Evening Post. FRIDAY, MAY 23, 1930. ARGUMENT BY SUICIDE

Evening Post, Volume CIX, Issue 120, 23 May 1930, Page 8

Evening Post. FRIDAY, MAY 23, 1930. ARGUMENT BY SUICIDE

The die-hards of both the United States and Japan are making a strong fight against the ratification of the Three-Power Naval Treaty, and one of the latter has given unmistakable proof of his sincerity by committing suicide. But to the Western mind the logic of Lieutenant-Commander Kusakari's protest is less obvious than its sincerity. Logically his action bears a close resemblance to that of the M.P. who moves to reduce an item in the Navy Estimates by £1 as an indication that it ought to be increased by £1000. By a similar process of reasoning, LieutenantCommander Kusakari reduces the strength of his country's navy to the full extent of his power as an indication that it ought not to be reduced at all. And the explanation of the paradox is essentially the same in both cases. Like the politician, the naval officer, being unable to get what he wants, does something that he does not want in order to show how badly lie wants what he really does want. But in such a competition it is not" surprising that identity of logic does not prevent the politician from scoring heavily over the sailor; for the politician's action is but a gesture which may get him credit,, but can do neither himself nor his country any serious harm, whereas in the other case the country loses a faithful servant, and the'servant himself loses everything except some posthumous, glory and a good advertisement for the cause.

It is, however, satisfactory to know that except for tin's tragic incident the return of Admiral Takarabe and the other Japanese delegates from London passed off without serious trouble. They had broken their journey at Harbin and stayed there a few days in order to allow the Diet time to conclude its session' before their arrival in Tokio. The assembled politicians might have had some nasty things to say if they had been given the chance, and even after they had scattered it. was possible for unofficial patriotism to suggest that Lieutenant-Commander Kusakari had taken the right course and to provide the delegates with 'the necessary equipment for the same journey. -

Upon arriving at■- Shiuionoseki, a patriot presented a dagger with a letter advising the atonement1 of suicide, whiles denunciatory handbills were also distributed. A warm official welcome, combined with the discretion of Admiral Kato, Chief of the Navy Staff, who is strongly opposed to the Naval Treaty, warded off further demonstrations.

It is conceivable that the "further demonstrations" which were thus warded off by the warmth of the official welcome and the ''discretion of Admiral Kato might have included the stiicide of all the delegates, and a tedious business it would have been with\only one weapon provided for the whole crowd. Why, one wonders in passing, did that patriotic deputation of one confine his present to a single dagger if he really meant business? His short-sighted economy may have helped to defeat his purpose. The distinction between the warmth of the official welcome and the discretion .' of Admiral Kato is to be noted. It is very unpleasant for Admiral Takarabe and his colleagues that the Chief of the Navy Staff should be a strong opponent of the Treaty which they have negotiated, but there was some compensation in the tact which enabled him to be present —that is, of course, if he was able to comport himself tactfully after he got there. "I will speak daggers to her," said Hamlet on the eve of his great interview with his guilty mother, "but use none." In the same way it is possible that Admiral Kato may have looked daggers at the guilty delegates, though he had none to lend or give away. But the mention of his' "discretion" and of, the part it played in averting further demonstrations is evidence that he played the game fairly, and helped to make the official welcome a success. The incident indicates, however, the strength of the sentiment which the advocates of the Treaty have to face. Another noteworthy point is that in-the hands of the unnamed patriot the argument of suicide takes on quite a different aspect from what it presented to Kusakari. Of the strangeness of his, suicide from the Western standpoint we have already said enough, but the logic of the recommendation to the delegates to follow his example presents no difficulties. He had done nothing to be ashamed of, but they, in their advisers' opinion, had. They have betrayed their country, and are therefore called upon to repent, and to show the sincerity of their repentance by destroying themselves. The logic is as familiar i» the West as in the East.

When lovely woman stoops to folly, Ana finds too lato that men betray— what on earth—to cut a long story short, and to put it in plain proseis she to do? There is nothing for it but to die. Those who do not approve of the argument can at least understand it, but the novelty of he present case is in its application to politics Neither when our politicians are very hard vp for arguments nor when they are very conk fident do they present one another

with daggers and written instructions as to how to use them and why. If it were judiciously applied the process might purge our politics of many an undesirable "who never would be missed," but the probability that the just and the unjust would fall together "in one red burial blent" suggests that a too enthusiastic adoption of the practice might have its disadvantages. By a natural transition we are reminded that Koko's little list of those who never would be missed included "apologetic statesmen of a compromising kind," and the question suggests itself whether the British criticism of the Naval Treaty is not being weakened by an . apologetic spirit of compromise which may be demoralising and even suicidal in its effects. In his arrangement with the Empire Crusaders Mr. Baldwin carried this spirit very near to the point of surrender, but in the compromise reported to-day he carries it further still. Eighty-two Conservative members, headed by Rear-Admiral Beamish, had tabled a motion that Part 111., of the Naval Treaty, in which the crucial point is the drastic reduction in the number of our small cruisers, is contrary to the interests of the British Empire, and ought not to be ratified. Mr. Baldwin will neither affirm nor deny, but he objects to the motion on the ground that it would lead to misrepresentation of the Conservative attitude on disarmament. He has accordingly substituted an official motion which asks for the appointment of a Select Committee to examine and report on the proposals of the Treaty. The motion will, of course, be resisted by the Government, and with the help of the Liberals it will be rejected. An awkward issue will thus be got out of the way without exposing the Conservatives to the risk of having their views on disarmament misrepresented. But surely unless Mr. Baldwin is prepared to put the interests of the parly above those of the Empire as he has never yet done, he should treat the risk'of the party's being misunderstood as of, infinitesimal importance compared to the wish to which the Empire is or may be exposed by the proposed reduction of its cruisers. Whether its security is menaced by the proposal is, of course, a matter ,for argument, but every party should surely be able to answer "Yes" or "No." The "yesno" policy which Mr. Baldwin is again, favouring is really another species of political suicide.