FAIRFIELD ESTATE

Evening Post, Volume CXVI, Issue 34, 9 August 1933, Page 8

FAIRFIELD ESTATE

PURCHASE OF SECTIONS

CLAIMS FOR RESCISSION

COMPLAINT ABOUT A HOUSE

Rescission of agreements to purchase sections of land in the Fail-field Estate, Lower Ilutt, together with the return of money paid in pursuance of the agreements, or, alternatively, damages, is claimed "iv two actions begun in the Supreme Court today before Mr. Justice Reed. ' The plaintiffs were "William Fcrricr Had win, a builder, and Mrs. Eleanor Gertrude Stoupe, and the defendant in each case is Charles Gilbert White, solicitor, of Wellington. On his claim for rescission, Hadwin asks for the return of £274 12s, and interest. Alternatively, he claims £400, damages. The amount Mrs. Stoupe seeks to have returned to her is £81 4s lid, with interest, and, alternatively, she is claiming £100 damages^ Mr. E. P. Bunny and Mr. G. It. Powles appeared for the plaintiffs, and Mr. G. G. G. Watson and Mr. H. J. V. James for the defendant. BUILDING RESTRICTIONS. Opening the case and dealing primarily with Hadwin'a action, Mr. Powlcs said that Mr. White was the owner of the Fairfield Estate at Lower Ilutt, a block of land in a very desirable locality, which he cut up for sale ill lots. The estate comprised some 80 sections, four of which Hadwin entered into agreements to purchase. They were sold subject to certain building restrictions, and it was the construction of one of those building restriction's that probably would be in issue in the two_ cases. It was claimed on behalf of the plaintiffs that the. effect of the covenant entered into between the parties with reference to the building restriction was twofold. The pur? chasers had covenanted to build houses of a value of-not less than £900, and the vender, it was submitted, also covenanted that he would not permit a house to be built on any residential section in the estate of a value below that sum. The first cause of action in each case was that the consent of the vender had been given to the erection of a house which was a gross infringement of the building covenant, and upon that ground it was claimed the plain/ tiffs were entitled to rescind the agreements to purchase. Secondly, it was claimed that by the erection of such a house the nature of the estate was entirely changed and the, sections^ were not what they were when the plaintiffs purchased them. In Mrs. Stoupe's ease, said Mr. Powles, only one section had been bought. The section was acquired purely for residential purposes, and it had not been built upon. Mr. Stoupe, the husband, was not aware of the erection of the house alleged to be an infringement of the covenant 'until some time in' January, 1932.' Formal notice of rescission was not given until May 30, 1932, the reason for that being that Mr. Stoupe was aware Mr. Hadwin had taken the matter up with the vender. FIVE MAIN POINTS. Evidence was led on behalf of the plaintiffs to establish live main points considered to be of importance oil the facts, These points ive*o as follows;—----(1) That the insertion of a clause as to building in the agreements to purchase was a material inducement to plaintiffs to buy; (2) the house complained of was erected at a cost of approximately £500, and that if it had been erected two years earlier when the covenants were entered "into it would have cost not more than £^600;. (3) that the defendant knew of the erection of the house and consented t& it; (4) that the building pf the house had spoilt the locality, destroyed the benefit of the building restriction, converted the estate into an ordinary subdivision, and had completely changed the nature of tho estate; and (5) that the value of the sections had suffered to the extent of approximately .£IOO each. STATEMENT OF DEFENCE. The statement of defence denied all liability for the causes of action alleged by the plaintiffs. The defendant admitted having entered into formal agreements with the plaintiffs for sale and purchase, but' denied any breach of conditions on his part. Tor further defences the defendant pleaded the i Statute of Frauds, and also alleged that in any event the plaintiffs had been guilty of such laches as to disentitle them to any equitable remedy. Evidence was proceeding at the time of going to press.