Evening Post. FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1927. MR. CHEN PROTESTS

Evening Post, Volume CXIII, Issue 29, 4 February 1927, Page 8

Evening Post. FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1927. MR. CHEN PROTESTS

Mr. Eugene 'Chen is unable to negotiate "with a revolver at his head," and therefore he declines to negotiate at all. He has no objections to a revolver as such, but it must be in his own hand and presented at the other party's head, and then he can talk freely. The parleying which took place at Hankow at the beginning of the year was therefore entirely to his satisfaction. The British had no revolvers, or were afraid to use them. Mr. Chen and his friends were well armed, and being thus enabled to present their case without embarrassment achieved a brilliant diplomatic triumph. Why the Baldwin Government will not consent to an equally fair deal at Shanghai is a deplorable example of British perversitywhich is just as baffling and distressing to Mr. Chen as it is to M. Tchitcherin and. Mr. Ramsay, MacDonald. In the statement with which he has broken off his negotiations with Mr. O'Malley, Mr. Chen declares that his intentions are strictly •pacific and honourable, but that they have been frustrated by the "singular concentration of armed British forces" which is proceeding at Shanghai. It is not the mere concentration of forces to 'which he objects, but the fact that they are armed, and armed with weapons that, may possibly go off. Mr. Chen's indignation at this paradoxical departure from precedent recalls one of F. C. Gould's cartoons in ,which at the beginning of the South African War Mr. Balfour, as he then was, and his Minister of War were represented as contemplating the picture of a Boer rifleman on horseback. Mr. Balfour took this to mean that the enemy had rifles. "Yes, Arthur," was the reply, "and they have horses too."

The absurdity of Mr. Chen's emphasis on the fact that the forces which Britain is assembling at Shanghai are armed is, however, qualified by the precedent of Hankow. There the small British force was unable to prevent the British Concession from being rushed by the Chinese mob because it was forbidden to use- its arms. Its position might even have been less unenviable if it had been unarmed, since its weapons seem to have been of more use to its assailants than to its own members. But the handful of marines and sailors had to take their punishment without retaliation because bloodshed would have imperilled every British life in the Yangtse Valley, and an effective demonstration in force six or seven hundred miles from the sea was beyond the unaided power of Britain. By turning the other cheek to lawless violence and submitting to ejection from Hankow, Britain sustained a staggering blow to her authority in China and the Far East. A similar blow at Shanghai would have been absolutely fatal, so far at any rate as China was concerned. The British Government, therefore, wisely determined to make Shanghai the last ditch, and, while continuing her negotiations for an honourable settlement, to submit to no.more dictation.

Referring to the manifesto issued by the Nationalist Government on the 22nd January, Mr. Chen says that the future status of the International Settlement at Shanghai was covered by its declared intention to submit all disputed issues to negotiation, and that to occupy the Settlement by force "is not and never has been within the contemplation of the Government." On the face of it, this is a very satisfactory assurance, but the history of the last few months cannot be entirely wiped out by a stroke of the revolutionary pen. Has this manifesto obliterated every previous declaration of the Cantonese Government that it would be content with nothing less than the abrogation of every treaty and the expulsion of every foreigner? And was the occupation of the British Concession at Hankow as far beyond the contemplation of the Government a month ago as Mr. Chen declares the occupation of the International Settlement at Shanghai to be now? .And was the subsequent looting.of Kiukiang—a sort of halfway house between these two cities— also beyond its contemplation?From the standpoint of British security it is immaterial whether these things were contemplated and perpetrated by Mr. Chen's Government or whether it was powerless to stop them. Politely accepting Mr. Chen's assurance "that the Cantonese Government does not contemplate an attempt to capture Shanghai by force," the British Government nevertheless declines to abate its preparations, and for the sufficient reason that the uncontemplated things which happened at Hankow and Kiukiang might happen again at Shanghai, and that at Shanghai there would be no possibility of re-

trieval. The point is well put in an official or semi-official statement cabled from London to-day:

We could at Hankow give the Cantonese a chance of proving their ability to maintain ,order, because in the event of failure we could rapidly evacuate the city. But at Shanghai the position is quite different. EiMit thousand British people there could not bo safely evacuated from a population of a million and a half of Chinese if anti-British feeling, of which there lias been already plenty of evidence, were fomented until great masses of'the Chinese ran amuck. In view or.' those risks no British Government, of whatever complexion, dare risk being unready to defend her nationals' lives.

Even a Mac Donald Government could not face such a risk.