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SOVIET RUSSIA

FIVE-YEAR PLAN

WHAT OF THE FUTURE ?

THE "MASS-MAN"

Introduced as ■"■'' written from firsthand knowledge by a distinguished economist,*' a'■■■remarkable article is published in "Lloyd's Bank Review," London, on Eussia and the' Soviet state and conditions of life. • ; .

"The writer has travelled extensively in Soviet Russia (states the "Review")) and he possesses knowledge of the language and a standard of comparison from previous acquaintance trith the country."

Before dealing with the present regime in Russia, the economist findi it necessairy' t'6'give ran outlino of .the political history of the country from the Betting?,up/ of- the Duma and 'its struggle:'isdth the Ministers of the.ismperor from; 1905 to 1907, to the' revolution in March, 1917, when Russia became a republic. This bloodless revolution, it is shown, was succeeded by ia Communistic revolution -"the aim. of ■which was to gain international dominance."- .The -first, proletarian Gqyernment came into existence .on/. 7th November, 1917, and on 13th January; 1918, a republic of Soviet Councils of Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies was proclaimed, private pr-oy perty was confiscated without compensation, and the transfer of all banks toState ownership was enacted. Government was by councils. Tho power to make and administer laws was concentrated in the hands of organisations of tho working "classes. Everything was subjected to the.will of: tho masses. :. '•■■•. •"••'.. .. ':' ", ; ' • Yet what lias happened iri Russia cannot by any means be described as revolution in the ordinary meaning of the word. It is a: matter not only of a change in the forms of State, business, and society, but of an attempt, carried through in. an entirely unprecedented ' manner, > and with coercion such as has never been experienced before,' to absorb tho individual in a mechanised industrial entity, to destroy, the family and to ignore and destroy many of tho roots df the culture of'the past in order to create a "mass-man." •In order to form, an opinion of "the possibilities "of" future development, it '.is necessary for us to clear away all sentiment from our minds. and to forget that "we "hate been witnesses of the pitiless, extermination: of one class of citizens • that numbered millions, witnesses of'the cruel displacement of hundreds of thousands of small peasants and of ■tho relentless battle dgainst'religion. ■ ' Ana'our horror at the oppression and terror, amid which the Soviet State is being constructed/1 will 'yet continue-^-w'e"shall have further to challenge the means and methods by which tho- edifice is being completed and a nation is "being led into such dire misery. But let us allow the achievements up to the present time to speak for the'mseltes,' and then .wo,shall, try t& investigate whether the, edifice, is only a theatre-scene or can become a reality; :whether Russia is merely a puzzle .for Europe or whether the eco> nomic collapse of Europe betokens hope for Bolshevism. THE RISING GENERATION. . Nobody can to-day say what will bo the future form of government as its development progresses, whether it will "be in the form of State-socialism or of State-capitalism that Russia will knock at, the agates of Europe. Tho decisive "fact-;is that almost no prospects are sow held oat for the re-establishment of private ownership, even less bo the longer the system is maintained and the 'more- the "five year* plan," with its, great new public works,1' advancos. The1-evidence shows that an enormdus, country,1 "which' embraces one-sixth of the earth is, by dint of the unrivalled exertions of its population of 160 millions, : being developed. in opposition to trade and industry as conducted by priVajte caDital., The system, is maintain* ed in-vigour by the rising generation^ whose thoughts and feelings are Soviet, aijd who hitherto have shown all the enthusiasm necessary for the Govern^ roent to hope to reach its goal by their aid. ;The questionwhether or no the yo.ntbfiil generation approves of the Soviet State ,«an',': in spite of existing ■criticism, be. answered by "yes" rather than by '"no." They work for it, because only by its means can they lite.. Students, belong, almost -exclur ■iVely, to' the working-classes. Those o^ average intelligence are sure, after completion of their studies, to be offered important positions •in the- administration ,or in industry. In the Union of Soviets it is not a general education, but specialised . knowledge, that, counts.. An important position assures better -living conditions, a sup«Hor,ity to the great masses, influence, and possibilities of further .advancement. This incentive :to the rising generation proves of good' service to the Soviet State. 1 Between the ages, of 16 and 30 years there' exist to-day more than 50 million beings, the conditions of whose lives aid work art unknown, in other' countries. And it is by these men arid women that the Government of the Soviets is,really supported; they alone form the backbone of the State. The Communist school has taught them the reputed horrors of capitalist exploitation,, and the Russian newspapers, unfortunately,' offer them only too rich a choice iof news, received - from European lands, of th^e growing numbers of the workless, their hunger and desperation. \ Instinctively each of these young people feels strongly that it for "his" Government that he ihust toil and sacrifice himself. !■ <--*^r# ECONOMIC POLICY. < Wjth the. conclusion of war-time comjnunis^i;- there''was introduced the Kew Economic Policy which is known as the restoration period of. 1921-1926. In. ties© years private trading' experienced! resurrection and death.. .The writer ofitUries the development of this policy and passes to consideration of the resources arid research-work in Russia. Ono-.of .the most interesting characteristics of the industrial structure is the creation of combines which bring together factories. dependent upon one another 'and links ;.theni iir groups. ■Thero are multifarious undertakings concerned in the" 'production of farm-machines, explosives, artificial eiDc, the development of the iron and eteel output, and the exploitation of natural resources—gold, naphtha, alkali, asbestos, copper, and many other things. This production of road-making maehinefc, radio and cinema apparatus, generators and high-tension machinery, hefvy chemicals, and so forth, which before the war were, generally speaking, not produced at all, has begun on a far-reaching scale. Numerous now industrial towns and barrack settle-1 mem ts, with populations even exceeding '100,000, • have arisen around the new 'factories, and proposals for intercourse by means of traffic connections and the making of navigable waterways are being promoted on an extensive scale. The shipping constructed in 1931 totals moro than 80,000 tons; the net-work of air-routes extends to the most distant parts of the country.

Bussian scientific research institutions have, while availing themselves of foreign help, taken a most substantial sWa». in. the .technical construction of factories. Yet, those branches of in-

dustry which are .dependent upon one another showed, as they developed, a lack of co-ordination. Newly erected concerns were often brought to a standstill owing to want of raw material, or forced to limit output owing to insufficient deliveries of semi-manufactured goods. The situation is rendered more acute by the fact that in many cases economic considerations have not determined,ihe site chosen for new enterprises—a-, state of things that.-'.'in its turn contributes to ,mako : more'arduous the transport problem. This threatens to becoir-s disastruus. : ; ■'; '

This shortage and inferiority 6f swpplies (taken in conjunction with' the condition-necessary for industrial reconstruction that production tiiust bo augmented, even at the cost, of the consumer and house-buihier) have createdna' gaping', discrepancy-: between stlpply ■■' and dejnand—a . discrepancy niadC; .still wider by a. badly worked system of distribution. Tn spite of an average importation since 1930 to the value of more than one thousand million gold roubles (of which 60 per cent, goes to industrial needs), it has for years often been impossible for the \ndividual citizen, to buy a nail' or a needle ora'ny. of the simple necessaries of everyday life.. "The resulting,'distress sets' thei seal of sacrifice, arid even of' despair, indelibly npoh' the Soviet Governineht. And pow already, it ca^ni" be foretold,-that even when the second "five years plan" has .been re'Ompletec}, the outward aspect? of the State will .not have fundamontally.-changed. ■'-',>•',-'.'' ••: MISERY AND DISTRESS. -The Soviets declare—-and,for lack ot. other figures "than* theirs, we must 4 bef lieve them—that in. most, spheres of; activity, the average production is more than double that of pre-war daysl But •if we deduct from-their figurest; the production of the provinces Whicii: formerly' belonged to^ Russia, arid the prewar -imports oft cornmpdities, and if wo takeiiitp account the quicker deterioration of tho nnw goods which are of inferior quality, and tho ever-increasing population, the result will show that for present needs} there is actually available no greater volumo of commodities than before. The only difference is that:, before.stlio war, productioii needed only to satisfy the wants "of a certain higher class, while -now-the { social upheaval means that jicw. and greater needs of 40-50 million people liavo to be satisfied. Tho spectacle of increasing production combined- with stationary shortage will not vanish for many years to come. This makes it appear to us the more incomprehensible that thb export of necessaries of lifo*shoiild, in spite of all, be enforced. Indus>: trial extension has .not only to be paid for by the misory arid distress of the people; it has imprisoned in chains the so loudly" proclaimed freedom of the workman. Freedom; of movement has been suppressed; the unions have been robbed of all influence and may now only concern themselves with cultural and social questions. A responsible director has again taken the place of the management'committee; instead of equality of wages, the principle of individual output has again become,law, Overtime, piecework, and a system of bounties are used as inducements for increased .work; the maximum wago for the members pf a workiirg party has been abolished. v . THE PRICE OF PROGRESS. The Soviet Government—a prisonerof the ''five years plan"—in its Tblo of employer has discarded its proletarian clothes.'-■,-• It. makes Uso of the most reckless methods of sweated labour to spur on the masses to increased production.' It is'not possible to describe in detail how, 'according to our ideas, %hp "five years plan," -has; transformed; a great-part of Russia into a penal"-set-tlement into which the entire population,, with all its physical, ideal,, and moral strength, has been forced. Only thus can be understood the visible progress and the equally visible distress. TJie one is not possiblo without the other.. Yet,, with an incredibly in; tense, nev\r;flaggin^- enthusiasm, tiorij of unflinching optimism, the nation-does riot perceive in the new measures' tasks inherent in Communist doctrines, but only passing phases which will serve the sole interests of theworkiug-clasjies. In concise statements and in/convincing terms, the authorities, point to the "improvement in their " own position at home, comparing it with the steadily deteriorating position abroad, and emphasising their own social -achicvo: ments. , • ; ; J^NACPQIO, SI^UATIOIT. \* In regard to agriculture, where backwardness, due to compulsory collectivism, .has, been, a primary cause of the misery' of the people, the situation appears to be particularly menacing, notr withstanding the results published by the Soviet Government, wHich imply that land sown- with.grain- has increased front.lo&'million -hectares in 1913 to 137 million hecta-res in 1931. Collectivism, which: ha^. brought .utter misery to the Kulaks, Kas achieved the formation "Of some 240,000 collective farms which only give a ,prpductibn equal; to ; about 60 per cent. of. the- earlier individual farms. ' In'addition, there are, in round figures, 4000 State domains, some of which are of. enofmojis extent. The results, of compulsory^collectivism have, been the .rationing of all foodstuffs, and the [classification, of t&e people in categories. ■.-.,, All .the success, all the efforts made, even the importation of. agricultural machinery to the value of more than. 400. million gold roubles, canriot hide' the fact that, scarcity of meat, fat, and milk products is felt more acutely from year to year, and that the rationed commodities are insufficient and subject to constantly increasing prices/ .Thja fjrst "fiye.yiars plan"1 is ending with a'loss of at least 50 per cqpt. in the output of the live-stock industry. , The industrial and agricultural situation which >ye, have now described, and the accumulating troublos connected with financial problems, profit-making, portage o* skilled labour, and diminishing capacity for work, are all. made jnore serious by reason of the difficulty of finding outlets for Russian goods on foreign markets, and justify our asking the question whether the Soviet Government, in view of the dangerously threatening tension at home, will succeed in maintaining its power. . . . Foreign cduntries cannot but see these facts'. '•'■..;■.'"■'• '■ • -^ SOVIET, RULE MAY ENDURE. - We cannot close <our: eyes to the fact .that, iji. spite of ,the present.situatipn, the Soviet Government will probably continue to exist, and that the unity of ,the party, in con junction, with the. Red Army arid the G.P.U., will manage Ho hold together the structure of the State; also that a slow improvement in administration w'ill_ hejp in. alleviating to some extent the distress which has' at' present become almbst "iritol'e'rable. Though it seems possiblo to estimate with a certain degree of accuracy .the ability of the leaders and the achievements which depend upon the power of "endurances of the Russian people, such an estimate becomes more doubtful in. so far as the life of the Soviet Government; is affected by a suspension of political' relations and by the economic situation of foreign countries. The fact that, for many years, any aggression of the Soviets towards foreign countries is ' excluded does not, however, prevent their continued existence from acting as a powerful if deceptive lure to millions of workless and despairingl citizens of the outside world. The Bolsheviks have now set their faces against international capitalism, which is allegod to sway tho.fate of people by means of national governments, ; and are trying to influence tho policy of these national governments through the medium of their people. While the fear complex may not have wholly disappeared, the Soviets are beginning to value their own influence

with the peoples of foreign countries so highly as to hope that no foroign Government could pow join in a crusade against the Soviet State without endangering its own existence. But when we consider the changes of system which the Soviets are compelled to adopt in order to maintain their Government, then the Bolshevik "aim," and actual Russian "development" more" and more coalesce. Tho Bolshevik .drama will become Russian reality. It is thejforces of Russia herself that in due cßurso will encounter Europe. . : ; article, for reasons of space, hais had'ito'be reduced in length as published.] ,'■■■ .' '

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19320722.2.8

Bibliographic details

Evening Post, Volume CXIV, Issue 19, 22 July 1932, Page 3

Word Count
2,389

SOVIET RUSSIA Evening Post, Volume CXIV, Issue 19, 22 July 1932, Page 3

SOVIET RUSSIA Evening Post, Volume CXIV, Issue 19, 22 July 1932, Page 3

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