NAVY IN WAR

Evening Post, Volume CVIII, Issue 119, 15 November 1929, Page 12

NAVY IN WAR

WORK OF GRAND FLEET

"THE ECONOMIC PRESSURE"

BATTLE OP JUTLAND

British and German Naval strategy during the Great War formed the basis of an address given by Commodore G. Blake, C.8., D.5.0., K.N., when speaking at the New Zealand Club luncheon yesterday. Commander Blake nerved under Lord Jellieoe in the Iron Duke during the period of his command, and saw at first hand what occurred.

Many people, he said, during the war wereasking the question, What is the Navy doing? Whea is it going to sink the German fleet? In spite of the fact that the British Navy had always been, and always would be, our first line of defence, people generally seemed to have possessed little knowiedge of what were the functions and the limitations of the fleet in war. Tho particular function of the Navy in the vast national effort of war was to operate so that we could, and the enemy could not, use the sea for any purpose. The security of our sea communications) vital to the Empire as a whole, was the Navy's first charge. At the same time, the Navy must deny that security to the sea communications of the enemy, thus bringing to bear on him the maximum economic pressure (stoppage of all overseas supplies). Obviously, the quickest and surest manner of attaining that object was the destruction of all enemy naval forces which could dispute our control over the sea communications. The public expected a .Trafalgar, and they didn't get it. Why? Because it took two to make a fight. History of sea warfare showed that it was seldom that both sides were anxious to light. In the last war history repeated itself. The German fleet was held back by direct orders from the Kaiser, and their commander-in-chief was cautioned that no risks were to be taken. "THE INHERENT DIFFICULTY." "Well," continued the commodore, "you may say, 'Why didn't we force the German fleet to accept a decision?'; and therein lies the inherent difficulty of sea warfare." In land warfare if you attack the enemy, he must either stand and fight, or, by retreat, give up what you want—that- is, territory. In sea warfare, although you may meet the enemy on the open sea, unless you can intercept him from his base he can refuse action and return to his defended base. That was the situation that developcd'as soon as war commenced, •and the Grand Fleet in the North Sea had to use what means lay in its power to make the enemy go to sea. In default of a fleet action, we had to exercise such control over the sea communications as would enable use to maintain our food supply, the supply of munitions of war, the transport of troops, and to donay all supplies to the enemy—i.e., to apply economic' pressure on him. .In this work the ±s Tavy had as its ally the incomparable Mercantile Marine. Even at the height of the submarine menace no captain of any merchant ship hesitated to take his ship to sea. We, in the Navy, and the British Empire as a whole, take- off our hats to those gallant and intrepid seamen who fed us, who maintained our essential supplies of munitions of war and material, and who transported our troops from distant corners of the Empire, and who paid a. heavy toll in the loss of many lives for their steadfast devotion to duty." Whe nwar broke out tho Grand IPlect was concentrated at Scapa, the Channel Fleet was at Portland more or less as a strategical reserve, and the cast coast was protected by local patrol flotillas. Rosyth was the best strategical centre, and that had been realised prior to war, but due to economy in peace time it could not contain the whole fleet. A modern fleet, the commodore pointed out, without a defended base could not operate. "That, as you know, is one of the reasons for developing the resources at Singapore," he said. "Although we trailed our coast up and down the North Sea for the best part of two months, nothing happened. TJie enemy refused to risk a decision, and remained in his defended base." We arrived at the situation where we could not get at the enemy forces to bring them to action, and we therefore had to turn to the alternative method and pursue those other subsidiary operations which had for their object the weakening of the enemy's resistance by the application of economic pressure and the consequent possibility of forcing the enemy to sea in order to throw off the stranglehold. But cover—or open blockade— cannot prevent the enemy from making sporadic attacks or getting ships put on the trade routes, and we therefore had to endeavour to give protection to those sea communications which were vital to us, and be in a position where, should the enemy main fleet come out to sea, we could intercept him before he could attain his object. ... It was not till the economic pressure which we exerted in the manner which I have indicated by attack on the enemy's trade that the situation became so desperate that they decided to come to sea and fight it out. I am referring to the projected operation of the High Sea Fleet in October, 1918, which never took place. The reason that it never took' place was because the inaction in harbour and bad food had so undermined the morale of the fleet that the sailors refused to raise steam or weigh their anchors." . ■ ENEMY STRATEGY. In regard to German naval strategy, Commodore Blake said that it was not till the Germans found that they wore "up against it" that G.H.Q. took much interest in the doings of the fleet, and then they decided to knock out England by means of a single surprise weapon—the submarine, disregarding all forms of international law. Briefly, German strategy aimed at offensive raids, with a view to causing dispersion of the Grand Fleet, and by such dispersion the Germans hoped to catch small detachments of the Grand Fleet without Risking the High Sea Fleet in 'a decisive action. When this was found to have failed it was con-sidered-that the best strategy which the High Sea Fleet could pursue was to support the submarines and to control the Baltic. In consequence, submarine warfare against merchant shipping was put into - operation as an alternative to fleet action. When this was found to fail and the situation becamo desperate it was decided to risk a decision, but it was then too late. • Commenting upon the battle of Jutland, Commodore, Blake said it was an indecisive action because only one side wished to fight, and also because action was not joined till so late in tho day. At Jutland, Sir John Jellicoe had manoeuvred the Grand Fleet into a position which, if the sun had stood still, would have enabled -him to reach a decision. The Grand Fleet were directly between the enemy and their base. "Although we*know all the facts," said the Commodore, "and are clear about the movements which took place, we can never know and reproduce the conditions which existed at definite times; nor what was seen from definite parts of the line. The visibility alone varied from moment to moment; one minute you could see ten miles, and the next you could not see three miles. As an example of the uncertainty of the situation, Sir John Jellicoe on the morning after tho battle asked me what ship I was firing at, and I told him tho leading ship of the German line. He replied: 'Are you sure

it was not the Inflexible?' which was one of our battle-cruisers. I assured him I was not firing at the Inflexible. One must remember that he had at his disposal the fullest information that could be obtained.

"As regards the future," concluded the Commodore. "Who knows? Disarmament is in the air, peace and goodwill are advocated from all sides. It is said, settle our disputes by arbitration. Nobody who went thorough the last war wants to repeat it. Surely, they say, there must be some other means than massacre, and the last war was only a taste of what may happen in the next. These high hopes cannot be realised at once. Progress must necessarily be slow, and world education towards peace is just beginning. In tho meantime let us remember the words of Lord Jellicoe: 'The sea is our life. By the use of it the Empire was formed; by holding it the Empire has been preserved; if we fail to appreciate its value the Empire will perish.' "