RULES ONCE MORE

Evening Post, Volume CXIX, Issue 98, 27 April 1935, Page 16

RULES ONCE MORE

FORCE IN CUBA

DISTRUST OF FACTIONS

DISCONTENT .REIGNS

Cuba's discontent once again has flared "into open conflict. Recently a general strike gripped Havana. Bombs occasionally answered Government rifles and machine-guns, but the major attack of the opposition was waged with non-violent weapons. The strikers, faced the authorities with folded arms. ■■•: r President Mendieta and Colonel Batista, head of the army, met this challenge to their, rule with' repressive ■measures,- which surpassed even those employed by the Machado dictatorship; writes Charles A. Thomson.in the ."New York Times." These measures brought apparent success, and soon many of the workerSi were reported returning to their jobs.l When they did so, however, hundreds, were arrested ; and lodged in prison. • HISTORY OF REVOLT. The strike movement had been gathering momentum since the middle of February, when a walkout of teachers and / students, numbering 300,000, according to some estimates, closed every school on the island, from the kindergarten to the university. Government employees later swelled the ranks of the strikers, and finally organised labour, was drawn into the struggle. The striking students and teachers . early : formulated five principal demands: (1) Abolition of military rule; (2) restoration'of democratic methods of government; (3) release of all political prisoners; (4) abolition of sum-' mary courts (Tribunales de Urgencia); and (5) larger expenditures .on education. To gain the desired reforms, the strike leader's demanded the resignation of. both President Mendieta ami Colonel Batista. Although estimates placed the total number of strikers at between 400,000 and 500,000, President Mendieta, in a statement, termed the movement "the work of a small minority who realise they would not obtain the support ot the people, in an election and wish, to triumph through violence." He declared that the strike was directed not so much against his Government "as against the very foundations of the Republic." He reiterated his intention to hold fair elections at the earliest possible moment, and said he would not resign until this had been- accomplished. MENJMETA'S RULE. Under the Mendieta regime some economic" improvement has taken place, thanks in large part to the sugar and tariff policies of the Roosevelt Administration. The price of sugar has been steadily if slowly rising; labourers are receiving.higher wages than for.some time past;, ' Regular Budget • revenues of the Government have markedly increased and for the first seven months of the present fiscal year total 29,000,000 dollars (£5,800,000),. a larger sum than for any year since, 1932. However, this year's budget of expenditures has been raised, by the voting of extraordinary credits, to 67,000,000 dollars (£13,400,----000)," a figure 50 per cent, greater than last year's. Competent critics have charged, the Government with disorderlyVfinancial administration, . and fear, that,present policies 'are producing a mounting deficit. ; While opposition politicians in the recent strike undoubtedly fanned the, ■flame of their efforts would have been fruitless had hot the popular temper been restless 'and dissatis- t fled. The overthrow of the hated Ma-' chado dictatorship in August, 1933, it had been expected, would usher in a "new Cuba" characterised by social justice and greater economic and political independence. 'No fundamental reform has been achieved. ; STATE OF DISILLUSIONMENT. •■ It is the old politicians who control the Government; Machado's former party, the Liberals, is'rapidly winning back its strength; the.island seems to be slipping towards another dictatorship, possibly more ironclad than that of Machado. ; The urge for a new deal in the island has been balked. Irj. consequence .-bitter disillusionment resigns. ; ;:-'; i "Nobody/believes ;in anybody," declares one Cuban writer, "and the statement is almost literaly true. The opposition does not believe that Mendieta will hold fair elections. Mendieta,' and Batista doubt the good faith of the opposition groups. Few Cubans believe in the sincerity of Washington's announced policy of nori-intervention. It is this; state of smouldering resentment and frustrated -' ambition which fostered the development of the strike movement. It ■Was backed in truth by a loose and heterogeneous array of groups. There was the United Front of Public Employees, allegedly representing 50,000 Government clerks and office-holders and 9000 school teachers, which claimed (leadership of the | anti-Government drive; -. ) THE LABOUR BATTALIONS. Next there was labour. Its battalions included not only the unions o£ the Communist-led National Confederation of Labour, but also the conservative railway brotherhood and in addition many independent organisations. ■ Moreover, several political parties actively sympathised with the movement. First, the semi-Fascist ABC society, a middle-class organisation with probably a more intelligent leadership than any other group in Cuba; its representatives sat in the Mendieta Cabinet for the first six irtbnths of its rule. Second, the autenticos, followers of former President Grau San Martin; they claimed last summer a large following in the rural districts arid among Cuba's Negroes and unemployed masses, but within recent.months have lost ground. A third party, "Young Cuba," has drawn off from the autenticos their most aggressive spirits. In contrast with the latter party, whose goal is a liberal democracy, "Young Cuba" would establish %i Socialist State; it openly advocates' violent revolution. Confronting this diverse and disparate group of oppositionists stood President Mendieta. An old-style eaudillo but honest and practical, he had gathered about him, when he entered office in January, 1934, a strong coalition Cabinet. But one by one his supporting parties have dropped away—the ABC, the Menocal Conservatives, the National Republicans of Miguel Mariano' Gomez. There , remained finally only members of his own party, the Union Nacionalista. From that remnant, moreover, there have been nine Cabinet resignations since the strike began. In consequence President Mendieta today is a man without political backing. The Menocalistas and the Liberals have offered him support in the present crisis; none the less, his Government would have fallen long ere this had it not been for two factors. One is colonel Batista. . BATISTA'S STRENGTH. I Colonel.Fulgeneio Batista now com; mands 13,000" soldiers, 3000 marines, and 3000 national police. He has whipped a disorganised army into a highly-efficient military machine, and as long as he retains army loyalty he is unquestionably the centre of power in present-day Cuba. I. talked with him for ah hour a few weeks ago; he'

I possesses energy, intelligence, and personal magnetism. His black eyes sparkle as- he speaks, and flashes of eloquence lighten even a private conversation. " . Batista recognises the need of fundamental reform in Cuba; he recognises also )his own power. Yet, paradoxicallyi he declares: "I cannot do what I would." - He feels that social and economic progress is thwarted by political 'factionalism and reactionary selfinterest; that until some equilibrium is achieved the army must stand as the bulwark of order. He believes he has been "appointed by destiny" to, serve Cuba. , Washington has constituted the second main prop of Mendieta. It viewed his accession to power with evident satisfaction. It was expected that his coalition. Government would prove the representative and middle-of-the-road agency for channelling, in accordance with the Welles policy, the Cuban revolution into orderly and constitutional courses. ACTIONS BY WASHINGTON. Mendieta's Government was recognised within five days, although the preceding Grau regime had been denied recognition for more than four months. In May the Platt Amend-, ment was abrogated; in August the United States signed a reciprocity pact' with Cuba. These measures largely failed to improve Cuban-American relations in general, because they were interpreted on the island as special favours to an increasingly unpopular regime. Decisively as Mendieta appears to ] have crushed the opposition- thrust, his 1 victory may prove Pyrrhic. The use lof repressive measures of unprecedented severity has robbed his Govlernment of whatever democratic prestige it still possessed. He is now more completely dependent on Batista and the military than ever before. j Batista himself might take over the I Presidency with ease. But rather ! than affront local and international opinion with' an open military dictatorship, he may prefer to continue to exercise his decisive, influence from the background. In any case, military .dominance seems destined to continue^ and as long as it lasts, talk of elections is but pious futility. A SHARPER DIVISION. The recent test of power may result in a more v clear-cut division between Cuba's right and left forces. On one side, allied with Batista and the army, now stand the island's conservative ecpnomic interests and the political parties which symbolise the oldregime —Machado's former Liberals, Menocal'? Conservatives, Mendieta's Nationalist? On the other are ranged labour and those '"revolutionary" groups' which seek' fundamental reform—the ABC the autenticos, "Young Cuba." ,- It'ftjmainf %o be seen to what extent these tatter .groups' can achieve sufficient working'unity to oppose the dictatorial tendencies of the military, or to become themselves a constructive force. For the. present the prospects for their success are not. bright.