Evening Post. MONDAY, JUNE 3, 1929. WHICH MINORITY?

Evening Post, Volume CVII, Issue 127, 3 June 1929, Page 8

Evening Post. MONDAY, JUNE 3, 1929. WHICH MINORITY?

One fact is clear as die result of the British General Election—that Great Britain in the meantime must be governed by a Party which has no clear majority of its own. In commenting upon the results announced on Saturday we assumed that. Labour would have that responsibility. The earliest British Press comment suggests that the possibility of a minority Baldwin Government is entertained. Mr. Baldwin (states the "Daily Mail" political correspondent) "will seek to carry on," and the writer adds that the decision will be deferred till Parliament assembles, and will depend on the Liberals: _. Great efforts will be made in the interim to reach agreements designed to keep out the Socialists, at least temporarily. An agreement is confidently expected. The "Daily Telegraph" editorially considers the possibility of Mr. Baldwin continuing in office: Wo shall hope to see Mr. Baldwin boldly reconstruct his administration and'meet the new House of Commons, not weakly extending his neck to the sword of the executioner, but with a programme of useful, non-controversial legislation, prepared to carry on the King's Government and throwing upon the two oppositions the responsibility for putting the Ministry out. Reconstruction and programme pre- j paration are, however,. tasks to be ' undertaken before an election, not 1 after a defeat. The Government! went to the country with'a: definite I programme. That programme has been rejected. Is it right or reason- j able that the Conservatives should now appeal from the verdict of 28,000,000 voters to a tribunal of 57 Liberals? Tf the Prime Minister were disposed to bargain for the retention of office he could,'of course, do so with some show of justification. He could point to the aggregate votes polled: Conservatives 8,530,835 Labour , 5,317,025 , Liberals 5,226,614 Others 307,931 These figures present .an insoluble puzzle. They show that the Liberals have suffered most severely by. the chances of the triangular contest. They have been transfixed on the sharp corner. But the figures give no clue to which of the other two parties is favoured by the Liberal electors, Mr. Lloyd George was attacked from both sides. Except in one or two isolated seats the Liberals had.no voting arrangement with the Conservatives. They certainly- had no arrangement with Labour. Mr. Lloyd George, moreover, outdid Labour in promising huge expenditure as a remedy for unemployment. Probably the correct division of Liberal votes would be to assign to Labour those which were influenced by the Lloyd Georgian programme and to give to Conservatism those which were guided by the more cautious Liberal spokesmen wKo backed Mr. Lloyd George as leader but did not support the whole of his policy. As it is impossible to say what proportion of the five and a quarter million Liberals are Lloyd Georgian and what proportion old Liberals, it is futile to juggle with the figures. The issue,could possibly be determined by another election-test, but that is neither desired by the parties nor desirable for the country until the possibilities of the present situation have been exhausted. It is possible for Mr. Baldwin to carry on with Liberal support; but it is highly improbable that he will attempt to do so. He is not the type of politician to bargain or compromise for office. Moreover, he has declared that he will not continue in office under such circumstances. The London correspondent of the "Sydney Morning' Herald," writing at the opening,of the campaign, stated: Mr. Baldwin and Mi-. Mac Donald have both declared that they will not form a Government unless they have a working majority. Mr. Baldwin would probably carry out his avowal; Mr. Mac Donald might not. A LabourLiberal pact would be more likely than a Conservative-Liberal one, though Mr. Lloyd George, on his part, has stated that he would make no effort to keep either of the opposing parties in office. But these words might have been uttered to be swallowed later. The position is now that the Conservatives cannot hold office without a Liberal effort. The circumstances differ from those of 1923. Then Mr. Asquith refused to keep the Conservatives in office (though they formed the largest party). He refused even to stand aside and leave Labour to fight out the issue. Now Mr. Lloyd George cannot leave the Conservatives in office by refusing to vote. He must support them or they are defeated. If Liberalism favoured a Labour Government under control in 1923-24, what reason has it for rejecting similar control now? The most important factor to be considered, however, is not what Mr. Lloyd George may be inclined to offer, but what Mr. Baldwin is disposed to accept. Mr. Lloyd George says: he will not use his power in a haggling spirit. We may be sure Mr. Baldwin will not encourage him to haggle. If the decision is left till Parliament assembles and the Lib-1 erals then decide freely and voluntarily to keep the Conservatives in. office Mr. Baldwin cannot resign; but he is not likely to offer any,

coalition type of bargain for the tenure. It would be a tenure of doubtful worth. With every Liberal vote secyre, a Conservative-Liberal Government would command a majority of only 24—proportipnately equal to a margin of three in the New Zealand Parliament. With such a margin, and hampered by the necessity for considering varying shades of Liberal opinion as well as Conservative differences, what hope would Mr. Baldwin have of carrying out a policy which would rehabilitate his party? He would be dancing on a tight-rope. It appears to us that for his own comfort and without sacrificing the interests "of the country he will choose the solid ground of opposition, well knowing that it is solid. There he 'can plant his feet firmly and hold securely the reins which will still enable him to check the pace and correct the direction of a Labour Government which may be inclined to swerve or to bolt.