EVENING POST. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1934. AIR AND EMPIRE

Evening Post, Volume CXVIII, Issue 101, 26 October 1934, Page 8

EVENING POST. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1934. AIR AND EMPIRE

A remarkable article in the j une number of the "Round Table" on "Air Power and Imperial Defence" opens with the remark of a high authority which, though humorous in form, is in substance profoundly pessimistic. It ends on such a note of optimism as has been rarely heard since the spring tide of the Empire's Armistice enthusiasm first began to ebb. Air-Marshal Lord Trenchard once said that if ho had the casting vote ho would "abolish tho air"; i'or though during peace tiuno aircraft might prove a greater blessing to the Empire than to any other country, this could not balance out the harm they would do in war. Against "the desperate conclusion of this eminent authority the "Round Table" writer set the pessimism which had been more formally expressed by another of still greater eminence about a century ago. "Twenty-six years after the first practical steamship was launched" and twenty-three years after Trafalgar, the Duke of Wellington's Government refused the requesjt of the Colonial Office for a steamer to carfy the mails between Malta and the lonian Islands. The only ground was that "the introduction of steam was calculated to strike a fatal blow to tho naval supremacy of the Empire." As even the pacifist who objects to the mention on Trafalgar Day of New Zealand's immeasurable obligations to the British Navy must recognise in his calmer moments, it was the supremacy of that Navy that gave the Empire a substantially uninterrupted peace at sea for nearly a century before tho World War, and it was steam that enabled it to maintain the position that Nelson had won. As the Duke oi: Wellington was wrong, says tho "Bound Table," may not Lord Trenchard also bo wrong? May not air powor not only vastly increase the riches of the Commonwealth by spoeding up communication, but also unify it by quickening contact between its parts and above all maintain its security as fully as once did steam powcH It is a little more than three weeks since we left our review of the "Round Table" unfinished. About a third of the interval is accounted for by the wonderful event to which that hackneyed phrase "the cynosure of every eye" may be applied with less extravagance than usual. From the standpoint of one who is to write about air power that week has been well spent. If it is permissible to qarry Lord Trenchard's figure of speech a little further, we might say that the permanence of the air, which he desired to abolish, is now secured on firmer foundations than ever. We may as well think of the solid ground failing beneath our feet as of the air failing to provide a highway for a steadily increasing share of the commercial and personal intercourse of the nations and to exercise a commanding influence for the purposes of war as well as of peace. The distance between London and Melbourne or Wellington is now reduced from weeks to days, and in due course may be reduced to minutes. But, even as things stand now, the blindest of pacifists should be ablo to see that the distances between these once isolated lands and capitals that may be less friendly than London are proportionally reduced in the same way, and that the new conditions call for some more powerful measures of defence than saying we hate war and shutting our eyef and hoping that nothing will happen. Britain must of course remain the centre of the Empire's defence under the new conditions as under the old. As the "Round Table" writer agrees with General Graves in believing that at present "the only known effective deterrent to aerial aggression is the fear of reprisals in kind" the defence of London has obviously become a problem of unique magnitude, but it is not a matter in which the Dominions can render any direct help. Indirectly, however, they can help by attending to their own share of the general problem in a manner which, as a whole, they have never attempted, and now seem to be further from realising than ever. The starting point of an Imperial scheme, says the "Round Table," is the hub, Great Britain, and the first step must be to provide this hub with a sufficient air force to deter any Continental Powers from launching an attack. But, while protecting the heart of the Empire, this force cannot possibly protect the circumference. The second part of the problem depends "first, upon whether India and the Dominions can provide their own local air protection, and secondly upon whether, in the event of another World War, all the air forces of the Empire could combine against an enemy centralised in one locality or split up among several." The gross failure of the Dominions hitherto to carry a fair share of the Empire's burden in lime of peace does not at the first glance suggest a favourable answer to these questions, but the "Round Table" writer points out that on two fundamental points the new conditions have reduced the difficulty of united action on an equitable basis. "As in -every other military problem," ho

says, "the primary determining factor is not strategy or tactics, but equipment and finance." The cost of modern warships has been 100 great to allow the Dominrbns to provide themselves with an adequate equipment, and New Zealand alone has cared to pay for the upkeep of a Navy whose administration was not in her hands. Air power, however, the article proceeds, alters the whole of this problem, because it is tlie cheapest form of fighting power that has been introduced during this scientific age. Thus while no Dominion today can afford a fleet sufficiently powerful by itself to safeguard her trado and keep open her sea communications, and while no Dominion can as yet afford a mechanised army of any size, all Dominions can afford small but highly-efficient military air forces. These units, not being tied to land and sea communications, could probably bo concentrated within a few days in an area thousands of miles distant from their starting points. Two further problems—the incentive behind military expenditure, and the establishment of airways that will facilitate war concentration —are next mentioned, and both are said to depend upon the future development of civil aviation. It is conceded by the essayist that "if civil aviation were not a practical proposition, military aviation would be no more than a martial luxury which the Dominions could ill afford." But he points out that India and tho larger Dominions arc "in fact natural homes of aviation," and that before very long there may be two or even three civil machines in each of these countries for every one in Britain. What the writer calls "the foundations of military power" will therefore be no longer "concentrated in the hub, but distributed throughout the circumference' of the Empire." Tho whole picture of Imperial defence will thus be changed; for no longer will the Dominions mainly depend, for their security upon Great Britain, but Great Britain will in large part depend for her security upon tho Dominions. Then and then only will they become true partners in the Empire, taking their full place in it strategically as well as politically. .. . What Power, in the event of another great war, is going to attempt to bomb London out of existence if, whon this dire act is accomplished, the whole aerial might of tho Empire will bo turned against it in an ovorwholming reprisal? It would almost seem that an all-wise- Providence has allowed tho secret of flight to be diseovorod ncft in order to turn humanity mad but in order to prevent it from losing its wits. What light the writer's arguments throw upon the value of the great air race and "vice versa" must be obvious to everybody. By diminishing the distances that divide the heart of the Empire from its remotest parts, and stimulating the air sense of all its component nations the great race may be found to have rendered an invaluable . service to Imperial policy, and to the unity, the safety, and the prosperity of all the King's subjects.