Evening Post. MONDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1933. COALITION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Evening Post, Volume CXV, Issue 48, 27 February 1933, Page 6

Evening Post. MONDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1933. COALITION IN SOUTH AFRICA

If the extraordinary circumstances under which. South Africa—one of the chief gold-producing countries— came off the gold standard and at the same tune was convulsed by an upheaval of an entirely unexpected kind were not easy to understand in our cabled reports, there is certainly no ground for blaming the reporter, for our Cape files show that the best-informed observers were surprised and perplexed. On December 28 Mr. Havenga, the Minister of Finance, announced thaf South Africa was "virtually off gold," and on the following day a proclamation by the Governor-General relieved the Reserve Bank of its obligation to redeem notes in gold. An issue on which the parties had long been sharply divided was thus decided in favour of the Opposition, whose contention that adherence to the gold standard was making the country bankrupt was in effect confirmed by the Government. Nor was the confirmation weakened by the official declaration that the step had been dictated by "the uncertainty resulting from the political situation leading to abnormally heavy purchases of gold," and that it was not proposed to link the South African pound with sterling or to devaluate the currency. . But though the question had long been a burning issue in politics and the embarrassments of the Government were the subject of some grave reports before Christmas, it was not from General Smuts or any of his followers but from a man who had taken no' hand in the controversy, and for several years had been out of politics altogether, that the'new impulse came which had startled the country and apparently added the last straw., to the troubles of the' Government. When General Hertzog defeated the South African Party under General Smuts at the General Election of 1924 .by the unexpectedly large majority of 27, the decisiveness of the victory was admittedly due to the Pact with, the Labour Party, and for that Pact the Nationalist Party was really indebted not to its leader but to its deputyleader, Mr. Tielman Roos. And when the. battle was won it Was again not General Hertzog but Mr. Roos who led the way with the' appeals to the . Dutch-speaking members of the South African Party to "come out of .the "house', of the stranger" and join their friends and brethren in the Nationalist Party. Here was a deputy-leader who could teach his leader and his party how to win their first election and, having won it, how to exploit the racial issue for the' purpose of disintegrating the Opposition. But a-few years ago they lost the stalwart who had proved himself a better tactician and a more thorough "backveldter" than General Hertzog himself, for Mr. Roos resigned the portfolio, of Justice in order to accept an appointment to the Supreme Court Bench of the Union. . _ It may be that these years of relative seclusion have made Mr. Roos more eager for a fight than ever. He has at any rate abandoned the .dignity and the security of the Bench in order to resume his place in politics at a time, when they are exceptionally stormy and under conditions which expose him to misunderstanding; misrepresentation, and.abuse. The three factors which Mr. Roos declared to be essential for the future prosperity of South Africa in a speech delivered to a crowded meeting at Johannesburg on December 28. were:—Coalition, the elimination of racialism, and devaluation of the South African pound. Though on the second ,of these points Mr. Roos may seem to have turned a complete somersault, it must be remembered that the Balf our formula 1 about equality of status and the Statute of Westminster have greatly modified the anti-Imperialism of the more broad-minded Nationalists, that General Hertzog himself has condemned the^ Republican agitation in his own party; and that, if the party has not officially accepted, it seems to have acquiesced in, the" argument of • General ■ Smuts that the virtual concession of South Africa's sovereignty has left herconstitutionally nothing to fight for. On both the other points also—a coalition and tha devaluation of, the ! South African pound—Mr. Roos j was speaking the views of the South African Party. It was, however, on, the question i of leadership that Mr. Roos and General Smuts differed. In the speech already mentioned, as reported by Reuter, ■ Mr. Boos declared that neither General Smuta nor General Hertzog could lead a coalition, but if General Smuts was prepared to throw in his lot with a Coalition Government under Bomeone who could swing both the Nationalist and South African P.arties, ho would do a great service to South Africa. He expressed regret that General Smuts had dissociated himself from the steps he himself proposed to take. All that General Smuts had said at that stage was in a New Year message to his party .exhorting it "to remain steadfast and do nothing to weaken the party's position." But it was obvious that in suggesting that General Smuts should serve under "someone who could swing both the Nationalist and South

African Parties" Mr. Roos was inviting General Smuts to accept him as leader—an invitation which the General of course had to decline. Mr. Roos's attitude to the Government was still more remarkable. In the passage' quoted he had ruled out General Hertzog as an impossible leader of a coalition without argument, and in his negotiations with the South African Party representatives he had explained that any agreement arrived at was "conditional on our jointly ejecting the Government or its ejecting itself and going to an election." Yet Mr. Roos afterwards declared that he had "never intended that his supporters in Parliament should vote for a motion of no-confidence in the Government." Incidents of this kind, said the "Cape Times" of January 16, increase the bewilderment with which the public contemplate the present position. General, Smuts says in his statement that in his belief Mr. Boos has not thought the position out, but is dominated by one idea—"tho importance of his Tole as a saviour of South Africa, and the position of Prime Minister." With these facts before us the outcome of Mr. Roos's dramatic intervention, ceases to surprise. He apparently precipitated the coalition which South Africa badly needed,, but at the same time he proved his own unfitness for the position to which he aspired. The man ,who intended to supersede both the political leaders and take charge of the coalition himself has involuntarily rendered his country a greater service by bringing them together in a coalition from which he will be'excluded. We are assuming that he will not be one of General Hertzog's. six nominees in the Coalition Cabinet, and he certainly cannot be one of General Smuts's. ■' : The ■whole country; we are told, is thrilled at the opsning of a new chapter of South African liistoi-y, -which General Smuts regards as the most hopeful for racial peace for a generation. The Hertzog-Smu'ts combination may not be as ideally congenial-as the Botha-Smuts combination with which the South African Union started less than a generation ago, but the danger is great, and General Smuts 'may be presumed to know what he is talking about.