AFTER EIGHT YEARS

Evening Post, Volume CV, Issue 97, 26 April 1928, Page 24

AFTER EIGHT YEARS

fOTHE LEAGUE OF NATIONS i&ECORD OF VALUABLE WORK -■■/'{Eight years ago the Council of tho fceague of Nations met for the first tifte in Paris. Important personalities gathered round the table, but it is safo „tp say that very few of them believed in the importance or oven the continued, existence of the League. Indeed, 'Jit" was the fashion at the time—particularly,'in the United States—to prophesy its immediate decease (writes Viscount Cecil of Chelwood in the "Spectator"). Scarcely half a year passed some triumphant declaration ■that the League was dying or dead. it has not only survived, "it has done an immenso amount of ''international work, which, by the admission of everyone, has been of great tyajue'..; Mistakes have no doubt been 3».ad.e in its name. That is inevitable. Bui It 3 chief danger is not that sometimes.it will act wrongly, but that it iraay fallow itself to be immobilised by "the Chancelleries of Europe. For Wery human institution must either ;grpjv ot decay. It can never.stand still. .The activities which were sufficient to ideal with the difficulties of yesterday jnust,expand if they are also to solve the Jrpblems of to-morrow. ,\Sb far tho League has scarcely tackled its most momentous'tasks. It ihas. improved international intercourse, it has:Btruek some effective blows at grave social evils, it has rescued some hundreds of thousands of men, women, and'children from captivity or starvajtibtti. it has done something to restore 'theeconomic situation in Europe, it has soccoureS States floundering in a financial inofass, it has procured the settlement of a certain number of interna- ' tionardisputes, and, in one or two cases, has prevented what seemed to be imminent hostilities. These are no mean achievements, but they come very far short of the object for which the League was brought into existence. For the chief end of the League is to destroy war." "Unless and until that ifc,.accomplished, its other work must be.of relatively slight importance. '."'. Npw.war is one of tho oldest human institutions. To put en end to it means the. reversal of a mass of understandings and assumptions, and destruction of a number of moral and intellectual — not to speak of material —vested interests. It- has behind it a literature of its' own. Poets and philosophers, novelists and historians, have combined to sing its praises, partly because it was the. sport of, kings, partly because of tlie, heroism of those who have taken part in it, ana partly because in tho absence of some other means of obtaining'iiiternational justice to a State had iio resource but war to secure its honour and existence1 against the fraud and" violence of its neighbours. Even so, and making all allowance for the splendid qualities it has called forth, it may 3reU.be doubted whether any other single (iause has inflicted on tho human ia¥e one-tenth. of the suffering which has, accrued' to it from war, with its accompaniments of dishonesty, lust, md, cruelty. '.'The task of the League then is to 'destroy war—a task of enormous difficulty. It certainly cannot bo accomplished at a single stroke or in a few years. It will need all our energies, all our courage, and all our faith. The tfrst step is to get rid of tho notion .that it : is lawful for one nation to make-wax on another at its own will and pleasure. That step has been taken go,-far as all members of tho League .ef Nations are concerned. It is implied ii. the Covenant and has been definitely expressed more than once in resolutions of tho Assembly to tho effect Ihat "aggressive war is an international crime." Those resolutions only bind members of the League. If President Coolidge's proposal that war as an ".'instrument of national policy" should ■te "removed, is to bo construed as in substance a proposal to extend to the •iTftnite'irStates a proposition of international, morality already accepted by the members of the League, it is much to .be welcomed. But more renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy will bo by itself of little effect. It is impossible to condemn wars really undertaken in sclf-defciiec. Nations .cannot be expected to agree to submit' to invasion. Yet tho difficulties of defining aggressive war arc 'great. ,' In the late war every Governmren''professed' to be fighting in selfdefence. .To .prevent war tho same steps .'must be taken by nations —in some rudimentary form at least—as were long ago taken in the case of civilised individuals. Private violence mus.t be forbidden even to redress wrongs, courts where justice can bo obtained and violence condemned must be..'established to protect tho law-abid-ing, and, there, must be brought into existence something liko an international police", force, or if that be impracticable," aii international posse coinitatus institution by which our ancient Constitution laid upon all good citizens the duty' to assist the sheriff in suppressing any breach of the peace. ''.Above all, weapons of violence, armaments, in the hands of nations, must be reduced and limited to those necessary for ".self-defence and tho enforcement of international obligations. A scheme •wjth this purpose is now being elaborated'by .the so-called Preparatory Commission, of the League, and a perusal of the.-verbatim report of its last session at'GeneVa is in many respects encouraging.'lt'is. the rceord of a businesslike ■jjody—a. body cordially endorsed Lord Cushehdun 's well-timed appeal for/definite action. Partly in consequence of that appeal three rapporteurs iiayeVbeen appointed to' prepare proposals . for arbitration, guarantees of security, and the explanation or precision of'the 'Covenant. That is all to tho good. But there is one 'danger against which it is. of the utmost importance that the Government should be prepared.!' Tliere are not wanting those .who beii.efve*that the whole of these proceedings with regard to security and arbitration are designed only to evade actual, limitation of armaments. Critics of'this school think that the idea is to bf'irig .'forward some suggested scheme of security which is not acceptable to all the Powers concerned. When it fails it will then bo said that disarmament is impossible without security, and since security is refused,•disarmament'must also be dropped. We may confidently .believe that our Government ■.would not countenance any such manoeuvre for a moment. But they must'take great care not oven to appear to'connive at it. Lord Cushcndun has asked very properly for a definite scheme of security. When it appears he must not be instructed to turn it down lock, stock, and barrel. That Si'wba't'tho British Government did in the dase of tho Treaty of Mutual Assistance. They did it again in t-he case of the Protocol. In both cases a proposal for which the British representative waslargely responsible was summarily rejected by the Homo Government. If it happens a. third time in tho ease of these new proposals when they are made, it will be at least plausible to fasten on the British Government the responsibility for stopping international disarmament. That would in itself be serious- enough, for our national prestige-depends.at least as much upon character as upon strength. But apart from the-effect such an event would have on our national position, its direct consequence must bo of tho utmost gravity. We and other Powers are- under perfectly plain and explicit obligations to our late enemies and especially to the Germans to proceed with a general reduction and limitation of armaments.

It was on the faith of these promises that the Germans, as they allege, agreed to their own disarmament. Whether or not the two obligations ore verbally dependent on one another, it is obvious that it will bo impossible to insist on the maintenance of German disarmament except in return for a general and serious step in that direction by the other great European Powers. Count Bernstorn? has recently pointed this out at Geneva, and no one has traversed his contention. It is clear, therefore, that if tho present policy at Geneva fails the Germans will claim to re-arm. That means the end of internation disarmament and almost certainly the abrogation of those advances towards European goodwill so laboriously achieved at Locarno and elsewhere. It would be, indeed, a terrible responsibility for us if it could be said with any truth that our action had contributed to such an overwhelming disaster.