AN AIR PATROL

Evening Post, Issue 19, 23 July 1934, Page 7

AN AIR PATROL

FOR BRITAIN'S DEFENCE

NEUTRAL ZONE PROJECT

Now that the Air Force is to boeonio the leading arm of the, defence of British security in Europo, the need for: tho creation of a, neutral air zouo

over Dutch and Belgian territory bc- ~ comes all tho greater, writes a London

correspondent, in tho "New' York

Times." Ecsistanco to tho idea iv Holland, and to some extent in Belgium, cannot prevent the study of tho scheme from proceeding. If pcopJo in Amsterdam, or in Brussels, dislike tho ■word "neutrality," some other naino can be devised for, tho special status "which it has been suggested bo imposed upon them.

The demilitarised zone on the right bank of the Ehine was imposed uppn Germany by tho Peace Treaty so as to create a neutral belt of territory iv | front of the defensive position of tho Trench army. In the samo way it is now suggested- the British Air Forco needs a neutral space between it and a potential adversary, coming from the Continent.1..1 To be understood, this principle needs some explanation. The year of tho Euhr occupation— 1923—can be considered as tho date lino when the military authorities in Germany definitely began preparing a plan for an attack on France. The essential facts of this so-called yon Seekt plan are now known.. It was based upon the fact-that tho organisation of tho irench army is such that in the first weeks of a -war tho regular units are swamped in the tide of a mobilisation which makes them incapable of undertaking an offonsivo operation.' Yon feeekt, therefore,' projected a mass attack by shock divisions of tho Beichsvehrto penetrate deep into the French positions,' disorganising their resistance and opening the way for tho pouring, in. of a torrent of auxiliary formations. This plan has now been definitely .shelved for two reasons. DEFENCES TOO GREAT. Tho first reason, which has obliged the German General Staff to cancel the original .plan of a crushing frontal blow, was 'the construction, by the French of the remarkable line of modern fortifications along the. frontier. Not only is this fortified line of immense tochnical strength but, in addition, ifc is permanently -garrisoned by specially-trained troops. German experts then played with the idea of a flank attack, cither through Belgium on tho north or through Switzerland on the south. But the Swiss, having received due warning, have taken steps' to strengthen their defensive position, and the attack through Belgium, cannot bo as easy as in 1914, because of the now forts constructed on the Belgo-Gorman frontier. Tho second reason is of • a psychological nature. "When two years ago German diplomats-raised the demand for equality-'in armaments they 'acted for reasons'of prestigo andagainst the wish of the leaders of tho Eeichswehr, who know that' it is dangbrous to ask for equality in war if in fact a final superiority has' not .already been achieved. Events confirmed the doubts' of the military experts. ' " ■ Immediately after tho presentation of the demand Europe settled down to a close watch of. German military preparations.,, This watch has not been relaxed. It' makes it impossible for Germany, in' tho classical meaning of the word, to be ever ready to strike at her neighbours with an overwhelming superiority in customary armaments. Her only, chance today is to make uso of the element of surprise, striking the decisive blow when .her opponent^,still believe her to be unready for immediate action. In other words, this" moans? that Germany needs a new plan1 for war, based on methods and means unknown to the other side. PLAN FOR StTEERISE. We know that the new German plan, for the reasons given, has for point of departure the employment of absolutely new methods of warfare. But the nature of the plan makes it imperative Jthat it should bo applied-to tho principal theatre of warfare, for it vroujld be dangerous to squander the element of surprise upon a field' of battle of secondary importance. This is the reason why tho Eoichswehr was so ready to- accept the respite of a Ger-inaa-Polish pact of non-aggression in the East, for the essential docision is to be sought in the "West, on tho Ehirie. But :;for-the same reason that tho element of surprise can intervene only once in Germany's favour, the .now plan: of ■ attack foresees simultaneous action against London and Paris. Here we have the explanation of the importance', of the suggested neutral territory embracing Belgium, Holland, and part of the North Sea. For it provides the buffer between the British Air Forco and any attack coming from beyond tho.Bhine. This brings us to tho now proposal of the creation of an air patrol over the Belgo-Dutch sector. Tho ajr patrol takes for it's model the . existing ice patrol which the United .State's main: tains in the Atlantic with an international mandate to observe the progress of icebergs. The air patrol over the Belgo-Dutch zone would be carried on by unarmed aeroplanes, the" duty of which would be not to use force'but to act ,aB observers of possible movements in the- sky. These unarmed observers would be maintained by any Power interested in being advised of . possible passages across the reserved area. Ger-many-could have them. But Great Britain certainly could have'them, and this would create a legitimate form of insurance against a sudden attack. Of course, this,arrangement cannot be perfect, and airmen know that there is always a chance' of slipping by. Still, the moral effect of the air patrol would be considerable, quite apart- from the fact of its, practical advantages.