CASE FOR ABOLITION

Evening Post, Volume CII, Issue 152, 24 December 1921, Page 7

CASE FOR ABOLITION

VALUELESS IN FAIR WAR

LORD LEE'S HISTORICAL REVIEW,

lOHIIKD PRGSI ASSOCIATION. —COPTtMOHT.)

(*DST*AUAH • NSW ZSAI.AND CABU ASSOCUTIOK.) (Received December 24, 10 a.m.) WASHINGTON, 23rd December. Official.—A joint meeting of the Committee on the Limitation of Armaments and tho Sub-Committee on the Limitation of Naval Armaments was held today. The Chairman, in the morning, explained what had taken place in tho sub-committee on naval limitation, and a general discussion followed. In the afternoon Lord Lee explained that he understood the present position was that there v;as an agreement between the five of the Powers in regard to the ratio of capital ships, but that all the Powers were equally uncommitted on tho subject of submarines, small crafL and auxiliaries. He agreed with Mr. Debou that it was justifiable to'begin clearing the question on the principle of the future of submarines. He regretted that a difference of opinion had arisen in regard to submarines, the only question on which the British delegation was out of sympathy with the American ' ijroposals and perhaps also with the views of Franco and other Powers. He felt it was necessary to mention the following figures as the basis of his state- , raent. The existing tonnages of submarines were: United States, 83,500 tone, Britain, 80,500 tons; Japan, 32,200 tons; France, 28,360 tons; Italy, 18,200 tons. The American proposals allowed. ths following tonnages: United States, 90,000; Britain, 54,000, and Japan, France, Italy proportionate amounts. The new building was permitted under Uii. proposals as follows:—-United State 3, 6500 tons; Britain, 9500 tons; Japan, 'Jl,Boo tons; and France and Italy in proportion. i A RETROGRADE MOVEMENT. Lord Lee said he was bound to say it seemed strange to put before a Conference on the limitation of naval armaments proposals which were designed to increase a type of war vessel which, according to the British view, was open to more objection than surface capital ships. Moreover, he was certain that in consequence those Powers which possessed large mercantile marines would be compelled to increase the numbers of their anti-submarine C!|ift, thus' giving liUle relief to the overburdened'taxpayers and providing scant comfort to those who wished to abolish war. The view of the British was that what was required was not merely the restriction of submarines, but their total and final abolition. He would first like to reply in advance to the contention that the ' submarine was a legitimate weapon of iveak&v powers, and an effective and noonomical means of defence for an extensive coastline and maritime com-

munications. Both points conld be contested on technical grounds, and could lie clearly disproved by recent history. Attacks against an exposed coastline wp.re conducted by powerfully-armed and 'wifUy-movinc; vessels, fully equipped to -oast submarine attack. There was no Vanch of naval research that had more closely engaged the attention of experts than the counter offensive against submarines, and methods for thair detection, location, and destruction had gone so much further than the offensive power of the submarine that the submarine wag already a reduced value against modern surface ships. !

LESSONS OF THE WAR,, Germany had 375 submarines'during die war. and no less than 203 had been sunk. The U-boats' aceoniplishment in legitimate naval warfare were insignificant. In the early part of the war a lew obsolescent vessels were sunk,, but tho British Grand Fleet was not affected. Xot one single ship had been hit and sunk by submarine action. Light cruisers had swept all parts of the North Sea, undeterred by the submarines, and the passage of troops across the channel, to the number of fifteen millions, was not prevented. Not a man had been lost except on hospital ships; and submarines !uvd proved equally powerless against the passage of the United States troops across the Atlantic.

If the argument were sound that submarines were required for the defence of coast linos and communications, said Lord Lee, no country wanted them more than the British Empire. Partly because experience had shown them injffective for this purpose, Britain was ?ady to abandon them. REVERSING AN ARGUMENT, fhe war had made it abundantly clear .hat the greatest peril to maritime comnunicationa was the submarine and it vas specially great to a country that lid not possess command of the sea on .he .surface. Hence it was to the interest of any such Power to get rid of :)iia terrible menace. It must be remem;ered that the submarine was of no value is a defence against the submarine. Vgainst merchant ships alone it had .ichieved real success. Germany sank twelve million tons of shippin- of. the value of a thousand million dollars, and over 20,000 non-combatant men, women, and children had been drowned. It was true that this action had been taken in violation of all laws, human and Divine; but were we to assume that all other Powers wonld always be good? Tho menace of the submarine would only be Sot rid of by its total banishment from the sea. Limitation was not sufficient.

IF WAR COMES AGAIN. So long as submarines are allowed and a trained nucleus exi«ts, the fleet personnel could be rapidly .expanded in case of war. So long as submarines were allowed, there would be the greatest menace to the food supplies of Britain, which was by far the greatest anxiety of the British Government diuring the war. Some people said this vulnerability of Britain justified the retention of submarines, since by this means alone the Empire could •be stricken down; but the Empire would find means, if ever there was war, to secure itself i'rom starvation. It was Being suggested that the conditions of the late

va,r would never recur; but could. France li'ford to run the risk of a disaster to •sa near neighbour and only certain j!ly if the situation of 1914 was eveT * (".produced ? Answering the suggestion r-hafc other Powers not represented at the Conference might proceed with submarines, Lord Lee said means could be simply found for bringing Nemesis to fcho transgresßOT. THE COST—TO THE VICTIM. It was said that submarines were cheap; but surely the Conference did not deaire to make war cheap. When war was cheap it was almost continuous. Submarine war was cheap to tho aggressor, but not to the victim. Germany had never more than rcino or ten submarines at sea at a time; but Britain had to maintain on an average no less than thiree thousand anti-submarine siirfaco craft. Britain, welcomed tih.R proposals for the curtailing of capital ships. What would she gain if competition was merely transferred to siib- . marines? Not much. But if sabmarines were abolished, she could accept practically the whole Amerioan propo»

sada. The submarine was a weapon of murder, piracy, and the drowning of non-combatants, for offence only. It was valuable when used against merchant ships. He would not say it waa useless for defence; merely that it waa inefficient, and that its disadvantages exceeded the advantages except for war against the mercantile marine. BRITAIN'S LARGE OFFER.

The submarine was the only class of vessel tho Conference was- asked to give permission to thrive and multiply. It would greatly disappoint the British if they failed to persuade the Conference to get rid of this weapon, and to show the earnestness of Great Britain in this matter, Lord Lee pointed out that Britain possessed the most efficient submarine navy in the world, and was prepared to scrap the whole of this great fleet and disband- its personnel, provided tho other 'Powers did the same. That waa the British offer. It would, however, be useless to be blind to the facts of the position. He hardly hoped to carry with him all the Powers there, though he believed that in the end all the civilised Powers would come round to the British viewpoint. In^any event, the British did not intend that the settlement of the capital ship issue should be affected by failure. They would welcome any suggestions for reductions and restrictions of submarines, and in particular would await with the greatest interest tho proposals of their French colleagues. At the conclusion of Lord Lee's address, the Chairman, Mr. Hughes, said he did not intend to make any comment. He merely wished to interpolate a statement giving the American figures of submarines built and building, upon which the proposals were based. They were as follow:—United States, 95,000 tons; Britain, 82,464 tons; France, 42,----850 tons; Italy, 20,228 tons; Japan, 31,400 tons. The United States was prepared to reduce slightly.

-M. Sarraut paid a tribute to Lord Lee. He profoundly disapproved, he said, the barbarous use made of submarines in the late war. He recalled the fact that the juestion of the use of submarines was dealt with at Versailles and by the League of Nations. Public opinion had shown itself favourable to the continuance of their use. The French believed that the submarine was pre-eminently a defensive weapon. It could not be considered a dominating weapon, but it could be used under honourable conditions. It was certain that these conditions should be examined, discussed, and formulated in such a way as would determino the laws of naval warfare.

The French delegation felt called upon £o give approval to the use of the submarine under restrictions, and wished to point out that as submarines were subject to withdrawal from service it would be necessary for a navy to possess a number proportionate to the needs of national defence. The French wished, moreover, to observe that the use of large submarines was undoubtedly more humane, as they allowed the crews of torpedoed vessels to. bo rescued. The French were of opinion that submarines with a large cruising radius were necessary to' erasure and. assure the defence of distant colonies and possessions, as well Eis to maintain the safety of lines of communication.

Signor Schan?er said that Italian exports still considered the submarine an indispensable . weapon for defending coasts and protecting lines of communication. B[e was not authorised to associate himself with the proposals ' for abolition. Mr. Manihara said that Japan unconditionally opposed all abusive uses_ of the submarine, and felt that their legitimate use was justified. ONE CLEAR FACT. Mr. Hughes said he thought one effect had emerged clearly from the discussion. There was no disposition to operate on any plea of necessity for the illegal use of the submarine. There would be no difficulty in announcing to the world a statement that it was the intention of the nations at the Conference that, submarines must observe well-established international laws.. He understood tjiat the orux of tho controversy was as to the use of the submarine, as a weapon of defence. He could not agree that they were in the same position with regard to submarines as with regard to capital ships. With |he latter they were dealing with 3 _ potency competition, whereas submarines were cheaper and could be made by other nations not represented at the Conference. Mr. Hughes said the report of the American Advisory Committee was not the opinion of tho American Government, but as the opinion of a committee which was created to advise the delegation as to '"public opinion.

The report reviewed the conditions of submariiiß warfare against merchantmen in the late war, and declared that unlimited submarine warfare should be outlawed. Laws should be drawn up stating the methods and procedure approved for the use of submarines against combatant ships, and also as scouts to attack i raiding enemies. Submarines w^ire particularly an instrument for weak naval Powers. The United States was Weak in cruisers, and submarines could greatly assist them. The United States needed a large force of submarines •to protect her interests, especially in the outlying posses'Jons. Mr. Hughes promised that ho would consult the naval experts on Lord Lee's address.