Evening Post. MONDAY, JANUARY 9, 1928. PACT TO OUTLAW WAR

Evening Post, Volume CV, Issue 6, 9 January 1928, Page 8

Evening Post. MONDAY, JANUARY 9, 1928. PACT TO OUTLAW WAR

The last day of the old year brought us a Paris message reporting M. Briand's "fervent conviction- lhat 1928 will be marked by a solemn Pact between France and America outlawing war." M. Briand did not disguise the importance attached to the proposed Pact, and said ho thought that if it succeeded it would be the most powerful instrument for peace in the world, eventually extending and embracing other nations. The negotiations for such a Pact had evidently made considerable progress at the time of M. Briand's statement, for on the following day the "New York Tribune" reported that Mr. F. B. Kellogg, the United Slates Secretary of State, had handed to the French Ambassador at Washington a draft of the proposed treaty. The accuracy of this information and of the summary of the draft which the "Tribune" supplied has since been substantially confirmed. The outlawry of war is, of course, a principle which the Governments not only of France and the United States but of all other countries, not excluding Soviet Russia, can accept in the abstract. The difficulties begin as soon as an attempt is made to put the abstract agreement into concrete form, and the differences which the publication of the draft has revealed have already clouded the vague hopes inspired by M. Briand's sanguine forecast. But only those who supposed a week ago that so momentous and complicated a matter could be settled by a formula as simple as an axiom of Euclid have any right to be disappointed by the sharp disagreement which the first step towards the concrete has provoked. Not merely for France and the United States but for the whole world, and especially for Great Britain, there is, on the contrary, very solid ground for satisfaction in the fact that negotiations which touch the interests of all countries have already passed beyond the stage of benevolent platitudes. If the object in view had been merely "to banish for ever war between the two nations" immediately concerned, it would have been even so of great importance to the world, since wars have a way of spreading, and whether they spread or not are a menace and a mischief to everybody. But the other nations have a more intimate concern *■ in these negotiations than what their general interest in peace provides. One fundamental point on which the parties are agreed is that the pact that they have in view cannot be exclusive in its terms or in its implications. In the statement which we have quoted M. Briand contemplates a document "eventually extending and embracing other nations." Mr. Kellogg takes an equally broad view. He is said to have emphasised the point "that the Pact should not be unilateral, but one to which other great Powers should feel free to affix their signatures." The agreement on this point is highly satisfactory since an exclusive agreement, even though limited, as it would be, to defensive purposes, would draw an invidious distinction that might easily make mischief. But an identity of ideal has not prevented a strong difference of opinion as to the method of approach. At the first glance, indeed, it looks as though the French Foreign Minister and the French Press were opposing Mr. Kellogg's proposals from opposite standpoints, the one regarding them as too broad and the other as too narrow. Paris messages indicate, wd were told on Wednesday, that opinion respecting the American proposals for a \Pact outlawing war has not yet crystallised, but the newspapers are diametrically opposed to the. proposals. They point out that the reservations do not leave much for arbitration. M. Briand, on the other hand, was reported on Friday to have instructed his Ambassador that "an AllPowers' Pact for the renunciation of war"—which is what Mr. Kellogg appears to contemplate—"would be contrary to the spirit of the Covenant, and would prevent the League of Nations having authority in coping with, international disputes." But though the two objections may be roughly described as aimed respectively at the narrowness and the comprehensiveness of the American proposals, there is really .nonspecific contradiction. While the French Press complains that the subjects to be submitted to arbitration will be too few, M. Briand considers that the parties will be too many; and it may well be that both objections are well founded. It is hardly possible that any responsible French journalist can object to the exclusion of "questions of interior politics, or problems to which the Monroe Doctrine applies," though the second point may raise some acute difficulties of interpretation. On the other hand, the stipulation for the approval of the Senate—which would probably require a two-thirds majority—may well excite the apprehension of anybody who remembers the mischievous part that the Senate lias been accustomed to play in the admin-

istration of foreign alliiijs. M. Briand himself shows his fear of this dangerous activity when he asks for information as to the position which would arise in the event of the United Slates Senate's refusing to ratify the Pact after its signature. To this pertinent question the answer can only be that the Pact will then be in the same position as that to which the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League were reduced by the action of the Senate in 1920—mere dead letters so far as the United Stales was concerned. An interesting and difficult question is raised by M. Briand's fundamental objection to the American proposals. Would an All-Powers' Pact for the renunciation of war be contrary to the spirit of the Covenant? There is force in the question, which M. Briand has been answered in Washington: The question is asked, if Mr. Kcllojtg's proposal for a multilateral treaty might conflict with the Covenant of the League, would not a bilateral treaty | between Franco and the United States I outlawing aggressive war lie equally conflicting? This very point was raised " when, while Germany's admission to the League was in suspense, she signed a defensive treaty with Russia. Her subsequent admission to membership must be taken to imply a ruling in her favour. M. Briand shows his appreciation of the point when he says that an All-Powers' Pact of the kind proposed would be "contrary to the spirit of the Covenant." He does not suggest that it would be contrary to the letter of the Covenant, and on a non-legal interpretation it is clear that an All-Powers' Pact concluded outside the jurisdiction of the League would be a more serious matter for the League than a Pact limited to two parties. When President Harding officially declared America's refusal to join the League, he added that she would not object to an Association of Nations. M. Briand is wisely reluctant to countenance any step that might lead to the formation of a rival organisation of that kind.