Evening Post. FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1929. A GESTURE—TO WHOM?

Evening Post, Volume CVIII, Issue 119, 15 November 1929, Page 10

Evening Post. FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1929. A GESTURE—TO WHOM?

After several months of indecision the Labour Government has decided to retard construction at the Singapore Base. There was ground for hope that the indecision indicated a decision against such action; but it seems now that Labour was waiting for what is commonly termed the "psychological moment." A stoppage of construction -xat the outset would have provoked opposition; indeed, that opposition was in preparation. Now Labour has pondered the matter for.months, and has, if not a reason, at least an excuse for retarding construction. The validity of the excuse is, to say the least, doubtful. When Labour abandoned the Base in 1924 the action was submitted as a moral gesture for peace. Mr. Ammon, Uhder-Secretary to the Admiralty, stated' the Government's policy in the following terms:

In view of the reported desire of the Americans for an international disarmament conference, Britain should make a moral gesture in the hope that it would be some co-operation. Britain would be iif a much stronger position if, after exploring all the possibilities, she were compelled to continue her armament policy. A base at Singapore, would undoubtedly hamper the establishment of international confidence and lay Britain's good faith open to suspicion.

There is no equal need for a moral gesture now. Indeed, the.' moral gesture preceded the Anglo-Ameri-can conversations. Britain reduced her cruiser construction and America replied -with a similar reduction. If the Base has not been the subject of ah agreement in the Hoover-MacDon-ald discussions we fail to see how it can arise in the London Conference.

Cruiser strength has been discussed, and some understanding has been reached for limitation of the British and American programmes. In reaching this understanding, Mr. Mac Donald, we assume, has been guided in a measure by his Admiralty advisers. . If they have estimated the minimum strength and tonnage necessary for guarding British commerce, their estimate would surely take into account what bases would be available. The existence of a base at Singapore would, so far as the Pacific is concerned, enable Britain to accept a smaller number of cruisers of a less powerful type. Without such a base both the strength and the number of cruisers would require -4o be greater to assure equal safety. Mr. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, now stales that the decisions of the Naval Conference might affect the use of this base; but he gives no hint whatever as to how that may come about. Surely, if Britain^ goes as far as she can in reduction of cruiser strength in order to satisfy America, it is* of the utmost importance •to her that she should maintain the bases" which enable her to put the reduced strength to the greatest use on the remote trade routes."

It has. never been suggested, so far as we are.aware, that America received the Singapore plan with suspicion. The arguments of opponents have been concentrated instead upon the way in which the preparation might appear to Japan. These arguments were never strong. Japan herself never endorsed them. Her friendly attitude to Britain has been maintained without alteration while the Base has been under construction. Her reply to the invitation to the Naval Conference was made in the most friendly terms, with no suggestion of anything but a desire to second Anglo-American efforts in naval limitation. / There was no mention then of any proposal that Singapore should be brought within the scope of the conference. On the contrary, there was good reason for assuming that Japan had no intention of raising the issue. Mr. Iyemasa. Tokugawa presented his credentials as first Japanese Minister to Canada a few days after publication of the Japanese reply. To newspaper representatives at that time he made the following statement:

Japan ia favourable to disarmament. Complete, disarmament ia impossible at the present time. It is all a question of balance. Nobody doubts the merits of. the Singapore Naval Base from the British point of view for the protection of trade routes, and, according to my belief, the Japanese Government never from the first had any fears concerning tho Base.

Mr.' Tokugawa, it should' be noted, recently concluded a successful term as 1 Consul-General" in Australia.' He visited New Zealand when representatives of the Japanese Navy were here, and he had excellent opportunities for forming an opinion on the Australian and New Zealand.attitude. Moreover, he went to Canada direct from Japan, and could speak with authority in interpreting Japanese opinion. The "menace to Japan" bogy can surely not be brought out again.

There remains the question of how (the Labour Government's decision

will be received in those parts of the Empire which are most affected. New Zealand's views have been clearly stated by Sir Joseph Ward, in a message in which he affirmed adherence to the. representations made by the preceding Government. Sir Joseph Ward further called attention to the fact that New Zealand's interest in Singapore was indicated by the provision to contribute £1,000,000 towards the cost of the work. Two instalments totalling £250,000 have already been paid, and a-third is due this year. Sir Joseph also expressed the hope that no alteration in Imperial defence policy would be made without consulting the Dominions, and he suggested that, if possible, the matter. should be reserved for discussion at the next Imperial Conference. Australia, under Mr. Bruce, was equally emphatic; but an Australian Labour Government is now in power. Has this any bearing upon the time chosen for retarding the work? Labour has already decided to abolish compulsory military training, and it would not be surprising if it were also \to support the Singapore abandonment. With less opposition to be encountered in the Pacific, the British Labour Government may think that the time has arrived for another gesture—not to the Powers summoned to the London Conference, but to the left wing of its own party.