Evening Post. SATURDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1922. LEAGUE'S LIMITATIONS

Evening Post, Volume CIV, Issue 91, 14 October 1922, Page 6

Evening Post. SATURDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1922. LEAGUE'S LIMITATIONS

The 1 deputation from the local branch of the League of Nations Union which waited upon the- Educational Institute on Wednesday was able to urge both the noble ideal of the League and its excellent record of work during the last two years as reasons why it should have the sympathy and support of the, teachers. For the present the League represents hope rather than achievement, but many an organisation which has'lived to make itself indispensable has made a less promising start against its initial difficulties. The novelty of the experiment, the haste with which it was launched at the Peace Conference as formally a vital part of the Treaty yet essentially a sort of side-show which was overshadowed by the substantive provisions relating to defence, finance, and frontiers, the rigidity of the constitution which was thus devised with insufficient consideration, and the defection of ,the Great Power which had played the leading part in the moulding of it, were some of the initial handicaps. In spite of these difficulties, the League of Nations has done good work and promises to do more. Scepticism has declined in the presence of an accomplished fact, and a month ago we were told that even M. Poincare, who may be said to lead the advanced guard of militarism 1 in Europe, was inclining towards the League as a likelier .tribunal for settling the troubles of Europe than the Supreme Council of tbJB Allies. France was right in refusing to 'accept the guarantee of protection ' against aggression contained in the Covenant of the League, as a' sufficient protection for her north-eastern frontier, but she may be already seeing in the machinery of the League the possibilities of peaceful adjustment which M. Clemenceau's scepticism had failed to recognise when the matter was before the Peace Conference.

The distinction illustrates the limitations of the League which its best friends are doing much mischief by ignoring. .The League is no more qualified to take charge of the Dardanelles than to guard the Rhine, yet the suggestion has been gravely urged during the 1 past fortnight as a solution of the problem which brought Britain and Turkey to the brink of war. In its present form the League of Nations would not give the Dardanelles a much more effective protection than the invisible line which the Allies had laid off on the Asiatic side of the Straits. The Turks had agreed to accept this line as the limit of the neutral zone, but the agreement did not stop them, and the line did not stop them, when they thought themselves . strong enough to cross. They broke the agreement and entered the neutral zone. They would have taken Chanak and Galiipoli and as much more of Europe as they needed if there had been no British soldiers and warships in the way. What force could the League: of Nations intarpoae if the Turks desired to ignore the boundaries of any territory entrusted to the League as they ignored the line which marked the edge of the neutral zone or the Asiatic side?

The demand that the British Government,, juigiteiui p| ■.preparing, iw

resist, should refer its difference with Kemal to the League of Nations showed an equal disregard of realities. If the first part of this prescription had been adopted, the second would have become impossible. The withdrawal of the British resistance would have given Kemal all that he wanted, and there would have been nothing to refer. The task of the League would have been not arbitration but ejectment. Assuming that the arbitration had proceeded with one party in complete possession of "the subject matter of the. dispute and perfectly indifferent as to the result, Britain would have been no better off with- an award in her favour than before. The award itself would not eject Kemal. The blindest partisan of the League would hardly suggest that it could do so. Britain would be faced with the problem of ejectment, which, after the Turks had' had ample time to dig themselves in on both sides of the Straits, would be infinitely harder than keeping them out. In that enterprise any scrap of paper that the League of Nations might have issued would be worth about as much as a round of blank cartridge. Why will not the friends of the League see that in invoking its aid on such an occasion as this they are inviting it to attempt an impossible task and playing into the hands 'of its enemies? and that they are also playing into the hands of the enemies of their country when they use an appeal of this kind; as a. ground for staying its hand while the aggressive preparations of the other side continue ?

The Educational Institute was assured by the deputation from the League of N-ations Union that it was not a pacifist organisation. The assurance was welcome, because it was badly needed. At the Conference of the League of Nations Union several months ago, Professor Pringle put it's propaganda on the proper footing as a "great Imperial movement," but both before and since that meeting the Wellington branch has been given a distinctly .pacifist and anti-Imperial colour by the unfortunate utterances of some of its leading members. From its Wellington habitat the Dominion executive of the Union may be affected in the same way- The resolution adopted by the executive at its meeting on the sth instant spoke respectfully, if not approvingly, of both the glaring fallacies to which we have referred. After declaring the renewed conviction of the executive that there is safety for the world only in the principles, and policy of the League of Nations, the resolution proceeded: «■

It is significant that, while opinion seems to be divided at Home as to whether the question between Britain and Turkey might not have been submitted at onae to the League, there is a widespread conviction that the problem can be permanently solved only by handing oven.' th© control pf the Dardanelles, to the League.; . .

This widespread conviction is sheer folly unless it recognises that before the League is given the control of the Dardanelles it must bt> given the power to keep them. Lord Robert Cecil has spoken in an unguarded moment of providing the League with an air force. But of what use would an air force be at the Dardanelles or anywhere else without an army and a navy? And are those enthusiasts of pacifism prepared to make this provision? Even if they are, they would be wise not to scrap the British Empire until their all-powerful super-State is fully equipped.