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STORY OF OCCUPATION

MARINES IN NICARAGUA

The present move was foreshadowed in. February last wlien Mr. Stimaon announced a plan for tlic withdrawal of the marines after the Nicaraguan Presidential election in 1932. Mr. Stinison's plan involves the financing by the Nicaraguan Government of an enlarged National Guard, and a new public works campaign, and will end an occupation during which 42 marines have been killed and 59 wounded. Under the provisions of the new programme the forces in Nicaragua will be reduced heavily in the nest few months. About 1000 marines and naval personnel will be withdrawn by^ June, and this will bring tho American troops down, to about 500. This is contemplated as paving the way to the final withdrawal after the next Presidential olections late next year. The arrangement, which has been accepted by the Nicaraguan Governuiont, calls for the increasing of the National Guard by 500 men, the building of roads and trails for the suppression of bandits, and the expansion of the school at the capital for the training of military officers. The 500 marines who will remain in Nicaragua are to bo held in reserve ready to assist the National Guard (the strength of which will bo about 2500) iv any emergency, while a number of aeroplanes aro also to remain to carry supplies to National Guard patrols iv ronioto regions. The plan was decided upon only after the situation had boon canvassed with tho American Minister to Nicaragua, Mr. Matthew E. Hanna, and with officers in touch with affairs there. In announcing the withdrawal Mr. Stimson emphasised that the officers in command were of opinion that it could be carried out with safety. Nevertheless the decision came as a surprise. TROUBLESOME TIMES. In '1929 there were 500 marines in Nicaragua busy keeping the peace which Mr. Frank B. Kellogg haft warned Nicaragua three yeara before must

bo established. In December of 1026 President Diaz hud urged American intervention, and the following month six naval vessels with 500 marines abroad wore ordered to.Nicaragua. These were reinforced by 1000 marines in tho following month, fierce fighting being expected between tho Government and insurgent forces. In January, Juan Sacasa, tho Liberal leader, had proposed that the United. States should supervise the 1928 elections, and in April Air. Stimson, who had formerly been Secretary of War, was sent on. a peace mission to the country. Mr. Stimson persuaded tho Liberals to stop lighting, and to turn in their arms and ammunition pending the outcome of tho following Constitutional elections, which were held in the latter part of 1928. General Moncadfi, the outstanding military General of tho Liberal Party, and the commander-in-ch ic'f of their armies, after several interviews with Colonel Stimson, was able to persuade all his chiefs oxecpfc one to accept the terms proposed by tho informal representative of the friendly power in the north.. Colonel Stimson'a visit was a piece oC successful diplomacy. The only ily in the ointment was young Sandino, a hot-headed young soldier of fortune, ivho was unwilling to accept the decision of the great majority of tho Liberal Generals and preferred, to carry on bandit warfare- in the mountain fastnesses of Northern Nicaragua. TOWARDS ANARCHY. Arriving in Nicaragua, Mr. Stimson had found the two armies deadlocked. The Conservative forces, supporting Diaz, were the more numerous, but in Moncado tho Liberals had the more skilful leader. It was evident on all sides, Stimson subsequently said, that a pacification of the country by either army was out of the question, and "time," he added, "was working rapidly toward a disintegration of all authority into a condition of anarchy." But for the presence of the marines, ho asserted, this trend toward anarchy would have been infinitely more rapid. Stimson was ablo to bring about an agreement between the two factions, as a result of which both armies were to deliver thoir arms ini^o American, custody, general amnesty was to be extended to all exiles, and all confiscated property was to be returned. A nonpartisan constabulary, was to bo organised under command of Americans, elections were to, be supervised by Americans, and they were to have ample power to make such provision effective. Everybody but Sandino complied. Sandino took to the hills, and he has been making trouble ever since. Sandino is still in his early thirties, and although most of his life has been spent in Mexico, he is by birth a Nicaraguan. He is, according to some reports, hot-headed- and somewhat pompous. Sandino may be a bandit, but so far he has proved himself a skilful guerrilla, and the marines have not un-der-estimated his 'abilities. A RAGGED ARMY. Driven into the inaccessible northern departments of Nueva Segovia and Jinotega by marines and Nicaraguan guardsmen, Sandino has time after time elided his pursuers. Exiled, and at various times actually kept from Nicaraguan territory, he has managed to keep alive the nucleus of an original ragged army estimated at 500. Recently Sandino issued a dictum saying it was "necessary to destroy. Nicaragua" in order to save it from Yankeeintervention and adheTenco to hated Yankee dictates. If Sandino has only 500 followers and is to be opposed by a properly organised force of 2500 it is difficult to sco any grave menace, tb property in the withdrawal of tho'"marines1 during tho next two years. But the truth is that "the marines were sent to Nicaragua at the earnest request of American citizens who were doing legitimate business there," as Senator Bingham admitted at the time. "Repeated protests from American citizens doing business on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua and tho inability of the Nicaraguan Government to give them adequate protection finally resulted in help being sent," and these citizens, after an interval of security are reluctant to lose it. Incidentally, the United States regards Nicaragua with an interested eye, because it is possible to cut a canal through that portion of the isthmus which would join the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. This method of uniting them was considered before the Panama Canal was constructed, and since 1911 the United States has held exclusive canal privileges in , Nicaragua from that Government.

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19310420.2.60.3

Bibliographic details

Evening Post, Volume CXI, Issue 92, 20 April 1931, Page 7

Word Count
1,024

STORY OF OCCUPATION Evening Post, Volume CXI, Issue 92, 20 April 1931, Page 7

STORY OF OCCUPATION Evening Post, Volume CXI, Issue 92, 20 April 1931, Page 7

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