WAR AND MUNITIONS

Evening Post, Volume CXX, Issue 6, 6 July 1935, Page 10

WAR AND MUNITIONS

BRITAIN'S EXPERIENCE

DR. ADDISON'S CHARGES

ATJSTEALIAN EEPLY

According to a recent report, Dr. Addison, who was Minister of Munitions tin 1915-16, in giving evidence before the Royal Commission which is I inquiring into the manufacture of I munitions by private firms, alleged that the private manufacture of arms was proved by the first nine months of the war- to be a tragic and perilous failure, writes Frank Ley, A.C.1.5., in the "Sydney Morning Herald." He based his conclusion on the fact that up to May, 1915, the Woolwich national arsenal alone delivered supplies as promised, whereas private firms were hopelessly in arrears with, their contracts, thus keeping our troops so meagrely supplied with shells that our armies were dangerously handicapped in their heroic struggle against odds. No doubt the ex parte statements of Dr. Addison will be dealt with suitably by subsequent witnesses representing the maligned manufacturers, who will put a different complexion on the matter, but in the meantime it may be as well for the writer, who took an active part in munition work, to present the real facts to Australian readers. It is no secret that the real reason of the shortage of shells for the first nine months of the war was that the national arsenal at Woolwich was only equipped to supply the modest requirements of Britain's small pre-war army for Empire policing purposes. Further, only small contracts for army shells were placed annually with a few private firms, insufficient to justify the latter laying down plant large enough to cope with a national emergency of the unparalleled magnitude of the Great' War. This alone would be sufficient answer to Dr. Addison's imputations against the private firms concerned. . WOULD HAVE LED. - But there is more to be said, as given a freehand from the commencement of the war there is no doubt that British private enterprise, if untrammelled with red tape, would have risen to the occasion and given a big lead to Woolwich. Unfortunately it was the conservatism of the Ordnance Department at Woolwich and its reluctance to accept modifications of its specifications for shell components, etc., that clogged the efforts of private manufacturers. It is more than a coincidence that it was only in May, 1915, the very date referred to by Dr. Addison, that those specifications were finally amended in accordance with the repeated recommendations of private enterprise. From that moment private enterprise went ahead, and the output of shells expanded at a rate many times in excess of the output of Woolwich Arsenal, whilst the costs were enormously decreased, the important item of shell steel, for example, being reduced to one-third of its pre-war price. , . The ability of Woolwich to maintain its limited promised output of shells, during the early stages of the war, was due largely to the fact that, as a Government Department, it had the first call on the existing output of private manufacturers of steel, explosives, etc. Without such products of private enterprise it could not have operated at all "The private firms accepting contracts for shells had to take what materials' were left, after the requirements of the arsenal had been fully But why was there such a shortage of shell materials in a country producing millions of tons annually oi steel, and with large chemical industries etc ? Let us take the case of steel, with which the writer was more particularly concerned. At the commencement of the war, British steelmakers had an output capacity of about 10 000 000 tons of steel, of which about one-fourth was made by the acid openhearth and acid Bessemer processes, the bulk of the remainder being made by the modern basic open-hearth process. Among the former there were a few old-established firms, with a small total output, whose plant was designed to cast tiny ingots of half a ton. On the other hand, all the larger and more modern plants were laid down to produce ingots of about five to six tons in weight, on the lines of mass production. FEW CHOSEN. In pre-war days the Ordnance Department at Woolwich acting on similar lines to those on which the Hebiew eader, Gideon, selected his little army to attack the hosts of Midian laid down in its specifications, conditions which excluded all steel manufacturers save those making half-ton ingots of acid steel, and refused to even consider basic open-hearth steel, the country* main output. Thus only a small fraction of the country's steel output was then eligible for shell steel manulaid down, firstly that only acid steel of a given analysis would be acclpted,. and provided that a certain percentage of waste had to be sawn cold from the top of the ingot to ensure soundness. Sawing cold a small half-ton ingot is a simple matter but similar treatment of a five-ton ingot would involve special machinery, which did not exist, and could no b improvised at short notice, and further would retard output, when a maximum effort was vital. Besides it was unnecessary as the requisite discard could equally well be sawn off the heated ingot as it passed through the rolling mill at the hot shears. The writer was concerned in. representations, both individually and collectively, of the country's steelmakers to ac authorities of the War Office, but t was not until May, 1915, that the later finally gave way and recognised hat "in the day of battle nice tourney rules must be set aside," and new specifications were adopted rendering it possible to call, if necessary on practically the entire British steel output f°lt Smay that during the first nine months of the war, the principal British steelmakers, who were not then allowed through official conservatism to supply steel for British shells, were supplying large quantities to our French and Belgian allies, whose works were in enemy hands, but once the handicap was removed they not only up such supplies, but also met the full British requirements. T.N.T. NOT WANTED. Similar stories can be told about explosives. For example, the writer visited the War Office shortly after the outbreak of the war to point out that large quantities of toluol, the basis of T.N.T., were accumulating at his plant, for which no Government orders were forthcoming. He saw a charming elderly general, who told him that the Department was only interested in cordite, and did not want T.N.T/lt was only after a considerable quantity of this valuable product had been,run to waste at various works that a retired Judge, with a chemical mind, the late Lord Moulton, was appointed Director oil High Explq-

sives, and the country's output of toluol was commandeered by the British Government. No doubt the cordite manufacturers will also have something to say about Dr. Addison's statements.

It is an interesting fact that the Ministry of Munitions, of which Dr. Addison was the Parliamentary chief for a short period, was largely controlled technically by volunteers from the country's manufacturers, who also released many of their skilled clerical assistants so that the Department might be adequately staffed. Permament committees of manufacturers put their services at the disposal of the Minister in London in an advisory capacity, and organised special area committees in all manufacturing districts to expedite the output of munitions. The writer was himself acting-chairman during the war of one of the more important of these munition .area committees. The very costing system, which Dr. Addison commends so warmly,' was drawn up by important consulting accountants, who were the regular auditors of private manufacturing firms, and conversant with the lattef's costing methods.

Finally Dr. Addison hints unfairly at profiteering, when he remarks that the national factories had produced ammunition components, costing £33,000,000, which, if bought at contract prices, would have cost £42,000,000. As a Parliamentarian, he must know that all the private firms in question were declared controlled establishments, under the Munitions Act and Rules, and their relainable profits were limited to a margin of 25 per cent, over the average annual profits of the three preceding years. _ ...... auJaaJ^USß^i «