Evening Post. TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1928. AMERICA AND THE WORLD COURT

Evening Post, Volume CVI, Issue 121, 27 November 1928, Page 8

Evening Post. TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1928. AMERICA AND THE WORLD COURT

By a singular anomaly of the American Constitution, the popular vole which was recorded ,at the Presidential and Congressional elections three weeks ago will not take effect till the 4th March. As the same party which was previously in control both of the Executive and of the Legislature has had its term extended in both cases, the inconvenience on the present occasion is not great, and the achievements in foreign policy with which President Coolidge is said to desire to distinguish the close of his term can provoke no conflict with his successor. The opening sentence of the Republican Platform on which Mr. Hoover won the election was:— ■We approve tho foreign policies o_ tho Administration of President Coolidge, and the President is not proposing at this late hour' to raise any new issue. One of his proposals was advocated by his predecessor five or six years ago, and nearly three years ago it was approved by the ; Senate with reservations. The only other proposal which is strictly a matter of foreign policy was not ripe for treatment when Congress was last in session.' It was'to a breakfast party of fifteen Republican. Senators on Saturday that President Coolidge indicated what his intentions are. Tho President discussed tho legislative programme with them, and they learned that Mr. Coolidge was anxious to round off his Presidential career with tho ratification of tho Kellogg Pact, tho enactment of tho Fifteen Cruiser Bill, and an arrangement with tho Powers signatory to the World Court protocol whereby the obstacle to American adherence offered by the Senate's reservations would be overcome. It would be a very simple matter for President Coolidge to get his country admitted to the World Court if he was willing to see'it enter on the same terms as every other country. The door was thrown open years ago, and is open still. But the terms which were good enough for 47 other nations—the number may be larger now—were not considered good enough by the Senate of the United States. In 1925 the House of Representatives expressed the opinion by a decisive majority that the United States ought to participate in the World Court, but this was an opinion and no more. Foreign policy is the peculiar prerogative of the Senate, which has to approve a treaty by a two-thirds majority before it can be ratified. It was by this power of the Senate that the ratification of the Versailles Treaty and the Covenant of the League was refused. The voting was actually 49 in favour of ratification and 35 against, but as a vote of 56 was required for ratification, the resolution was lost. The question of ratifying the World Court Protocol was not complicated by -the personal and party animosities which had embittered the fight over President Wilson's policy, but the Senate made very heavy work of it nevertheless, and in a body where the flowof speech is almost unlimited the closure had to be applied for the first time in 50 years. The fight had turned less on the principles of the Protocol, but on the nature of the reservations by which the acceptance was to be qualified. When the Senate ultimately approved it on the 27th January, 1926, by a vote of 76 to 17, the approval was subject to less than five reservations. About three of these reservations there was not much to be said, but a good deal of controversy was excited by the two others, which were as follows:— (_) That the United States may at any time withdraw its adherence to the said Protocol, and that the statute for tho Permanent Court of International Justice adjoined to the Protocol shall not be amended without the consent of the United States. (5) That the Court shall not render any advisory opinion, except publicly after due notice to all States adhering to the Court and to all interested States, and after public hearing or opportunity for hearing given to any State concerned; nor shall it without tho consent of the United States entertain any request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or question in which the United States has or claims an interest. When the Senate's reservations came to be considered by the Signatory Powers at Geneva, it was the fifth of them, and especially the last words of it, that presented the chief stumblingblock. Though an "advisory opinion" of the World Court is, as the words imply, merely advice, the effect of the concluding clause was to enable the United States Government to prevent the Court from considering "any dispute or question in which the United States has or claims an interest." The chief object of this reservation was unofficially said to be to protect the Monroe Doctrine from the inquisition of a foreign tribunal, and one strong American opponent of the World Court rejoiced to see that "the doctrine announced by President Coolidge recognises the same great principle which inspired President Monroe." But whether the Monroe Doctrine was at the root of the reservation or not was really immaterial. On its face the reservation claimed for the United States a privilege which would have been highly invidious if it stood alone, and would

have struck a heavy blow at the Court if it had been extended to everybody. What happened at any rate was dial four of the five reservations required by the Senate were accepted at Geneva, but assent to die fifth was qualified by a counter-reservation. The effect of President Coolidge'. reply in a speech at Kansas City on Armistice Day, 1926, was "Take it or leave, it." I do not intend, he said, to ask the Senate to modify its position. I do not believe tho Senate would take favourable action on any such proposal, and unless the requirements of the Senate resolution are met by the other interested nations I can see no prospect of this country adhering to the Court. The attitude of the President was described at the time by the "New York World" as follows:— There was a cause to which he and his party were committed by promises repeated and repeated in the course of years. The realisation of these promises now hangs in the balance. A crisis exists. There is a disagreement between the views of certain foreign Governments and the views of the Senate about tho meaning of certain reservations. Mr. Coolidge, who is supposed to be devoted to tho project of American adherence to the Court, will not, however, lift a finger to allay the crisis and work out a compromise. lie will not appeal to the Senate; ho will not argue -with Europe. He will do nothing. He is perfectly -content, it appears, to drop tho whole issue without oven a word of explanation and a word of regret. But the Protocol which was buried in this cold and unsympathetic fashion two years ago has now, we are told, become "a matter dear to the President's heart." It does not appear, however, to have become so clear as to justify any sacrifice or compromise on his side. He is mere[y willing to have Mr. Kellogg re-open the negotiations with foreign Powers to obtain approval of tho reservations proposed by the Senate in voting on United States adherence to the World Court. The stipulations of the Senate are like the laws of the Medes and Persians, but it is still open to the 47 other nations concerned to gladden the heart of the President by accepting them.