea as Admiral Beatty. The preparatory signal had been received at 2.30, and Beatty's alteration of course at 2.32 could be clearly seen in the Fifth Battle Squadron. But quite unnecessary flag signals .were laboriously hoisted in the Barr ham and kept flying until they were answered by each individual destroyer, with the result that when ,the Fifth Battle Squadron eventually turned to the S.S.E., six minutes after the Battlecruiser Squadron, it was ten miles distant, a routine zigzag during those vital moments having still further increased its distance from its more alert consorts. There are people who attribute this lamentable delay to Beatty's failure'to use this or that form of signalling, and blame him for not waiting for the Fifth Battle Squadron to close before engaging the enemy. The enemy had on two previous occasions made for home at full speed, the moment he was aware of the presence of Beatty's superior force: is it likely that he would have waited until Beatty was reinforced by four powerful battleships, with a maximum speed of two or three knots slower than his own? Beatty knew that his one chance of bringing the enemy to action was to attempt to cut off his retreat without a moment's delay, and he had every right to suppose that the Fifth Battle Squadron would conform to his movements. Besides, he had every reason to think, at that time, that his six ships were, ship for ship, superior to his | five possible opponents, though he was soon to be disillusioned. PAPER SUPERIORITY. Further, he knew, or thought he knew, that the German battleships were' still in the Jade River at 11.10 a.m., for he had intercepted a signal from the Admiralty to the Commander- [ in-Chief to that effect. i When Beatty brought yon Hipper to action, he possessed, on paper, a considerable superiority, his six battlecruisers mounting 32 13.5 in and 16 12in guns, against 16 12in and 30 llin guns in the five German battle-cruisers. , The action opened at 3.49. Photographs prove, and it is an accepted fact, that during the first phase of the action the British ships were clearly silhouetted against the western horizon, whereas the enemy's ships were bareiy visible, and sometimes could only be distinguished by the flashes of their guns, the dull red glare of shells bursting on them. At about 4 p.m. the Lion was struck by a shell, which, entered her "Q" turret and killed or wounded nearly everyone in the turret and working chamber. Fortunately the officer of the turret (Major Harvey, R.M.L.1.), though mortally wounded, gave orders to close the magazine doors and flood the magazines, which saved the ship twenty minutes later, when a fire, started by the explosion in the turret, reached some cordite charges, causing a flash of flame to pass over the gun-

house to the closed magazine doors and krll all the survivors of the original explosion. A few minutes later the Indefatigable (Captain C. Sowerby) was struck by a salvo near her after turret, which caused a heavy explosion, and she was seen to be sinking by the stern, when another salvo hit her near her foremost turret. A terrific explosion followed, and she rolled over and sank, taking, with her 1022 officers and men. THE QUEEN MARY. : At 4.26 a plunging salvo from , the Derfflinger struck the Queen Mary abreast of her "Q" ■ turret 1 and she blew up with a tremendous ■ explosion—l 266; of her company perl ished. According to a German account, „ "The Queen Mary shot splendidly and ' hit the Derfflinger with her two last 1 salvos almost at the moment she her- ' self blew up." . A little later the Princess Royal (Captain Walter Cowan) disappeared for a few moments in a. cloud of smoke, ■ which accompanied a violent explosion, i and a'signalman reported laconically: :. "Please, sir, the Princess Royal has • gone." (Fortunately this was a false' I alarm.) ■. . ■ [ Turning to his Flag Captain, Beatty 1 said: "There must be something wrong with our ruddy ships, Chatfield." These ; reverses might well have daunted a > less valiant spirit, for there obviously ; was something very wrong with the ' design of his ships, and he might well ■ have fallen back for support on the t Fifth Battle Squadron. However, he " was determined not to allow the enemy ' battle-cruisers to escape this time, and ; he continued to pursue them to the ■ southward. We know now that our ships inflicted considerable damage on ; the enemy, though they were not ! given credit for it at the time. ! Meanwhile the Fifth Battle Squad- - ron, spoiling to get into action, had made strenuous efforts, and thanks to • converging courses had been able to ■ reduce its distance from the Battle- • cruiser Squadron to about seven miles, and shortly after 4 p.m. was firing at " very long range at the two rear ships : of the enemy. 1 DESTROYERS IN ACTION. I About the same time Beatty ordered : his destroyers to attack, and eight yes- ■ sels of the Ninth and Thirteenth Flo- : tillas were able to get into a fayour--1 able position to do so by 4.15, when : they stood. towards the enemy battler cruisers at full speed, led by Commander the Hon. Barry Bingham in the Nestpr. ■ '-..-.. The German destroyers, supported 1 later by a light cruiser, came out to : meet them, and a'fierce fight ensued ■ between the lines; but considerably " closer to the enemy battle-cruisers than f to ours, with the result that our de- " strbyers came under a very heavy fire " from them, as well as from the oppos- ' destroyers. Two German destroy- " ers were sunk, and first the Nomad (Lieutenant-Commander P. Whitfield) 1 and then the Nestor were disabled by shells in their engine-rooms, but not ' before the intrepid-Bingham, followed : by the.Nicator (Lieutenant J. Mocatta), » had pressed his,attack and fired, tor- ■ pedoes-Within 3000 yards of the enemy : battle-cruisers. ; 1 The destroyer attack had the effect 1 of throwing off the enemy's fire, their ■ ships having to alter course to avoid ' torpedoes. On the other hand, while it was in progress,' the Lutzow was " heavily hit by shells • from the Lion ' and Princess Royal, which caused a ' severe fire and forced her out of the 1 line for fifteen minutes. One of the 1 German destroyers was sunk by a tor--1 pedp from the Petard, but it was not ; known until recently from German 1 sources that the Seydlitz. was also ' struck by a torpedo in this attack. - f'iWe know now that the German ,det stroyers fired twelve torpedoes at our ' battle-cruisers, but thanks to the reso- ' lute-.-wjctibn of 7 our. destroyers, these ! were fired outside their effective range, 1 and did not reach our ships. , THE MAIN FORCES. l At 4.33, the Southampton—flying the - broad pennant of Commodore W. Good- > enough, commanding the Second Light , Cruiser Squadron—then about three ' miles ahead of the battle-cruisers, sig- . . nailed to the Lion, "Enemy Battle Fleet t in sight." At 4.38 he wirelessed a de- ; tailed report, which was receiyed witht in two minutes in the Barham, and by Sir. John Jellicoe in the Iron Duke fifty miles away. This was unexpected news both to the Commander-in- > Chief and to Beatty, who, relying on 1 the Admiralty's report, thought the Ger- - man High Sea Fleet had not left the " Jade River. ■ . 1 ' Yon Hipper, having led Beatty to his Commander-in-Chief, turned sixteen I points and took station ahead of his ■ battleships. Beatty turned likewise at 4.45, and stood to the northward with '■ a signal flying ordering the Fifth Battle ' Squadron to do the same. At the same ; time he informed the Commander-in- ' Chief of the situation by wireless ■ through the Princess Royal. ! Meantime the Barham (Captain A. ;W. Craig), which had received the Southampton's signal at 4.40 reporting ' the enemy's battle fleet, stood on to : the southward, and, passing the battle- • cruisers about one and a half miles on - her port hand at 4.50, led the Fifth 1 Battle Squadron round sixteen points »to starboard, at 4.53. But the battleships and battle-cruisers were passing ' one another at a speed of not less than ! fifty knots, and by the time the turn ' was completed they were three and a ' half miles apart, and the Fifth Battle Squadron was then within range of the ! enemy's battle fleet, which concentrated ' on its turning-point' and inflicted considerable damage on the Barham and 1 Warspite (Captain E. Philpotts). It is almost incredible that Beatty, L who. had been so heavily engaged, with ; much to occupy his attention, should ' again be blamed, this, time for having 1 failed to keep the Fifth Battle Squad--1 ron out of trouble.