RISK OF WAR

Evening Post, Issue 29, 4 February 1935, Page 18

RISK OF WAR

,/ECONOMIC CAUSES

'.EXCESSIVE NATIONALISM

SIR J.f STAMP'S VIEWS

Some of tho economic factors that May"m'ako'rfor war were dealt with by Sir Josiah Stamp, the English economist, in a recent 8.8.0. address which flfas^ subsequently reproduced in "Tho Listener."

["I have been asked to deal primarily with, tho economic causes of war (ho eaid).s Such isolation o- certain aspects for* special Btudy, though artificial, has a real value so long as "we remember;-what we are doing. Ido not belong'to *that school which accounts, by* whatsis, called tho economic interpretation of history, for all that has happened by desire for economic gain or defence of economic interests. But in.' all that interrelated collection of conditions preceding any great event, fhere.is always an economic factor or condition. It generally depends upon our definition whether it can really be called a "cause," even though we are ablo to "say the event would not have happened if the factor had not been present. The ambiguity in tho term •^causo" is^shown, for example, by the common statements about the Boer T^str. It was said 'that tho real cause was geological, because if gold deposits had not existed in the Transvaal, there wpnld have been no incursion of science, capital,, and labour from outside. This influx,was an economic move. Geology could never have caused the war, for tfie- war was man-made; then economics arising from geology must have caused it'« But the- ordinary economic working of mines is not, as such, a cause of W.ar. ,It was the fact that the new population had no political rights; the old^burghors were afraid of losing the ultimate control; Kruger, hating political suzerainty, feared still moTo the foiree- of'-new; numbers and wealth. Tho so-called causo'then becomes political and racial. As Mr, Money Kyrlo said, on' the "analogy of medicine, there arc precipitating causes, and predisposing or-> constitutional causes. If wo do not take care we may elevate economic condit'iona into altogether too prominent a place as necessary causes of war, and I refuse- to give that title to any condition^ which can easily exist without giving rise to trouble. Dry brushwood is-Bot the cause of a fire—but we have to'^bel careful about it, and much tho same, may, be said about economic inequalities and jealousies.

In the armaments debate in the Commons the other day, tho Foreign Secretary, referring to tho Bolivia-Chaeo War,-said'r." It-appears'to be the opinion of some honourable gentlemen that a-pfiofi every war in the world begins out .of some economic cause. I am not claiming to know about every war, but there'has,never, within my knowledge, been'a war in which economic causes have' played a smaller part. '' After referring^ to the fact that the Chaco boundary had,never- been defined, and had been-in .dispute for fifty years, ho said, ",It,is quite true that one of tho elements, no-doubt, is that Bolivia would.like to have a port on the great river,th'at rnhs'through." Honourable mßmbers 1 exclaimed: "That is economic." "\ > ; WAB FOB LOOT AND BOOTY. .SJxamination of the causes of war in history,is'o£ very limited value to us. We dismiss tho religious, dynastic, and military, ambition causes. Tho econo-' mitff cause as ,pure loot or booty is also, for, the'larger part of the world, quite obsolete. .It may exist as a hidden auxiliary motive, but is not avowed or primary. After recent experience, no great nation would be foolish enough to-.believe-taat.it can beat another great nation, and, after paying its own cash .expenses, make a cash profit by an indemnity which would compensate also 'the losses of life and limb. It would not be a justifiable business risk. N,o democracy, would consciously set out to beat another along those lines. "War indemnities, even if they appear to be adequate in amount, and are willingly offered, are collectable only at prohibitive co3t to industry. That gftnie is clearly not worth tho candle. But we cannot dismiss the loot and booty cause altogether. There are two possibilities: (1) That in the course of time, with a new generation, the lesson may bo forgotten; (2) that it might actually pay a large nation to bully and beat a small one, by a dramatic military stroke, into submission. The forgetfulneso is not true yet, and we can afford-to dismiss it as a danger today. The second is made more difficult by tho moral sense of. the world marshalled and expressed in tho League, even'without military sanctions. The case'for tho bully must not be as thin as mere'loot. Even if by loot we include .annexation of territory, this also is of doubtful gain, for only personal occupation, dispossessing tho present inhabitants, can transfer much wealth to tho 'Victor. "When slavery was not universally condemned, it had great importance. No, even a review of the economic, causes of war in past history does not^help <very much —so many are now,, almost 'obsolete. The justification of our Chinese wars a century ago was no ,doubt good enough by the standards -of 'jjfche time, but -they would hardly .stand1 the1, severer tests of today. The .partition of Africa and the spheres, of influence in China, only forty years ago:, provoked issues for whieh.war,'as the possible solution, or remedy, was 'talked' about calmly and freely. ; The^partition is complete, the spheres of^inflnonce no longer so gre,atly .trouble us. -What,then are tho conditions today wnich ,may' provoke war? I will list threet (1) Economic penetration; (2) economic inequality; (3) differential population. CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC PENETRATION. Tho brains and capital of a developed country enter a'country loss advanced, mining or railway concessions are willingly granted, and the economic de"velopment is profitable to both sides. But in course of time the conjunction of twol'peoples with different political ideas provokes animosity, as in tho Transvaal, and the immigrants look to tHeir,motherland for help in their persecution, or.tho developing country re-'grots-its bargain and thinks the substance of 'the" country's wealth is going | €o the foreigner."We have only to think 'how. Palmerston ;,.would have handled the recont Anglo-Persian oil dispute, and .how it" was actually settled, to -Tcalise'the rapid development of international methods. Tho Japanese and Chinese relations over tho Manchurian problem^ are^ the outstanding example of ;the ,~CQnß.equen.ees of economic penetr4tion. Tho mere subscription of private capital on, a large scale, might ©n,<?o, on a wanton default, have called the\big"guns into action. Probably tho defaulting States of America, if access'iblCby sea, would havo been visited by a ship or two, but for the fact that the federation o£ States protected its parts from any kind of outside suasion while- «onveniently not taking any rosponsibility for the enormity of their actions.

! .flh'.geherai, the risks of , war through economic penetration are greatest when theroj is ■■&■ considerable alien population, "forlt'is'some harsh treatment of theße exiles, rather than the mercenary interest, which would today serve as

tho immediato pretext for war, on tho ground'of national honour. Indeed, whoro economic penetration has taken place honourably, it is the defence of national interests from insult 'on grounds ,of national prestige, rathor than on grounds of economic gain, that is the cause.. ,Qn a simple economic proflt-and-loss account, tho cost of war might be far greate.r than tho point to be gained, but' national honour and prestige would dictato tho action. A survey of the world indicates that these provocations should become steadily less, antl there is none that caimot be better and more economically settled by The Hague or the League than by war. These must now bo perfect solvents of questions of honour. An agreement between Trance and' Germany concerning the payments to be made for the gold value of the Saar mines, should the territory decide to return to German nationality in January next, was described in a loading journal the other day as "eliminating what might have been a very serious thorn in the .flesh of European peace." ■UNEQUAL DISTKIBUTION OP NATURAL WEALTH. The second class are economic r in-. equalities-^-first, those made riaturallyj second, those made politically, In the past the necessity for agricultural products'has loomed largo in the, outlook of nations and determined their policy —they desired spheres of influence which meant supplies of food and raw 1 materials.. Sir Thomas Holland, when president of the British Association, 1 showed the influence of these motives in our penetration of British India— how minerals have taken the first place lin envy and jealousy, not so much because of great intrinsic values, but as 1 thekeys to many enormous values and 1 scientific potentialities formerly unr 1 realised. And it is no longer merely 1 a question of largo deposits, such as phosphoric ores, as in Alsace-Lorraine, with the accompanying economic power, resting upon the production of pig-iron —a power so important to Germany in 1914. If is the finer question of the rarer minerals. In 1888 manganese and other ferro alloys brought a host of rare metals, out of.rt^e laboratory into the field of urgent human nee'es--1 sity—they became essential to the progress of an advanced nation in the ' arts of peace. It. was not till .1914 ' that they had also fundamentally changed the requirements for war. The 1 unexpected.: included !the wolfram deposits of South Burma, and nickel. Germany had been using'ores from the British Empire, the while Aye had been; if not ignorant, at any-rate oblivious of their vital importance. The distribution of key minerals has no relation whatever to political boundaries or requirements—it. is quite accidental—-and to,those who do not,possess them seems "quite unfair." If all nations had a 1 share, they might bo of little importance as provocation' for war, or preventions of it. f But tho,facts aro that 90 per. ?cent. of asbestos comes from the British Empire, 63 per! cent, of chromite 1 and over 90 per cent, of nickel from ' Canada. Sir Thomas Holland gave 94 1 per cent, potash from Germany and 1 France,. 70 per '• cent, petroleum from ! United States,' 78 per cent.;, antimony ' from China and Bolivia, 50 per cent. ; copper' from the United - States. The | world depends' upon the ■ Empirp for Chinaclay, gold, mica, monazite, nickel, and strontium. Of these, nickel is of dangerous importance in time of war. Between the British Empire and the 1 United States an enormous proportion of the1 important minerals are shared. Ypt even if they pooled their resources, ' there aro still essential links missing. Experts tell us v there will never be a synthetic metal.' No artificial substance can ever give \the■ qualities of mica-— there can never be synthetic mica, with , all its special and important qualities. 1"A MINERAL SANCTION AGAINST ' ~;- . !;■;.>. _.-vVWAR.";- ': • ... .'. ' , There are,two sides to this maldistribution ■"■■: One side makes possibilities, for war and the other for peace. Unqualified self-determination of the nations is in* with. the ■ distribution of essential metals and the desire for equal opportunity of de- • velopment. A desire to hold on relenti lessly to mineral resources ■within each , area' has been manifesting itself. This , monopoly of essentials by a few seems ; inevitably to make for national enmity ; and.'strife.'' But the other-side is that i possession by a few—if.. they are the • right few—may make what General ; Smuts calls "a mineral sanction against ; war.", "The only, two nations that , can fight for long on.their own natural 1. resources are the British Empire and i the United States. If they are firm in I refusing to export mineral products to i those! countries that infringe tho Kel- ; Jogg Pact, no war "can last; very long." ■ Proposals have: been made in both i countries for a rider to- the Pact, i giving each country the authority, to i prohibit the export of-mineral products, ■ iron ore, Tubber, manganese, nickel, • chromium, copper, tungsten, aluminium, '. and ■ mercury to any treaty-violating i country. The proposals have perhaps i been a little optimistic in treating the . British Empire as the same kind of unit ■as the United States. It is only an i economic; unit so long, as the British' I Fleet .maintains; its shipping. connec- ; tions, and'its political unity of decision lis subject, to, important: qualifications ;of Dominion sovereignty.' But the prin- • ciple of; economic; sanctions is importi ant and;capable ofi great development. • Mean while; the jealousy remains. Italy ! has been.in the ■forefront in urging a l proper, distribution ,of the world's Taw i material according to national needs— i even suggesting collaboration 'to de-. ' velop unpopulated lands.by labour from I densely populated countries; and by in- ; tcrnational co-operatidh" of an unprecei dented kindy; supplying a common, need,, 1 But even. : this does not' delocalise an • essential mineral. The secretary of the '. American'lnstitute- of Mining Engir i heers said recently.!.in;; London that th'o • possession of anyi kind of these, minerals is a> responsibility to the whole ■ world—a country has '-'no right to sit ; down on that' supply." The United States has often raised the general '.. question;'.; I could give.scores of quotations on rubber and oil. A prominent general said, for' example, ''The possibility is not remote of there being a , new world tragedy over the'petroleum • dispute." The author of "Wo Fight ' for Oil" says: '"The danger cannot bo removed by denying its existence. Peace cannot be maintained by repeating the ■ lie that w;ar between Great Britain and ; the United States is impossible." Presi- ' dent' Goplidge referred many times tp it 1 and re-emphasised his "Government's ' policy of supporting private companies in the acquisition of foreign oil fields. He said: : "lt.is even probable that the " supremacy-of nations may be deter- | mined by tho possession of available ; petroleum;and its products." Some of us have lively recollection of Presi--1 dent Hoover's attitude to us on tho 1 rubber monopoly question during the ' Geneva; Naval-Conference.' Some'economic inequality is unavoidable, but in ■■• time-of peace it is bearable, partly ' mitigated by greater freedom of trade, partly relieved, by equitable adjust- ' ment, through the League. It is only ' fear of being left without in time of 1 war that makes th"s inequality itself ' a cause,of war—a vicious circle!. If the ;■ other causes of war1 go, this one automatically goes with them. iNO ONE ECONOMIC CAUSE IS IRREMOVABLE. My third . head was population in- ' equality, generally called the "pressure, of population upon the means of -. subsistence." "We.'are'asked to picture :a. nation bursting its bounds into the | adjoininglands. .But the'power of pro- • ducing subistence, and distributing by transport and exchange over tho iv-holo 1 world is now almost embarrassingly

great, and so one bogy goes. Again, all tho. industrial nations are within sight of their maximum population, and an actual decline,will soon set in—so another bogy goes. The difficulty may remain in certain Eastern countries, but as a modern "cause of war, overpopulation 'in the old sense is losing its importance. . Major Douglas ,'s criticism of Bank of England policy last week was quite misconceived. The bank can hardly reply in the same way, for it is the Government's banker and never publicly discusses its clients' affairs, and monetary policy is a Governmental affair. It discharges monetary functions laid'down by the-law of the land and does not enter JLto public controversy | about them any more than a Government Department' would. But I will say for myself that when Major Douglas suggests that war would be avoidable if bankers thought as he does, I emphatically disagree with him. In so far as the desire of armament firms to make profits leads them to egg politicians on, by fear or rivalry, to larger armaments, and larger armaments lead to war, it may be said to be an economic cause. But it was explicitly dealt with, as his main theme, by Mr. Cole, and I will do no more than say that I agree with much that he said, but I do not believe any war has actually been brought about in this way—it has been only one of the assisting factors. No one of . the so-called "economic causes of war *is irremovable or irresistible, if the spirit of excessive nationalism is destroyed, and a reasonable internationalism for really international interests take's its place. '