PATH OF THE SEA

Evening Post, Volume CIV, Issue 2, 3 July 1922, Page 5

PATH OF THE SEA

WORK FOR NAVY LEAGUE

THE LESSONS OF THE PAST

QUESTION OF INTERVENTION,

A highly illuminating and valuable address in "The Navy League, the League of Nations, and the Washington Conference" was delivered by Professor Elder at the annual meeting of the Otago ■branch of the Navy League.

Discussing the two leagues, Professor .Elder said it seemed to him that there ■was in reality no such incompatibility ±>efcween the two Jeagiies as some critics imagined, and that it was quite a sane and logical view of the situation that the good citizen who had the interests of his country and of humanity at heart might give his support to both leagues. At the same time, that the greatest Powers of Europe had joined the league and to that extent had agreed to help one another to work towards peace, that the league had already done much for the cause of humanity in Europe, would not bliud the eyes of the serious individual to the fact that tie League of Nations Union .was faced with grave and serious limitations, and that for the Council of the League of Nations to givo practical effect to its judgments was a problem involving international issues most difficult of solution. Moreover, neither America nor Germany had joined the league, a point which again complicated the situation, while it was obvious that we had not. yet leached that ideal state in which the Great Powers of Europe were prepared to forget, even as they sit at the table of the League of Nations Conference, that they were great Powers, with huge military and naval forces behind them. In short; they could say only that the na • tions had the ideal of peace rather than the ideal of war now before them, but that the Theocratic inter-European state seemed far distant. ROCK ON WHIOH ETJBOPE SPLIT. Professor Elder traced the prototype of the League of Nations in the plan for organisation of Europe which was projected by the Tear, Alexander 1., at the close .of the great Napoleonic struggle, arguing that the experiment of the Holy Alliance was full of lessons for us to-day. The Alliance split upon the rock of the principle of intervention, and that rock lay ahead of the League of Nations. The question was not whether democracy or autocracy ought to prevail. It was to what extent one nation or a league of nations might intervene in the affairs of another sovereign State.. The case did not seem to have altered eince 1822, when Britain refused to give her sanction to the principle of intervention as enunciated by the autocrats of Europe. The difficulty still remained. It was easy, a_s< a matter of,fact, for nations, as for individuals, to move harmoniously in conference, so lone as general questions are being discussed, and general princi- j ■pies brouerht forward. The Italy Alliance came to grief upon a particular point. The particular and individual case afforded the testing ground,..and it was obviously difficult to induce great nations to refftr su"h cases to an international tribunal.' and to aereo beforelmnd ■to abida Try its rleoisinno. The question of, the particular dispute, the problem of the. (sanction behind international law, .for Mii'niHttw..there must be power; thn question of the curtailment- of national .RnvftTPi'srnty. since (submission to the lpa,<r>ie of nßf^sitT involves .some "urbailment'of the lihertv of individual i States, wnfl these were nrnVilo-ms towprn's thn solution of whifh we }">.& rvnlv. nornm to move. A-serious effort is lipins; marie to organise Deace.bnt, the very foundations of t-hp new structure.have "ot. vet. been laid. If the exiFtence of fhn.Navy Les-gne had. its iiKtifieatren befnrß the meeting of the P°ace Conference and before the setting ntJ of the Onm'Ml of *'ie Leacue of Nation?, >t had the same iusHJWtion now. They mieht locrically iput it. therefwe. fthat while the Lencnie of Nations cave hope for world .ii'wie in the future findw Reserving of nJI support, if on!v for t.he fact that the very existence of tho le<ynie was . a factor ■ma.lrinrr for peace, it had not yet sti-ccped-ed in effpotins such a revolution in world condition* or such-a' chancre in the treneral mentality' of bumanitv as- could justify us in relaxing our efforts towards tho majntononce of n-n. nffWent navy. LESSONS FROM WASHINGTON. The Washington Conference he said, was an argument not against, but for, the continued activity of the Navy Loagne. One main purpose of the league was to impress upon the public mind the necessity for the maintenance of a thoroughly efficient navy, and at the present moment of post-war relaxation of effort, when all minds were naturally turned towards schemes of -national economy and retrenchment, theTe was probably more need for propasanda work on the part of ■ the Navy League than at any time within the last decade.: It was certain that , unless we maintained an efficient navy, we should quickly find the path of peace , become more and more rouch and encumbered, until our very inefficiency and : 'weakness were sufficient reason for some ■ Power to seize the opportunity :' and thrust war upon us, however much ■we desire to avoid it. Definite limitations »had been set upon our naval armaments Tjy the Washington decrees, but within those limits there must be no relaxation of effort. It'was the very efficiency of the world's great navies and' particularly i of the navies of the United States and of Britain, which convinced the Powers of , the futility of continuing a strusslo for , /power which, coiikl not alter the relativoj position, and which must seriously em-* ■barrass the; peaceful activities of the ■nations which surrendered themselves to the mad race of armaments. Bui it was because the navies of United States., and of Britain were powerful and efficient that tho offer to consider- the question_ of (limitations of naval armaments met with ceneral acceptance. Had fchq navy of Britain been weak or inefficient, the whole attitudo of her competitors towards her must have been different, and the whole idea of a nayal holiday would have been ienored. To accept any sujfffestion that it was now sound policy to practise economy at the expense of the tn-avy was to ignore the essential facts. POINTING THE PATH OF THE SEA. Even were disarmament an accomplished fact, evon had tho British Navy passed out of commission, the. Navy League would still, have a sphere of groat influence and utility; first, in pointing Britain towards tho path of the. sea—for'sea power implied not only tho possession of ships of war but of wellequipped merchantmen in numbers sufficient for the needs of our Empire—and, secondly, in commemorating the achievement of the great British seamen of the past, whoso monument was the Empire itself. It might be argued that to continue to repeat the talc of sea-en-deavour and of Empire in the ago of peace to which we hoped the world was turning, vans to continue to glorify .war. In answer he would say, in the first place, that tho tale of sea power was much more than a mere story of sea fights.. It embraced the story of Itie daring and endurance of our merchantmen,, and the tale of the vision and sacrifice of the long line of sea explorers and adventurers from the men of Elizabeth to Scott and Shacklefcon. He should say, in the second place, that it <>vii,s possible to speak of War without idealising warfare —few uoukl exist ;tl the'present moment who wore inclined to tin that. It happened, unloUumv Wiy, thiil ,£iiu firmit pixl oi Uae Jiiit«y- ef mw<

kind was the history of war, and;, vie should gain nothing by seeking to hide such a fundamental point, either from ourselves or from our children. "WORSE THINGS THAN WAR." He felt inclined to pursue the subject further, and to say that men in the past have found that, evil though war was, there were worse things than war; things so evil that peace could not live beside them. Apart from- all this, the story of our great sailors and their deeds told much of patriotism and self-sur-render, of hardships cheerfully borne at the call of duty, and without hope of gain. It told not so much of physical as of moral force, as of triumphs of character, of the victory of noble spirit over frail bodies. The talo was not alone one of valour and of glory, it was more often one of patience, self-sacrifice, endurance, devotion to a cause. Such a theme had its value for the citizens of the Empire, not as a training for war, but as an education for peace. The efficiency of the Navy was an objectlesson for men engaged in every pursuit. Had we such efficiency in civil life the British people would be irresistible. The sense of discipline that controlled a fleet, the spirit of self-abnegation that triumphed over every ' adversity, the dogged determination to carry out one's duty—all these afforded worthy lessons, encouraging tho men of tho present to emulate the mighty dead and thus maintain the tradition of Empire. That the Navy League devoted itself, as one of its main functions, to the promotion of such an important part of the education of our patriotic youth, was in itself no mean function. That the league undertook that task was alone ample justification for its continual existence. (Applause.)