Evening Post. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1933. RUSSIA'S NEW ROLE

Evening Post, Volume CXVI, Issue 135, 5 December 1933, Page 8

Evening Post. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1933. RUSSIA'S NEW ROLE

w ■- The brilliant send-off which M. Litvinoff received at New York on the conclusion of his highly successful mission was reported on Monday week. After the lapse of sixteen years he had restored the diplomatic relations between Russia and the United States, and it was evident that the good impression that he ' had made was not confined to the official circles of Washington. From New York he was proceeding to Italy at tlto invitation of Signor Mussolini, which, according to a message from Rome, was "apparently due to-a desire to reintroduce Russia to the European comity of nations." If it really was the Italian Duce's desire to give Russia a lead in that direction it must be admitted that he was only marshalling her the way that Under M. Litvinoff's guidance ' she was already.going. If Russia, though a member of the World Monetary and Economic Conference, was in one sense outside the pale, M. Litvinoff enabled her to redeem the futility of the Conference itself by the series of noh-aggression pacts and commercial agreements which he incidentally arranged—an achievement which may be seen in the perspective of history to have been a solid contribution to the security and the prosperity of mankind. .In manners, at any rate, Soviet Russia was just as conspicuously the success of the Economic Conference as the stupidity and arrogance of the Naiis made Germany its worst failure. So gross was Germany's blunder in demanding the restoration of her colonies that the shock which it administered to the Italian delegation was not allowed by Signor Mussolini to; reach the Italian people. The coihity of nations and the decencies of-diplomacy are, of course, not identical issues, but they are related, and the world hopes that Signor Mussolini may have more success with Russia on the One point than he has had With Germany on the other. His^Weekend conversations with M. Litvinoff are reported today to have been "cordial," to have resulted in an agreement to ratify a friendship pact, and to have "cleared the way for the inclusion of Russia in a general disarmament pact supplementing the present Four-Power Pact." Tlie "cordiality" of the conversations might have been taken for granted, and means nothing. The "friendship pact" is a misleading alias>for one of the normal non-aggression pacts by which M. Litvinoff has secured Russia's western frontiers and those of her western neighbours from the common danger, of Nazi aggression. Such a pact was signed by Signor Mussolini and the Soviet Ambassador at Rome on September 2, and it is now to be ratified. The proposed "inclusion of Russia in a general disarmament pact supplementing the present Four-Power Pact" indicates that the conversations must have touched the very heart of the business, but the governing < words "cleared the way for" show that the matter is still open. The two causes which have induced Russia in the course of the present year to abandon, temporarily at any rate, her hopes of a World Revolution and to come forward as a champion of peace, have been the dangers to which she has been exposed by the German menace on her western frontier and the Japanese menace in the Far East. On the ground that anything that disturbed the peace of capitalistic Europe would hasten the coming of the World Revolution, Russian policy had previously favoured the revision of the Versailles Treaty as admirably designed for that purpose. But when the Nazis with their ideal of eastward expansion had taken complete charge of Germany, and the Japanese armies, after seizing Manchuria, were threatening to*go further, there was good reason to fear that Russia might be crushed between these forces long before the World Revolution was in sight. Hence the sudden and momentous change of front which was indicated in May last by Moscow's determination to oppose treaty revision. The change was all the easier because the two chief supporters of revision were the two great Fascist Powers, Italy and Germany. The way to revision of tho predatory Versailles Peace, wrote M. Eadek in the "Izrestia," leads through a new world war. . . . The mere fact that revision of the Versailles Treaty ia linked up with the victory of Fascism shows how much this revision could reckon with the interests of the masses of nations •which are regarded by tho Fascisti as "lower." In view of this anti-German and anti-Fascist obsession, it was natural that the Soviet Governments saw in the Four-Power Pact a scheme dominated by Italy and Germany and designed to dictate to Europe and pro-.,

mote revision. The zeal with which M. Litvinoff had set about securing the western frontier of Russia was accordingly stimulated by the signing of the Pact. What, then, Baid the "Bulletin of International Nows," August 17, is the effect on Europe aa a wholo of this new dovolopmeat oi! Soviot foreign policy? Primarily the effect is twofold:' the isolation of Germany, and the provision of a counterblast to tho Four-Power I-aet signed on^July 15. ... Tlio FourPowor Pact created an oligarchy of tho "Western Powora to which Germany was admitted. Tho now development in Soviot policy has created for the TJ.S.S.B. a position in Eastern Europe without peer or rival, and has doflnitoly put her "on the map" 'as a leading Power in tlio diplomatic world. The effects of the Soviet Union's Oew role upon France and Italy respectively were of course exactly opposite. By isolating Germany it played right into ihe hands of France, the leading anti-German and anti-revisionist Power, which had only heen induced to come into the Pact by the pressure of Britain and the toning-down of its revisionist possibilities. Signor Mussolini,, on the other hand, may well, as the "Bulletin of International News" says, have "regarded with a certain dismay the appearance .of a new factor running counter to his policy." That dismay must surely have been increased by the striking improvement which 1 lias since taken place in Franco-Russian relations.,' If the complaisance which prevents Signor • Mussolini from joining in putting an effective check on the violence of Germany persists it may yet restore the Entente into which she drove France and Russia before the War. But in regard to Russia at any rate Signor is taking a wise course. There is nothing exclusive in those non-aggression pacts of M. Litvinoff, and the ratification of the pact with Italy can do nothing but good. The attempt to bring Russia into closer relations with the other great European Powers and into a more intimate, responsibility for the keeping of the peace may have still more important Results; The Four-Power Pact has indeed been such a dummy that ,it is badly in need of "supplementing." A Five-Power Conference, or a still larger conference, convened at Rome, might find a way out of the dangerous impasse which the precipitance of Heir Hitler and the hesitation or encouragement of Signor Mussolini have created.