NEW NAVAL PACT

Evening Post, Volume CXVIII, Issue 122, 20 November 1934, Page 9

NEW NAVAL PACT

LIMITATION NEEDED

PROLE' OF BRITAIN

: /With the; arrival :in^London;;b£- the American; and Japanese delegates,:; the conversations "initiated last ■ July "as a preliminary . to' next year's. Naval Coniference will resumed, wrote Hector BywateFin the "Daily"Telegraph" recently;'.'.■'.;:'; ;'.,■ ■;..''.•'• "\, '": '■',"'''' :";.'' ■■.'; ' '-[",.".■ v

.The importance of the exchange of views is < attested by- the'character of the delegations.' ; ::-?-!•;■■■ .'■'■■' :~,■:•'-'. :'/<■ : .

This time Mr. Norman -.Davis, ; the United States Ambassador-at-Large,vis accompanied ! by Admiral 'Staudley, whose position as Chief of Naval Opera--tions corresponds- with; .that *of our Fiyst Sea Lord; ; :' [\oj ::■: '•■■ •■>;;';

■ v'Japan is represented by Bear-Admiral ■I. Yamambto, ■ who is known. to have received the most explicit instructions from his superiors'.' '■■ ■■■' ;; ■ ..'■.','■.;■■

'France and-Italy also'are expected to send'spokesmen of eminence. It looks, indeed, as'if the conversations about to open - will be in the nature of a: dress "rehearsal of -the' Conference itself.; ■ ■ -

The task'awaiting-thevdelegatesis' a truly; formidable one' At no time since the war have; the'naval policies of the Great: Powers- seemed-less reeoiicilable. Conipared with that; now existing, the situation on' the eve; of,the' WashingtonConference in; 1921 was simplicity itself, wnile' even the London Conference of 1930, which achieved :but a partial* sue-' cossj did not have to face diniculties in any way.; comparable with those which hive Bince matenalisod. " ' "

' -The naval problems of today are not merely 'political and technical,;! but,: to some extent, psychological.; ;At the first conference held thirteen years ago the element of nationalism was virtually in abeyance; Today; that: element is .extremely active, and is exerting a strong influence on the; naval policy of more than1 one Great Power. ~; ' •'■-

Alike in the preliminary; .talks and

at the' Conference itself Great 'Britain will occupy a placejvery. different from that which she held in/1921.andlQSO.,

On both those occasions she possessed largo: resorves of naval strength upon which to draw'when it became expedient:i to ; bargain for concessions.- .-Now those reserves" have "disappeared, "and in their room is a glaring deficit:, Consequently we .are no longer in a position to offer a substantial fquid pro quo "to Powers which we may invite to scale clown their naVal armaments. This is the inevitable result- of "the ; policy •>of unilateral disarmament -jpon w^ich we embarked some years ago.: . ; .; ■:.'. ; ... • Cabinet Ministers and members of the Board of ; Admiralty . have repeatedly told iis of late that the Navy is f^cut.to the bone "arid reducedI'"tb the edgei'pf risk^'^:;\ '. ■"-" ' ■': I'; :y--V:''^:y::-H\-';'' *'■'>:'■■}-> '..

What the country, ough^ to.; know: is that Great Britain , i.s ; not M at 'V'this moment capable of defending hersei comrhunications against' assault .by :a Naval Power of the first ranki' ) ■; '■'?■ ;;>::

■.'■; So far, then, as. Britain ; is ..concerned the naval problem appears to be one of reconstruction rathe*, tKan' \of demolition. Onfy' in the event flf: drastic trenchment by all the" l other [ major Powers—not; merely■> the; "cancelling: of building-projects, .but; the •actual scrapping .of , a large proportion ; of,-, their tonnage completed, and ( bnilding^rc6uld Britain safely postpone^ the" rebuilding of her depleted navy. ;vlx- "'f ~'': '■■■' .'■■■'.'■■";. • therefore,..othis country,is a.principal in,the present negotiations, she : cannot hope.AtO: play ;as'actiy.© c a role, as formerly,, "■ She ; must'f'wait and see^^ what ; the;other; Pbiversj have ■■.propose.;"■,■■;•.■■ ,•:'.;;;■";. 1 :;, =..■'■//..;-»<-rt'f-t-a;..'■..;■■ V ■'.. •■■> r- ; TWOHBROUPS: : --v .vH ~ There ■is yet' another. circumstance ' whieh '. will compelv Britain:, to .maintain, at first, this^.attitßde of:^watchful'V aiting. ;li Politically;!the pother.pleading Power? are :divided .into. two. 'groups, the .first consisting, of the State's and Japan,;, the sec'oßdv of,; Prance, and Italy. Neither .group is* particularly interested in the other, :but--and ithis1 is. thei.rub—Britain, is: and. Irmust : be vitally, interested; in;both., 'V,-:y in:s&•'/.' The/United, States t aiid, Japan ' are more' or; less, avowed, rivals .-'for "the command i\of • thei Pacific, -or at ; least/of its main; strategic zpnes^ '■ Jfdr .;; geographjcal; reasons neither, ne.ed concern itself, 'seriously, with the naval strength of France or'; Italy. ;,..'/,:./K ';', V!.y.' ■'■:.'.& i "To the :Jast:namea; Powers, ontheir part," the.size of- the, American--.orthe JajpaneseJfleet .isi largely^/a, matter.:of indifference/-and; for .similar'reasons. Thus, at jthe, next,'"conference'there ceitainv ; tblbeVAvw Amrican:Japanese;; ratio: ': of. 'relative .strength, and : also; on. the. corresponding pFrancd-ttaliiin" yardstick," each group being in its/own:;'immediate problVmsti';";'.^;': ;':;';. ,■', .';'.-.;'CJ :!-}'\'-\-:i.J". •.',':'■ : - Britaiiij howeyer, 'is unable to Idealise theiNaval problem in this fashion;; Her commitment?; aie "wprifl-widq.^ T' She','iis as vulnerable in the"Atlantic 'as1 in'"the; Pacific/- in :the:" Channel -fs,s V; vin'''r.tiie Mediterranean. or; the:, Caribbean.,';:; ;,;,t' .';.,Heavy^irailding fiyjS-l^the '.^Japanese nivy;' is, a "phenomenon ,iq watched as 'closdly. as'/'the^ ;muljtiplication:i '.of French l^abm^ines'or; the production of German:'' pocket; battWsnips.', ' ''- >' •;:■ I' Five years ago, at the London : "pon- ;- ference, \we j ';'BWfaIr?.ignb_red''lihis;.';",'elementarir truths'asf';to"jenter;intb;;a'pact i37;.wHch:;'6ni^Na^l:'wßs.reg^ated,to',a; stihdard; based': on, :.-^m.eHc^Ln. > ' i o t onV:eni-' enee, a :p'apt! which jhapp^ned 'to ■conform,- for'the 'moment, to Japanese' re-' .quirements/^-^'^r^; ■■'p%l% : '.'f-y(% , ■','■' ;,;:^ :;:;:^ERIbAN;;OTRI^OTHJ: /';■";>: ;. •Continental, navies^ were* lef^ out^.of account, neither .France,nor. Italy being a signatory. Since, it is in the: last de'gree'improbable that any Government /willj be i.guilty.-.j of t r,a ; similar aberration no more .need'be 'Bald'about it, save this: In the last five years our relative .position; in the ■ Channel ;■;•.,and thorMediterranean' has i gone fromj bad to > wOi'sey -and >is',:now-;'such -as"ywould makeVany. British;; strategist;: of,-bygone days'^turnan-.his^grave.M;'l)'; '■'/■■.^■;•:.'•'. ■-.■/.•: '•All indications ipoint';to;;the,,trnited States 'as being .cast?for the;outstanding part in the 1935 conference, vWith a fleet. ; already assured iofvparityVand >n-.;^men's*-i-buildtog-:'i/>.pr«gramih i e.;-V..in traini''she';■ is iix an ; :exceptionally/;strong position; ':\'-'::-'. {:;'-v!H'^r>-W-;;'V;;..'-:v'^K:;:.; '■■'.■ .; 'fbig -navy.'-'(:;eiouncils • prevail, ;nbthingii;can;; prevent her:V»from'. coming, ?!=; a ':ifew ; :;; years ' ; ;.:hence >:; /• the sjepteme naval ;Power in .terms of ship toriiiago rarid'persdnneLv;iHer .intentions may!;be;iforeshad6wed;;by^the|fact .that within, the^'pasfc:ififteen;<;mqntts|,:she has: authorised: the 'constructionVof'l4o new fighting• ships,jali;;of the strongest types; ':^^t''uvri::(^^.-i^.,t:\:^ i:V:^,f-ix,:f i!: Ipec l ts■tti^e.•,\!ni^C€^^♦ tain factor Jin the; ptpcieedingsr SSbe ap-; pearß'-;to;'-b.B^on;':tliJB}'icre'st^of.'-a:wayB;.o£: nationalistjmingled^ritt.an; apprehenv sion it or ' jth c: future : which! her .'inenis fin& harditoj elucidate. i,TKe c Japanese Press habitually refers t0.1935 as ( ' v 'tn? yeariOf. peril,*r.tKough.;apart from;the Naval Confererice.and her, final severance from the: League.of Nations: there is no jobviousireason;why; Japan should look to.ithe coming,'year,; with /such anxiety. ; ; ; pr,. ; -w^.\-.;VV-'fv;-:oj';s» •;ii-r->^ ; Meanwhile' ; she isVbuildingv'iip.tp. the limit of::'naval Strength. sanctioned by treatyy.i-Bhav'tiaß^emi-^iEciallyi-i'repudi-ated. the,treaty ratios,■ f and .is; .claiming full'parity^with;^h^ v str.oiigest;;;:»i'";-;. ■■>■ ,;' This acute sensitiyeness on.the subjoct of hatioriai defence is bound .to" influence ;Japan's.attitudo:'at'the-Confer-ence;: and we shaU do well'to be prepared/for it. Fbrttinately the. old-ties of frieiv^shipjwith,Hthis/couiitry;remain. ■••■ It- maybeihat'in* helping1 to -eompqse the differeaftesI::;between the -United States ;andi Japan, which. are -responsi-, ble' for the'present naval ;race vinl.the Pacific,' British;; statesmanship; may ; find a; golden: opportunity'fto'proinotedis; armament and -peace,'"v> ":•'•,•: •'' ■ Vi'-'.v-')''•■:'::*' : ; ;'' \ *'-^.ymEKE ■ ;% .-. ■'•■.■Nbarer^ at home; tie^^navai; problem is'painfully 'complicated;r'lnl -recent' years■ France- and.■ Italy ' "resp«ctively. have'a6Meved ;&'naval .strfength\''never x foreseen" when- existing'; treaties kwere signed. J Though our relations' with' both Powers /are: of'tho! friendliest^ British, strategists! are bbund: rto -take "cbgnisance of the amazing growth -of their two fleets.':;'■; r'.^ty'-. -:•'■ -:;X V:-:/:' ;i-;'-=^ France: now has nearly four times as many submarines,'and 'Italyv nearly thrice-; as: many,:;as^ .Germany: Jjossessed in; 1914. :■'; Conversely, "-Britain's antisubmarine forces are barely one-third' as strong as "they; were at that date; Clearly, therefore, some readjustment of the balance'is'essentiatif thai; sense of security- which ?is the-'"bedrock^of sound diplomacy is to be',restored. ;'.',',' Other ; developments tending ,to confuse the-; situation in: Europe are' the building of hew ''ships 'by France and Italy-^-the latter5 has. just/ ordered' the two largest battleships :in -the' world—• and "the renaissance of; the. 'Germany

navy;.-1' ■"■ •'■':. \ ■'■ :■ '.:■■'\\'"'y"- ■■,':■■■'• :i . ;''v Within tMs-bncf: review there is' no scope for a 'discussion of-> the'inany other issues -which'/'-'must 'be' ventilated at the Conference, such as the sice and gun-calibre; of 'future ships', the future of the submarine, the limitation or control: of naval ■'aiicfaft and I personnel; Taxpayers not interested in tehnical de^ tails may nevertheless be into attention fby being reminded that the outcome of the Conference oniay make a", difference'of t£Io,OOO>OOO to £15,000,000 in our annual .\Navy^Estimates for the next six years./ ",; ;

Should/the Conference fail* and yet; by some miracle, unbridled competition be averted, the- fivo1 Groat Powers be: tween them would still Have to-spend £800,000,000 on the bare replacement of their existing fleets. . - ■It wiH be seen, therefore,' that whether the matter is regarded either from th&; political or ■; the economic, point of view, a: new naval limitation' agreement is well worth striving for.