WAR FOOD

Evening Post, Volume CXVI, Issue 26, 31 July 1933, Page 7

WAR FOOD

HOW BRITAIN MET BIG PROBLEM

TOUCH AND GO

In small, highly industrialised countries, such as those which comprised the British Isles, the food problem was one of the most difficult of the war.

The extent of the problem and the steps that were taken lo meet it are related in the following instalment of Mr. Lloyd George's memoirs. (By David Lloyd George—No. 22—Copyright.) '

By the autumn of 1916, the food position was becoming increasingly alarming and grave, and its handling by the Government was a most conspicuous example of its hesitancies. The increasing shortage of shipping made the food position doubly grave, dependent as we were upon ships for our food supplies. In the War Committee of October 31, 1916, the Prime Minister had read a letter from the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, who "expressed anisgivings regarding the danger to the causo of tho Allies from submarine attacks on merehaut shipping, which must be expected to increase in the spring, when tho enemy would have more submarines." It was known that in this opinion the Admiralty were in complete agreement with the Com-mander-in-Chief. Lord Crawford was now Minister of Agriculture, and had circulated to tho members of the committee an urgent document showing, tho seriousness of

AUSTRALIAN WHEAT SUPPLIES

I supported Lord Crawford wholeheartedly in his efforts to obtain a decision as regards 'the food supply, and on November 10, I circulated a short memorandum embodying a few concrete suggestions which I thought would materially help in "solving tho food problem. They wero as follows: — "That someone—who shall npt be a member of the Ministry—bo immediately appointed to organise the food supplies, including purchase, production, distribution, and prices. "That he should be equipped with all the necessary legislative, administrative, and financial powers to enable him to utilise to the full the food-pro-ducing capacity of tho United Kingdom. "That, inter alia, he should direct his attention to: 1. Securing adequato supplies of food—especially from home sources. 2. Keeping prices down. 3. Increasing in this country the acreage of land which produces cereals, potatoes, vegetables, and other food products.

LIVING FROM HAND TO MOUTH

i realised that if the submarine »enaee were not cheeked (and there teemed at that moment no glimmer of hope that "anything could prevent it fi'om increasing in gravity) the war, as far as we were concerned, might end in starvation for this country.

It was now months since the proposition of a central authority had been put before the Government, but. we seemed to bo no nearer achieving it. I therefore pressed at this meeting for the appointment,of a central authority.

I saw no reason why every village in t.lic country should not be self-support-ing, just as it was when I was a boy.

The War Committee approved of my proposal for a Food Controller in prinfh»lo, subject to the right man being found to control the great organisation i-.outeniplated. There were enough provisos in this last paragraph to prevent any action being taken immediately.

Oii November 16 the Admiralty circulated a note to the Cabinet stressing the increasing gravity of the submarine danger. They said:—

The increasing danger to our supplies from the enemy's submarines has recently become so much more

tion before it is too late.

the situation; ana how tho outlook grew more difficult as time went on. He pointed out that our stocks of wheat and flour at that moment (October 30) amounted to four months' consumption, and that there was a world deficit of wheat.

The probable wheat requirements of importing countries during the twelve months ending September 1, 1917, were 72,000,000 quarters, .while the total available supplies were estimated at 63,000,000.

The potato crop had failed in England, as in Germany and Prance, and the forecasts indicated a shortage of some 1,800,000 tons (0r.24 per cent.), as compared with 1915. Moreover, tho crop was diseased, and, a shortage of seed potatoes was possible.

Fish supplies were some 64 per cent, below normal, and the prices had risen from 100 to 400 per cent. The feeding- of live-stock was causing anxiety, as foodstuffs were costly and labour scarce.

4. The mobilisation and utilisation to the full and in the best way of— (a) All the available mechanical appliances ior the cultivation of the soil. (b) The manufacturing capacity of this country and tho United States for the output of machinery for cultivation. (c) The skilled agricultural labonr of tho country, (d) The unskilled male ana female labour capacity of the country for agricultural purposes. 5. Tho utilisation for animal fattening of the enormous waste of food products now consigned to the refuse heaps in the great towns." The same day (November 10), at a meeting of the War Committee, the President of the Board of Trade said that tho Wheat Commission were at present unable to find 40 free vessels for the essential service of conveying the Australian wheat supplies. Tho conclusion that he drew was that a complete breakdown in "shipping would come before June, 1917.

evident through their ruthless attacks on neutral shipping as to make this question need most serious considera-

Still no immediate decision was taken. On Novembor 22 the Shipping Control Committee reported that the stocks of wheat were running down, and that we were living from hand to mouth.

In London there were only two days' supplies, and London bad, therefore, to be fed by rail from other ports.

In Bristol there were only two weeks' supplies. The Wheat Commission had purchased 700,000 quarters in North America, but there were no steamers to bring the wheat to England.

In spite of these and other urgent messages showing the critical position of our food supplies, none of the plans suggested either by tho Minister of Agriculture or myself for dealing with the situation were put into operation during tho lifetime of the First Coalition, and no Food Controller was appointed under Mr. Asquith's Premiership.

My first action on becoming Premier was to appoint Lord Devonport as the first Food Controller.