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Evening Post. THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 1935.

FIRMNESS WITHOUT THREATS

From the clear and cold analysis made by Sir John Simon the House of Commons could draw scarcely even a hint of the British policy for Stresa. No, doubt this was eminently correct. The Foreign Secretary's speech was not an outline of British policy, but a summarised statement of the views of other States. As such it was admirable in form. There was no suggestion of pre-judgment of the case; no tendency to present a dramatic and colourful picture of the diplomatic contest on the Continent. As an impartial approach to a conference that may be decisive, the statement was diplomatically correct, in every particular. Yet it was evidently unsatisfying to the House of Commons. Sir Austen Chamberlain, Sir Herbert Samuel, and Mr. G. Lansbury, maintaining the unity so strikingly demonstrated in the debate which preceded the exploratory mission, asked no question which would have suggested a divergence of opinion. Sir Austen Chamberlain was careful to say, in supporting the request of Mr. Lansbury t and Sir • Herbert Samuel for an'early debate, that the only object was for the Government to know that in these critical times it had the support and authority of the House behind it. But this statement and the questions addressed to the Foreign Secretary and his colleagues from other parts of the House indicated an unsatisfied desire to know what policy the House and the. country were supI porting.

Had Sir John Simon been slightly less analytical the effect of his statement might have been different. The Foreign Secretary recognises, of. course, the gravity of the present position; but his summary was made with the detachment of an onlooker. Mr. Stanley Baldwin speaking in Wales on the same date maintained an equally correct attitude but yet managed to convey his sense of British apprehension and British determination not to be dragged at the wheels of a Continental war chariot. At times, he said, he felt that he was living in a madhouse. He h«d not lost hope yet in the limitation of armaments and he would stick to Germany on that subject until she had declared that she would not have anything to do with it.

But if she or any other country will not consider these things, then I think the situation becomes far more difficult. I would say this—this country does not want war, and does not mean to have war, and if wax* can only be stopped by letting the aggressor know that war will not be' permitted in Europe, this country will play her part, I am convinced, with the rest of Europe to see that do aggression shall take place.

This, and the appended affirmation of Britain's adherence to collective security, inside the League of Nations, offended no canon of diplomacy. Yet it gave a warning, and a warning that the House of Commons would have been anxious to support had Sir John Simon given it the opportunity. Made by Mr. Baldwin at Llandrindod Wells the declaration will strengthen the hands of the British delegation; but it would have strengthened their hand still more had it been made by the Foreign Secretary at Westminster. Britain is not yet ready to approve the note of impatience in the "Morning Post" question: "When land where is this exploratory business going to end?" Still less is the country prepared to brush aside as absurd the encirclement objection to a defensive security system without Germany. But the reception of the Foreign Secretary's statement shows that the fear of indecision is growing. The views of the Powers have been ascertained. They reveal a great divergence, but they do not reveal that the gap is so wide that it would remain unbridgeable by a j decisive lead from Britain. M. Stalin [acknowledged the remarkable influence exercised by one little island in the maintenance of peace. His remark may be attributed, not merely to his perception of the strategic position of Britain geographically, but to the impression of friendship with firmness conveyed so successfully by Mr. Anthony Eden. If the firmness is not missing at Stresa, British influence may still be decisive.

The prospects for Stresa, and for Geneva where the second act of the drama will be staged, are indeed dependent upon the note introduced by the British delegation. Germany's demands are excessive and disturbing, and the reservations of Herr Hitler in the conversations add to uneasiness. The statement that he was not prepared in the present conditions to contemplate the inclusion of Lithuania in any pact of non-aggres-sion and that he saw great difficulty in defining "non-intcrfcrcncc" in relation to Austria suggest strongly that the Fuhrer is averse to any agreement which will hamper the Nazi

aims for Memcl or for Austria. And even in (lie short interval between Hcrr Hitler's conversations with Sir John Simon and Sir John's statement to the House the full-dress campaigning of Nazi forces in' Danzig demonstrated that the German-Polish pact had not settled everything for ten years. But with all these disturbing signs there are close observers who are convinced of Herr Hitler's desire for peace. The Prussian Nationalists of the old school still cherish a dream of German hegemony in Europe, and the Fuhrcr's bold pursuit of treaty revision makes it appear that he and the Junkers have similar aims. Yet only two months ago Lord Lothian, who has no sympathy with Nazi principles, declared in a letter to "The Times" that he had not the slightest doubt of HenHitler's peace sincerity. This conviction was based upon a visit to Germany and talks with Herr Hitler and prominent Nazis. Behind Hitler and urging him onward, however, are the Junkers. If there is no restrain.ing influence they will press him on to Memel and to Austria. The difficult task confronting the British delegation to Stresa is to shape the restraining influence in such a way that Herr Hitler will respect it, not resenting it as a provocative encircling movement, but accepting it as an assurance of the equality he demands. All the skill of Sir John Simon and all the conciliatory powers of the Prime Minister will be required in the negotiation of a new Locarno. It is regrettable that they enter upon their task without the reinforcing support which a united House of Commons would surely have accorded had Sir John Simon given it a lead and the opportunity. ' .

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19350411.2.39

Bibliographic details

Evening Post, Volume CXIX, Issue 86, 11 April 1935, Page 8

Word Count
1,070

Evening Post. THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 1935. Evening Post, Volume CXIX, Issue 86, 11 April 1935, Page 8

Evening Post. THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 1935. Evening Post, Volume CXIX, Issue 86, 11 April 1935, Page 8

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