END OF THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume CVII, Issue 22, 26 January 1929, Page 18

END OF THE WAR

RUPPRECHT ON THE CRISIS

'; Remarkable documents, showing how parly in the war the cooler heads in Germany's army despaired of victory are printed in the memoirs of the exCrown Prince of which have been published in three volumes. They are already being utilised by "the democratic Press to disprove the charge that Germany's defeat was due to ."a stab in the back" caused by the Socialist agitation, states the Berlin correspondent of tho "Daily Telegraph." Writing in the autumn of 1916, ,the author, then commander of the army group on -the .wesf front, transmits to his father a request from the German Crown Prince that he should urge upon the ■Kaiser the advisability of attempting to conclude a separate peace with Kussia even.at the cost of. abandoning the whole of Poland and East Galicia to the ■Tsar.-. The immediate stimulus to the letter was the news of a project to establish an autonomous -Poland, whidh the two Princes thought would render an understanding with Russia impossible.

Prince Rupprecht, who says ' that his WwsTare shared by all the generals on the'-West front, writes: "It is becoming ever more obvious that our troops- have no attacking force left, as nearly all our aggressive undertakings, even those of small dimensions, have been failures. The troops are no longer what they were in the spring. They are exhausted by continuous exertions.' The quite young recruits are not equal to the staggering impressions of .battle like older; men, and the increasing lack,of trained officers is becoming-ever more noticeable. . . If we cannot in the spring transfer the.Bast troops to the West thoi worst is to be feared." After a prophecy that if. a separate peace is not concluded with Kussia "wo .shall probably lose the war," the Prince.closes with an interesting reference to the'necessity of having some system of control "to prevent a repetition of such events as those which led to the \rar and which.were caused in part by a blundering foreign policy." ■; That .was iii 1916, and on Ist November, 1918, the Prince could truly write to his father .that for more thaii a year he had "seen everything coining." In a letter of July, 1918, he protested against "the- • frivolous deception^' public opinion^" representing tho-fighting at itheiins and Soissons as a great German success iii attack and defence." On 4th September he used •tnese ominous words: "The general position is more critical than ever . . . utten the battalions returning from the tront are not more than from 40 to 400 shong. It is to be feared that in such circumstances the enemy may succeed w days" 8 thr°^ b '°Ur itOni ' within a "nclusim, n f ' The.»Peediest possible conclusion of peace is urgently necessary,even ( at the price J great■ sacrl

On the las day of the same month he recorded m a letter to hi 3 father he decisive defeat" which ■ he had "long teared." n 0 Wl . ites . -™' troops, have no powers of rpsisHi.,., :iff- t T]7 ai;v voni out- *»* "lo"^ able, to face the enemy's superiorks -Things are very bad on the othe, fronts, too, and we must be preparer for tho.very worst. It la absoluteh necessary at once to conclude peacefor we are as good as defenceless." The publication of these clocumenu is not likely to improve tho already very- strained relations between t.hi Prince and General Ludendorff, whoso plea is that the' German fighting front romuincd. unshaken'-till the end, and that victory, was snatched from him at the last moment by sedition at home.