GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

Evening Post, Volume CXIII, Issue 55, 7 March 1927, Page 19

GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

AN AMERICAN VIEW

BRAVERY OF THE TURKS

.Interest in the Gallipoli campaign is constantly stimulated by some new view or criticism of this greatest.of Australian, adventures in the vrax. The latest contribution to the discussion comes from the'.penof Capt. W. D. Puleston, of the United States navy, who has written a book entitled "The' Dardanelles Expedition: A Condensed Study." The volume is priniarilylntended for officers of the American army, navy, and marine corps, but the author hopes that "it will be found: worthy of the brief notice 'of American statesmen, who may be required to direct'-.the destinies of our country in time of war.'"

After giving the political history which led up to the a-ardanelles campaign and reviewing the naval fighting which preceded the landing, Captain Puleston presents a vivid, if laconic, picture of the coming ashore at various points of the different units- "The impressions has gone abr< d that the brave but undisciplined Anzaes, disregarding .'orders, " pushed into a wilderness and were lost, "-he writes. " Actually the farthest point any soldier reached was < nly one-third of .the way to the ambitious objective assigned by Hamilton and his hopeful staff. The country would i_ave split the best disciplined troops into small groups; this dispersion was increased by the orders dinned into the Anzaes in Egypt that they must keep going on at all costs, even if their comrades on both sides were held up. When the high command abandoned the original objective and endeavoured to dig in on Second Crest,' they were unable to communicate'the! change of orders; to-the company oifi-. _cers,~~whq continued in most instances to press forward in the'vain effort to capture-Third Crest and Mai Tepe. Few Turkish prisoners were taken, by the Anzaes. The Turks took none, and report that no Anzac would surrender." -Captain Puleston's summing up of the campaign will not receive 'the endorsement of most Australian soldiers, but it is an interesting example of how others see us. He writes: "The British employed over 400,000 men during this campaign. The iiumber of French is not given, but their force neveV exceeded two divisions, and these were usually depleted. TJe Turks employed 800,000 men. The British lost almost 120,000, of whom 31,389. were killed, 9708 missing (mostly killed), and 78,741) wounded. The F-jrench losses were not given. The Turks lost 218,000 men, of whom 66,000 f weije^killed. Some Turkish regiments received 5000 replacements. • The Turkish losses give the final reason for the Allied failure; the terrain and Turkish breastworks were usually against the Allies, but it was the bared breasts of the Turkish infantry which denied, them Gallipoli. After Suvla the ;morale of the Turkß was better than.jth.at'. of, any of the 'Allied troops except the 29th;.Division. The battles-of May, June/and July fengendered this.feeling of Turkish superiority, and it wtjs only in the beginning iof t^e ; ,campaign that the .Turkish morale waß lower- 'than' the British."

Of the popular\'supposition-,that.;the success .or. failure of the" expedition held by ".&. thread, CaptaL Puleston writes:— "Many crises haye bTsen described by various writers'. \?hen ; ia. few moro men or'alittle more push\would Lave changed defeat'into victory.' With thy. exception of 7th and Bth''August at Suvla and Sari Bair, close analysis will -Skqw. that Jhe^Turks • ways had a sufficient margin jof7strength,~andv their reported hairbreadth 1 , escapes ■ were imaginary. The Turks at all times possessed 400,000 to 500,000 troops comparable in all respects to those brought against them; the Turkish^ Government was in the hands of an energetic trio who niight:/be danmedabroad, b '/who represented a~.d had thg confidence of the militant Turks, at horn- while the British Government wr.3 in the 'hands of amiable parliamentarians, dominated by the restless Churchill or the bewildered Kikchener. /on Sanders and Mustapha Kemal could command troops.; Enver could.furnish them. At uriticai moments British Generals could not command nor Kitchoner furnish trained men. Hamilton regarded war as; a sublime iorm of sport, was diffuse in his efforts, and turned readily from one project to another. Yon Sanders set his men a definite task within their capabilities, and held them to it, regardbss of losses. ' And it is the glory of the Turkish soldier that he spilt Nhis blood freely at a foreigner's behest to.save bis Capital." j-

Regarding ) o possiblo result of a successful pedition, the critic's viow is negative. /'Ha- the expedition succeeded," he writos, "some of tho expected benefitL would not have materialised. British recruits were ..rilling with wooden guns, British front-line soldiers w re using trench-made hand grenades, and British field artillery was starved when tho jtJritish Government offered to munition Bussia. France, better prepared tl i England, as late as 4th August, 1915, found it a material impossibility, an utter impossibility, to supply rifles to the Bussians, when in some of the front-line infantry regiments one-third of the, Bussian soldiers wero without rifles. . In Bussia the railroad system was so, dem^alised that it is doubtful if wheat could have been delivered in quantity to Black Sea ports, and at tho same time distributed throughout Bussia. The caus.s of this condition were so-deep rooted that it is more doubtful if a commission of super-organisers from tho Allies could have overcome them." Of Sir lan Hamilton, Captain Puloston writes:—"lan • Hamilton was tue military expert selected by Asquith and Haldane to convince an alarmed British public that universal, service (conscription) was unnecessary; a ruthless v fate promptly punished-Hamilton's crro- by denying him Constantinople for the mt' of a regular army --vhich conscription would have proyided."