BIG BATTLESHIPS

Evening Post, Volume CXVIII, Issue 78, 29 September 1934, Page 13

BIG BATTLESHIPS

BRITAIN AND U.S. DISAGREE

It is now soini-oflicially admitted that tho preliminary naval conversations in London recently wero not confined to details of procedure at next year's conference, but extended to certain technical matters, writes Hector Bywater in tho "Daily Telegraph." The most important of these, I understand, related to the size of future men-of-war. It was .speedily made clear that the British Government's proposal to limit capital ships to 25,000 or 22,000 tons, and cruisers to 7000 tons, found no support from tho U.S.A., whoso representatives insisted on the necessity of adhering to existing standards, viz., 35,000 lons for capital ships and 10,000 tons for cruisers.

On this question there appears to be little hope of compromise, despito the fact that the British plan is approved, in principle, by Japan and France.

Tho U.S. Navy is anxious, I learn, 1o develop two distinct types of capital ships: tho first a battleship of 35,000 tons, comparatively slow, with ten or more 16in guns; the second a battle cruiser of 35,000 tons and great speed, armed with 1-tin guns. Both types are regarded as essential to the requirements of U.S. strategy in the Pacific. During his visit M. Pietri, tho French Minister of Marine, gave a detailed exposition of French policy 'in regard to submarines, and made it clear that France would find it very difficult to reduce her strength in this arm. Yet without such reduction it will not be feasible to extend the London Treaty ratios beyond 1936.

During the conversations it came out that Prance doos not accept the treaty definition of a cruiser as a ship exceeding 1850 tons and mounting guns above S.lin. On the other hand, British naval experts insist that the thirty-one French "flotilla leaders," which displace nearly 3000 tons and mount 54in guns, are, in. fact, cruisers within tho meaning of the treaty.

Captain Kainori Bi&cia, the Italian naval representative, is understood to havo expounded'ltaly's reaaons for ordering two 35,000-ton battleships on tho ove of the conference. Ho aUo made it clear that Italy's, future programmes of submarine and other light construction will be determined mainly by the actions of France.

Iv -well-informed circles the proliminary talks have created a somewhat pessimistic impression, revealing as they have done- the widely-divergent viows of the various Powers on questions of naval policy that are fundamental. ■ . . •